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ABSTRACT 
 
 The way in which senior U.S. Army leaders such as the chiefs of staff define  
transformative change is important, especially if the meaning of that term is to be interpreted as 
originally intended by Army field grade officers. An Army chief of staff is responsible for 
creating a vision and establishing goals for the future, and field grade officers are responsible for 
pursuing that vision and those goals by implementing objectives that endeavor to arrive at the 
desired ends. By using both qualitative and quantitative methods, this research analyzes what 
each of the three chiefs of staff, who have served from 1999 through 2011, have said about their 
vision and goals for transforming the U.S. Army. Additionally, this research analyzes what field 
grade officers have said about transformation and how they view the Army has transformed over 
the last decade. The findings in this research indicate that there is a significant gap in how the 
chiefs of staff have defined transformation and how field grade officers view that same term. 
 This mixed-methods research employed a case study analysis of what the chiefs of staff 
have said about transformation; a survey of field grade officers who attend the U.S. Army 
Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and how they view 
transformation within the Army; and, individual open-ended interviews with CGSC field grade 
officer students, faculty and staff. The literature that largely informed this research centered on 
how difficult it is to implement significant change in a large bureaucratic organization; there will 
always be some level of goal failure. If transformation means different things to different groups 
within the U.S. Army then the vision and goals may not be achieved as originally intended; a 
problem that could potentially result in future increased national security risks.        
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 Since the end of the Cold War the United States Army has been in the process of 
identifying what it must look like in order to meet the threats of the 21
st
 Century. Over the last 
two decades the Army has been in the process of transforming itself from a ―heavy‖ fighting 
force necessary to counter the threats of an of an opposing peer (such as the Soviet Union), to 
that of a ―lighter‖ more lethal, and mobile force needed to defeat nontraditional and non-state 
threats (such as the Taliban and Al Qaeda).  The Army is similar to other bureaucracies in the 
United States Government where individuals may serve in very senior leadership positions for a 
relatively short period of time. When a large bureaucratic organization, such as the Army, is 
endeavoring to institute considerable organizational change, will successive senior leaders of the 
same organization be consistent in their vision of what the organization is to become? As 
important, will mid-level policy implementers within the Army‘s organizational structure 
understand that vision?  
 The Army is changing, but what is the nature of this change? The answer to this question 
is not only important for senior level policy makers but it is also relevant to those who 
implement policy within the Department of the Army. The purpose of this research is to 
determine if there is a gap between how senior Army leaders define ―Army Transformation‖1  
and the way in which Army lieutenant colonels and majors understand it. Do U.S. Army 
lieutenant colonels and majors understand Army Transformation in same way as both uniformed 
                                                   
1
 It is useful to have a working definition of what ―Army Transformation‖ means. According to 
the ―Army Transformation Roadmap 2003‖, page ix, ―Transformation is a process that shapes 
the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of 
concepts, capabilities, people and organizations…The Army‘s Transformation Strategy has three 
components: the transformation of Army culture, the transformation of processes – risk 
adjudication using the Current to Future Force construct, and the development of inherently joint 
transformational capabilities.‖ 
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and civilian senior Army leaders do, notably the three Army Chiefs of Staff who have served 
since 1999? Might there exist a gap between how the senior Army leadership endeavors to 
achieve the ―right‖ force and how the middle-level officers view transformation? My dissertation 
seeks to answer these questions empirically. The ability of the Army to transform to the ―right‖ 
force should be of significant interest and importance to both policy makers and national security 
experts. 
Implications of U.S. Army Transformation 
 The U.S. Army is a large bureaucratic organization and may not respond well to   
significant organizational change over a relatively short period of time. As will be discussed in 
Chapter 5, the Army appears to be most effective in incorporating change during times of war. 
Historically, however, the Army was not adequately prepared as it entered into most wars of the 
twentieth century. Harold R. Winton (2000) argues that one of the consistent themes of military 
history is the lack of preparedness of the military at the onset of war. While the U.S. Army may 
have superior technological and weapon systems capability, it may not possess the capability to 
fight a war on the terms of a sub-state threat. As will be discussed in this dissertation, the Army 
preferred to fight a conventional war in Vietnam and had a difficult time adjusting to the 
enemy‘s counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy. The Army had to re-learn that same lesson again 
beginning in 2003 in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army‘s conventional weapons systems 
derived largely from the World War II model of conflict may not be appropriate for modern day 
adversaries. If the Army had been willing or capable of changing in order to meet prospective 
non-conventional threats such as COIN then rather recent outcomes, including the Vietnam War, 
may have ended more favorably. In order for the Army to be ready for future conflicts likely 
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scenarios and expectations may need to be considered well in advance and then effectively 
planned for accordingly. 
 The U.S. Army prepared for war in the 20
th
 Century based almost exclusively on a large-
scale conventional threat, most notably defeating the Soviet Union in a European engagement. 
That threat appears to no longer exist. However, the U.S. Army must now plan for future conflict 
in a more uncertain world. It is difficult to determine what any future confrontation with a large 
nation-state, such as China, may include. According to Zeb Bradford and Federic Brown (2008) 
U.S. national security policy must include more specific factors that include the ability to 
function effectively within the environment that represents the 21
st
 Century battlefield. Bradford 
and Brown (2008) argue that any new strategy and any new missions assigned to the Army must 
realistically acknowledge that many of the assumptions of previous national security policies are 
no longer valid. According to these authors, the problems that are faced by the Army are more 
complex and more difficult to plan for (Bradford and Brown 2008). This complexity and 
difficulty makes it imperative that the U.S. Army plan appropriately. The national security 
planning process is vital in determining the proper roles and missions of the U.S. Army.  
However, Amy Zegart (1999) argues that with a national security apparatus that was inadequate 
during the Cold War, how can the U.S. expect to be any better at planning for new and 
unfamiliar threats? Without a clear concept of what the Army‘s role is in national security, the 
more difficult any planning may be and the more assumptions senior Army leadership may be 
forced to make. This reality should be of considerable importance to both public policy makers 
and defense analysts. 
 As the Army, or all of the military branches for that matter, prepares for future 
contingencies it may be important that the goals and objectives that the Army is seeking to 
4 
 
achieve are made clearer to field grade officers, and indeed to as many within that branch of the 
military as practicable. As will be discussed in this dissertation, many of the Army field grade 
officers today will be in senior leadership positions in the next 10 – 20 years.  It may be very 
important, if not crucial, for them to understand the reasoning and implications of the planning 
processes that are occurring at the present time. For instance, new weapon systems take a long 
time to develop, and the weapon systems that are available are the ones that are used for war at 
that time. The justification for a new weapon system is based on some perceived threat that must 
be confronted. Many of the Army field grade officers serving at the present time have 
considerable combat experience. Their thoughts and ideas of what is needed in order to confront 
the enemy of the twenty-first Century may be important as the Army plans ahead. Hopefully the 
challenges that the U.S. Army faces in transforming for the future will be brought to the attention 
of policy makers. 
U.S. Army Transformation Research Goals 
 A summary of how the research will fit into the policy environment will be addressed. 
Policy implementation, problem definition, stakeholder analysis and the role of research in 
policy making are all relevant public policy components pertaining to this research.  
Furthermore, this research may provide policymakers with information that might be useful in 
identifying any gap that might exist between policy goals and policy implementation.  In 
addition, this research can provide a policy advocacy mechanism if there appears that a gap does 
indeed exist between how the senior-level Army leadership defines ―Transformation‖, and how it 
is being perceived by field grade officers.  By determining the nature of this potential gap this 
research could inform policymakers as to how to best address it.  
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 There are two additional questions this dissertation seeks to answer. The first simply asks 
how do U.S. Army planners, in fact, define ―Army Transformation.‖  Army planners are 
specialists who take the directives that are provided by senior-Army leaders and express those 
directives by way of changes to Army doctrine and organizational structure. The second asks 
whether Army Transformation needs to be defined in the first place. By answering the primary 
research question, and seeking to answer the two additional questions, it is hopeful that this 
research will be a useful tool that the U.S. Army might consider as it plans for the future. 
 In additional to addressing the practical questions listed above, this research should add 
to the body of knowledge centering on the use of Principal-Agent Theory. Specifically, this 
dissertation will examine how difficult implementing significant change in a large hierarchical 
and bureaucratic organization can be. Principals seek to manipulate and mold the behavior of 
agents so that they will act in a manner consistent with the principal‘s preferences (Waterman 
and Meier 1998, 174; Moe 1984, 756; Sowers 2005, 388; Shapiro 2005, 271).  If the Chief of 
Staff of the Army is ―the principal‖ and the field grade officers are ―the agents‖, then an 
assumption might be that the field grade officers would carry out the desires of the Army Chief 
of Staff. 
 Following the events of 9/11, President George W. Bush expressed the need for 
transformation this way: ―In September 1999, I said that America was entering a period of 
consequences that would be defined by the threat of terror, and that we faced a challenge of 
military transformation. That threat has now revealed itself, and that challenge is now the 
military and moral necessity of our time.‖(Bush 2001). Following that statement by the 
President, the Bush Administration had identified transformation as a major goal for the 
Department of Defense (DoD) and has used the concept to justify many initiatives to Congress. 
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Ronald O‘Rourke (2006) mentioned that some observers were concerned that the Bush 
Administration‘s regular use of the term ―transformation‖ had relegated the term into an ―empty 
slogan or ―buzz phrase‖.  Others were concerned that the Administration had invoked the term as 
an all-purpose rhetorical tool for justifying its various DoD proposals, whether the proposals 
were directly related to transformation or not, and instead proceeded to tie the concept of 
transformation to the need to fight the war on terrorism (O‘Rourke 2006, 38). In light of these 
concerns, there does exist the possibility that Transformation is merely a symbolic effort, 
hindering the ability of senior Army leadership from succeeding in effecting change within the 
organization. 
 Significant attempts to dramatically overhaul the U.S. Army are nothing new. Several 
efforts to redesign the government‘s capacities to deal with the new security challenges have 
been undertaken in the last 25 years, including the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, the 1995 
Commission on Roles and Missions, the National Defense Panel of 1997, the Hart-Rudman 
Phase III Report of the U.S. Commission on National Security, and, the final report of the 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (i.e. the 9/11 Commission) 
(Murdock, et al. 2005, 139). As part of their focus, each of these efforts sought to significantly 
change the structure and operations of the U.S. Army. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 
provided for the most consequential and successful example of defense reform in the Cold War 
era (Murdock, et al 2005, 140).  
      U.S. Army Transformation Since 1999 
 General Eric K. Shinseki was committed to transforming the Army as soon as he became 
Chief of Staff in 1999. He believed that the reason it had not been accomplished since the end of 
the Cold War, some nine years earlier, was that the originators of such previous initiatives had 
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left office without completing it. He believed that by the time he departed as Chief of Staff, his 
efforts would be so firmly rooted that transformation would have to occur under future leaders 
(Kagan 2006). 
 An important component to transformation is mobility. In testimony before the Senate 
Armed Services Committee, General Shinseki indicated that the Army must be able to deploy a 
combat-capable brigade anywhere in the world within 96 hours after receipt of an order to 
execute lift-off; a division on the ground within 120 hours; and, five divisions in 30 days 
(Shinseki 2000, 6). The forces would need to be ―light‖ enough to deploy, lethal and survivable 
enough to fight and win, agile enough to transition from peacemaking to war-fighting and back 
again, and versatile enough to enforce peace or fight wars. And they would be lean and efficient 
enough to sustain themselves, whatever the mission (Shinseki 2000, 6). 
 General Shinseki‘s vision for the transformed force was: ―Soldiers on point for the 
Nation transforming the Army into a strategically responsive force that is dominant across the 
full spectrum of operations (Shinseki 2000, 5).‖ In order to achieve this vision, he indicated that 
it would require the entire Army to commit to a comprehensive transformation. It would be 
necessary to immediately turn the Army into a full spectrum force that is strategically responsive 
and dominant at every point on the spectrum of operations. He added that it would be necessary 
to invest in new equipment that will  stimulate the development of doctrine, organizational 
design, and leadership training as a search is made for the new technologies that will deliver the 
new materiel (this refers to weapon systems and equipment), for the objective force (Shinseki 
2000, 8-9). 
 General Shinseki expressed the need to invest in new weapon systems and equipment that 
would drive changes in doctrine as well as organizational design and training (Shinseki 2000, 7).  
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Although General Shinseki described the full-spectrum force, it may be difficult for the rank and 
file to synthesize the true meaning. In other words, senior leaders set broad objectives regarding 
doctrine, strategy, operations, tactics, and procurement. Subordinates are responsible for 
implementing more specific tasks to achieve those objectives. The success of the Army is 
dependent on all systematic levels within its structure operating more or less in unison. However, 
senior leaders know more about what they want to achieve and the subordinates know more 
about their tasks.   The conflict caused by the separation of responsibilities between different 
levels of a bureaucracy, such as in the case of the Army, may result in an implementation failure, 
as the principals (the senior army leadership) are frustrated with the efforts of the agents (the 
field-grade officers)  (see Stulberg, Salomone and Long 2007, 38).  Therefore, this research will 
focus on how transformation was formally initiated in the U.S. Army in 1999, and how 
transformation, under generals Eric K. Shinseki, Peter J. Schoomaker and George W. Casey, Jr., 
has been defined since that time, both by senior Army leaders and field grade officers. 
Problems in Defining Army Transformation 
 The term ―Army Transformation‖ appears to have different meanings to different people 
within the U.S. Federal Government and within the structure of the U.S. Army. Until there is an 
understanding of what the term actually means throughout the rank and file of the Army, 
planning for and achieving the end-state readiness necessary for supporting foreign policy 
objectives may be difficult to achieve. James Carafano (2004) describes what tasks future U.S. 
Army forces must be able to perform: ―homeland security; assisting other countries in 
developing anti-terrorism measures; war fighting, including conventional military operations as 
well as special forces missions such as raids, hostage rescue, search and recovery, and non-
combatant evacuations; and post conflict operations (pg. 3). Carafano goes on to say that ―long-
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term needs to fight the global war on terrorism, and meet other demands as well, will be difficult 
to predict. Unlike determining requirements to fight major regional conflicts, future 
counterterrorism operations could vary significantly in number, size, scope and duration 
(Carafano 2004, 3). In the absence of clear mission goals for the Army of the future, or of the 
21
st
 Century, how is it possible for there to be a clear definition of what ―Army Transformation‖ 
is and, by inference, for there to be a universal understanding of what  the Army is to become in 
the 21
st
 Century? Not only may there be a significant gap in what Army Transformation means 
among senior government officials, there may also be a significant gap that exists in how the 
term is defined by the Army rank and file. 
 If this mindset still exists, then there may be little progress being made in defining ―Army 
Transformation‖, and therefore effective implementation of Army Transformation could be 
falling short of the intended goal. If there is not a clear definition of what ―Army 
Transformation‖ means, this could be more indicative of some level of goal ambiguity that may 
exist. Y. H. Chun and H. G. Rainey (2005) define goal ambiguity as ―the extent to which an 
organizational goal or set of goals allows leeway for interpretation, when the organizational goal 
represents the desired future state of the organization…therefore, organizational goal loses clear 
meaning and becomes ambiguous when it invites a number of different interpretations‖ (Chun 
and Rainey 2005, 2). 
 As addressed previously, there appears not to be a single interpretation available of what 
―Army Transformation‖ means, for purposes of changing the U.S. Army from what it was in the 
20
th
 Century to what it may need to be for effectively addressing the threats of the 21
st
 Century. 
The purpose of this research is to address three specific questions that will determine whether a 
―gap‖ currently exists between top-level policy makers (notably, the three Army Chiefs of Staff 
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over a period of over ten years) and Army planners and implementers (specifically, Army 
lieutenant colonels and majors). This gap may exist because there may not be a relevant or an 
acceptable definition of what ―Army Transformation‖ means. There are literal definitions 
available: Army Transformation can be defined as large-scale, discontinuous, and possibly 
disruptive changes in military weapons, concepts of operations (i.e. approaches to war-fighting), 
and organization that are prompted by significant changes in technology or the emergence of 
new and different international security challenges‖ (O‘Rourke 2006, 3).   From a strategic or 
visionary level this definition provided by O‘Rourke may be meaningful, but is it definitive and 
clear enough for policy implementers?  
 As mentioned above, the primary research question addressed in this dissertation is 
simply to determine if field grade officers (i.e. lieutenant colonels and majors) understand Army 
Transformation in the same way as the three Army Chiefs of Staff who have served since 1999. 
A secondary question examines how Army planners define Transformation. The reason that this 
question is relevant has to do with the lengthy amount of time that is involved in developing 
weapons systems that are necessary to defeat future threats. Policymakers must recognize that 
the decisions that are made now, in the name of Army Transformation, will be the ones that 
unidentified future political leaders will have to live with for carrying out foreign policy 
decisions years from now. Kevin Reynolds (2006) indicates that it takes anywhere from 12 to 20 
years to develop a weapon system. Since foreign policy objectives may change every four years, 
there is likely to be a ―policy lag‖ in planning horizons, budgeting cycles, and predictability 
forecasts between foreign policy/national security development on the one hand and weapon 
systems/force structure on the other (Reynolds 2006, 2). 
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 A third question challenges the need to define Army Transformation in the first place. 
Specifically, does Army Transformation need to be defined? Does the term indicate that there is 
some sort of end-state to be achieved, or does the term mean that Army Transformation is a 
process and that the journey may continue indefinitely?  If policy makers themselves are subject 
to wholesale change every six to eight years then should there be a specific concern of what 
―Transformation‖ means to implementers in DoD in general, and the U.S. Army in particular? 
Policy decisions are governed by the structure of the federal government and its political 
processes, whereas weapon system and force structure decisions tend to be relatively isolated 
from this process (Reynolds 2006, 21). Reynolds (2006) argues that foreign policy and national 
strategy formulation systems and force structure planning and execution decisions, on the other 
hand, revolve around the military‘s preferences (Reynolds 2006, 21). Moreover, foreign policy 
and national security decisions have greater visibility or are more salient to the public, while 
weapon systems are seldom subjected to public scrutiny (Reynolds 2006, 21).  So if politics and 
defense planning are to co-exist as just described, is there even a need for a definition of Army 
Transformation? 
 Unless Army Transformation, as a policy problem, is well understood and clear, then 
political forces throughout the large organization will use their ―re-definition‖ as a tool to gain 
advantage over other groups (Portz 1994).  Any problem definition, in the context of a large 
military organization, will be interpreted in a framework of standardization in order to guard 
against uncertainty and the possibility of unchartered and uncoordinated action.  The Army, like 
other branches of the American military, is cautious about change and the idea of introducing a 
new means to achieving new ends. This presents a significant challenge since transformation 
involves a dynamic process of translating vague visions of war into mature, innovative outcomes 
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(Stulberg, Salomone and Long 2007, 14). A ―vague vision‖ provided by senior leaders would be 
a reason for why political forces would be able to define the problem in terms that best suits their 
cause.   On the other hand, if everyone understood Army Transformation in the same context, 
this would reduce the amount of discretion that may occur within the Army bureaucracy as a 
result of an ill-defined problem. 
The U.S. Army as a Bureaucracy 
 The Army, as an organization within the Department of Defense, is a part of the largest 
bureaucracy in the U.S. government. In any large bureaucratic organization, it may be difficult to 
implement new policy or direction throughout the organization and expect everyone to have a 
clear understanding of what needs to be accomplished in the same way. Since the messages from 
the three Chiefs of Staff have been largely consistent with regard to transforming the Army over 
the last ten years, then there might be an implementation problem associated with achieving 
large scale change.  James Q. Wilson (1989) says that here are two ways to look at government 
agencies: from the ―top down‖ and from the ―bottom up‖.  In the ―top down‖ approach, there is a 
requirement for senior leaders to know what is going on day-to-day. Goals of an agency can be 
precisely specified in advance and progress towards those goals can be readily measured by its 
top officials. In other cases of the ―top-down‖ approach, leaders do not assume that they know 
exactly what the members of the agency do. Leaders assume that organizational members‘ 
behavior results from rules, laws and organizational structure, and so leaders change that 
behavior, when seeking organizational change, by changing the rules, laws and structures 
(Wilson 1989, 11). 
 The U.S. Army is a hierarchical organization that identifies actors, whether uniformed or 
civilians, based largely on the rank they hold.  There is a significant sociological and status 
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distance between the ―four star‖ level and the lieutenant colonel and major level within the 
Army. The differences in rank and the deference accorded to people of different rank operate, by 
the clear and obvious differences in rank in a very hierarchical organization such as the U.S. 
Army, as a divisive element in many organizations by filtering and distorting communications 
upward and downward. Subordinates may only tell their superiors what they think they want to 
hear, when given perhaps a rare opportunity to convey information (Kaufman 2006, 69). Senior 
leaders tend to be effectively insulated from operating levels of the organization. This insulation 
may occur due directly to differences in rank, or the status that is associated directly with rank. 
Additionally, many leaders may not be receptive to ideas provided by subordinates; the thought 
that an idea coming from someone of lower rank will not be treated with the same respect or 
seriousness as one coming from a person of higher status. Senior leaders, on the other hand, 
make casual comments, inquiries, and tentative observations that may be emphasized, 
reinterpreted and applied in ways never intended (Kaufman 2006, 69). If Kaufman is correct, and 
if Army Transformation has not occurred as General Shinseki had intended, there might be a 
communications gap that exists between senior Army leaders and field grade officers.   
 Since the U.S. Army is a very large hierarchical organization, there is some distance 
between senior Army leaders, with the four-star chief of staff residing in the Pentagon, and field 
grade officers serving in assignments throughout the world. Kaufman (2006) refers to this 
separation in terms of both a ―status distance‖ and a ―social distance‖.  Kaufman says that 
difference in rank creates a ―social distance‖ that may serve as a discriminator in that it acts as a 
filtering element which may distort information traveling upward and downward throughout the 
organization. Superiors are not always receptive to ideas submitted by subordinates because 
those ideas are not typically received with the same level of respect as those ideas coming from 
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someone with senior status. Conversely, observations and comments provided by senior level 
officers may be re-interpreted, emphasized, and applied in ways, by field grade officers, not 
necessarily intended by senior leaders (Kaufman 2006, 69-71). 
 Kaufman (2006) goes on to argue that there is also a ―social distance‖ at work in a large 
hierarchical organization. There are attitudinal barriers that may appear when people perceive 
communications in a totally different manner than what was intended. Even people serving 
within the same organization may have difficulty understanding the intended message based on 
their specialties and assignments within the organization. Social distance, therefore, can result in 
variants of the same policy being executed within the organization, when in fact the senior level 
leader had only intended that only one be pursued (Kaufman 2006, 70). 
 Following on Kaufman‘s description of distance, James Q. Wilson (1989) says that 
change which is consistent with existing tasks within the organization will be accepted, and those 
that require a redefinition of tasks will be resisted (Wilson 1989, 222). The inference here is that 
field grade officers might be able to close both Kaufman‘s ―status distance‖ and the ―social 
distance‖, when a task is consistent with what they are used to performing. Conversely, the 
inference is that if a new task is unclear, then there is a possibility that it will be misinterpreted at 
best, or rejected at worse. 
 John P. Kotter (1996) argues that if transformation is to be successful within any 
organization, then executives (i.e. senior Army leadership) need to lead the overall effort and 
leave most of the managerial work and the leadership of specific activities to their subordinates 
(i.e. field grade officers). Kotter adds that good leadership from above helps everyone understand 
the big picture, the overall vision and strategies, and how each of the projects, being managed 
and led by subordinates, fits into the whole transformation process (Kotter 1996, 140-141). 
15 
 
Kotter‘s view of successful transformation might not be attainable if there is some status or 
social distance that distorts communications between senior leaders and subordinates, or if the 
transformative tasks are inconsistent with tasks already being performed by subordinates 
(Kaufman 2006; Wilson, 1989). 
 Any U.S. Army Transformation goals initiated in 1999 by General Eric Shinseki may 
have been altered in January 2001 with a new presidential administration and a new Secretary of 
State beginning in January 2001. Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld will be 
remembered by his attempt to transform the military into a lighter, nimbler force better able to 
take advantage of new technology and respond to new threats.  He may be given credit for 
shaking up an institution perceived as being inflexible that, if left to its own devices, would 
prefer to endlessly refight the 1991 Gulf War (Boot, 2005, 103).  This assertion may or may not 
be accurate, but the message is clear: the Army is a bureaucracy defined by a culture that will 
implement change within the context of its existing framework. That existing framework 
includes the relationship between senior Army leaders and the lieutenant colonels and majors, 
mid-career officers who play a significant role in implementing policies within the Army. 
 Policy Implications 
 The research question posed in this research, when answered, should serve as an input to 
senior level policy makers within Congress, and the various departments within the executive 
branch such as the Defense Department, Department of Homeland Security, State Department 
and the National Security Agency. Reynolds (2006) mentioned that neither the executive nor the 
legislative branches of government have the time or the inclination to master the arcane 
concepts, processes and jargon associated with weapon systems development. But, those two 
branches of government should understand how policy decisions are subject to played out in the 
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bowels of the Pentagon in the name of Army Transformation. The Senate and House Armed 
Services Committees would benefit from the results of this study for purposes of providing 
clarity to policy goals. The reason that Congress, in particular, is such an important target 
audience for this dissertation centers around the need for perhaps a greater oversight of the 
military‘s decision making process. As Reynolds (2006) provides, this is important for purposes 
of reducing the inconsistencies both between and within presidential administrations (Reynolds 
2006, 49). 
Limitations of the Study 
 The purpose of this research is to explore the gap that may exist between senior U.S. 
Army leadership and field grade officers in defining the term Army Transformation. The purpose 
of this research will not be to provide a definition for Army Transformation, but the purpose will 
instead seek to determine if policy implementers believe that there is clear definition already in 
existence; to understand how U.S. Army planners define transformation; and, in the absence of a 
definition, to determine whether there is even a need for a definition of Army Transformation in 
the first place. 
 This research will not provide a course of action for how policy-makers should proceed 
with Army Transformation strategies, whether those strategies are based on clear policy 
guidance or not. This research will also not provide a solution for bringing U.S. Army planning 
in line with foreign policy or national security priorities. Resolving any planning gap that may 
exist between ―defense policy‖ and ―foreign policy‖ is well outside the scope of this work. 
 The purpose here, instead, is to provide answers to the three research questions. The 
answers will provide a good starting point for policy leaders as they consider how the Army is 
being transformed to meet future national security threats. Congress, in particular, should have a 
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good appreciation for how transformation is being implemented, or not, within the Defense 
Department. Perhaps the most important aspect of defining Army Transformation has to do with 
agency discretion. The more ambiguous terminology is in describing a policy the more likely 
there is a chance of ―goal ambiguity‖, which could result, especially in the case of Defense 
planning, in inefficiencies that could cost billions of dollars and may or may not result in 
appropriate weapon systems being developed along with the requisite force structure. 
Research Approach and Overview of Relevant Work 
 The constructivist paradigm is the best framework to use in answering the research 
question associated with this study. As in the case of Army Transformation, elements of what 
that term means, as argued in Hatch (2002), is shared across social groups, and multiple realities 
may exist that are inherently unique because they are constructed by individuals who experience 
the world from their own vantage points. Realities are understood in the form of abstract mental 
constructions that are experientially based, local and specific (Hatch, 2002, 15). This may be 
especially true for U.S. Army planners who make their decisions on their interpretations of 
public policy.  The constructivist paradigm argues that knowledge is symbolically constructed 
and not objective; that understandings of the world are based on conventions; that truth is, in 
fact, what we agree it is (Hatch, 2002, 15). This description of the constructivist paradigm may 
be useful as this research proceeds to determine if there actually is a clear definition of Army 
Transformation. 
 The products of the constructivist paradigm are important for purposes of this study. Case 
studies or rich narratives that describe the viewpoints of senior U.S. Army leadership are keys to 
understanding why field grade officers may have the views they do regarding Army 
Transformation.  Sources that address changes in bureaucracy will be reviewed in order to frame 
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the significance of ―transforming‖ an organization the size of the U.S. Army.  Because the 
discretion of how the Army is to be transformed rests primarily with that service‘s Chief of Staff, 
and the implementation of that directive is carried out largely by field grade officers, the 
Principal-Agent Theory will be used for purposes of addressing the three research questions. The 
Army Chiefs of Staff comments on Army Transformation will be reviewed in papers and 
documents published by think tanks, such as the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS); the Congressional Research Service (CRS); the General Accountability Office (GAO); 
and, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). This review will be conducted in order to 
determine what information the legislative branch might be using for purposes of viewing Army 
Transformation efforts by the senior leadership of the Army.   
 A review of Government documents that have specific language that justifies priorities 
for transformation authorization and appropriation purposes will be helpful as well. Specifically, 
the President‘s Budget (PB) includes the Defense budget and priorities, as well as the National 
Security and Foreign Affairs budgets.  The term ―justifies‖ is the operative term here. The 
agency and department financial and program experts are the ones that put the respective budgets 
together and provide for the argument in support of, in this case, transformation funding.  
However, if their definition of ―Army Transformation‖ is inconsistent with the intent of the 
policy, then a gap may exist in critical Government planning documents. 
Organization of this Research 
 This introductory chapter serves the purpose of identifying why this research is important 
to senior Army planners. It also sets the stage for the fact that a significant gap may actually exist 
between how senior Army leadership defines ―Army Transformation‖ and how mid-career, field 
grade officers define ―Army Transformation‖. Why is this important? Any gap that may exist has 
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not only costly fiscal implications, but the gap could suggest that significant change remains very 
difficult to execute and that large bureaucracies, such as the U.S. Army, have a way to go in 
order to create mechanisms to facilitate changes in organizational goals. 
 Chapter 2 will provide an overview of military transformation and how significant 
change is difficult to achieve in a large bureaucratic organization. The chapter will highlight the 
complexities of principal-agent relationships which are critical in achieving the organizational 
synergy and buy-in necessary for a ―transformed‖ bureaucracy. 
 Chapter 3 is the literature review that will provide the theoretical basis for addressing 
significant change in a large bureaucratic organization. This chapter will address the literature 
that explains why the U.S. Army is having a difficult time in achieving its transformational 
goals. The literature review will provide an overview of the research techniques employed in this 
study and why they are relevant for answering the research questions. Finally, the literature 
review will highlight the relevancy of the principal-agent model for purposes of changing a large 
organization such as the U.S. Army. 
 Chapter 4 describes the methodology used in this research. This is a mixed-methods 
research project in that it combines case study analysis with open-ended interviews and a survey 
of field-level U.S. Army officers. The case study will focus on directives provided by the senior 
Army leadership. The interviews and survey will identify how lieutenant colonels and majors 
interpret those senior level directives. 
The open-ended interviews will be conducted with eight lieutenant colonels and majors selected 
by the administrative staff at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at 
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The survey will be issued by the CGSC Quality Control Office using 
the centers internal e-mail system. 
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 Chapter 5 will be the case study pertaining to the three Army chiefs of staff that served 
from 1999 – 2011.  The case study is collected from speeches, senior level policy statements, and 
testimony before Congress. Chapter 6 will be the results and analysis that will be conducted in 
order to use the survey results and the open-ended interview responses to answer the research 
question. The data analysis will combine the qualitative analysis associated with senior level 
directives with the more quantitative data resulting from the survey and the open-ended 
interviews. Chapter 7 will be the conclusion of the study. A synthesis of the data and literature 
will occur that will demonstrate the significance of any gap that may exist in how senior Army 
leaders and mid-career field grade officers define Army transformation.  Any gap that may exist 
will also be addressed in order that senior level policy makers may have at least one more data 
point to consider for future considerations. 
 
Conclusion 
 There is an inherent need to define and to understand what is meant by ―Army 
Transformation. Without a clear definition of transformation, there will continue to be a ―goal 
ambiguity‖ and waste associated with pursuing programs and priorities that may or may not 
support foreign policy and national security priorities.   Agencies pursuing individual interests in 
the name of ―transformation‖ cannot be the answer to a top level policy matter. The policy needs 
to be clear and concise so that agencies can be held accountable for fiscal and performance goals. 
 The desired outcome of this research is to provide empirical information to policy 
makers, at all levels of Government, which will assist in effectively addressing the problem of 
defining ―Army Transformation‖.  
  
21 
 
References 
Boot, Max. 2005. ―The Struggle to Transform the Military.‖ Foreign Affairs 84 (March/April): 
103-118. 
Bradford, Jr., Zeb B. and Frederic J. Brown. 2008. America’s Army: A Model for Interagency 
Effectiveness. Westport: Praeger Security International. 
 
President George W. Bush. 2001. ―The World Will Always Remember September 11.‖ 
December 11. Speech at the Citadel. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011211-1.html 
 
Carafano, James J. 2004. ―Missions, Responsibilities, and Geography: Rethinking How the 
Pentagon Commands the World.‖ No. 1792, Washington, D.C.: The Heritage 
Foundation. 
Chun, Y.H. and H.G. Rainey. 2005. ―Goal Ambiguity in U.S. Federal Agencies.‖ Journal of 
Public Administration 15: 1-30. 
Dombrowski, Peter J. and Eugene Gholz. 2006. Buying Military Transformation: technological 
innovation and the defense industry. New York: Columbia University Press.  
Hatch, J.A. 2002. Doing Qualitative Research in Education Settings. Albany: State University of 
New York Press. 
 
Kagan, Frederick W. 2006. Finding The Target: The Transformation of American Military 
Policy. New York: Encounter Books. 
Kaufman, Herbert. 2006. The Forest Ranger: A Study in Administrative Behavior. Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
  Kotter, John P. 1996. Leading Change. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
Moe, Terry M. 1984. ―The New Economics of Organization.‖ American Journal of Political 
Science 28: 739-777. 
Murdoch, Clark A., Michele A. Flournoy, et al. 2005. ―The Quest for Reform, Beyond  
 Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic 
 Era.‖ Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies. 
 
O‘Rourke, Ronald. 2006. Defense Transformation: Background and Oversight Issues for 
Congress. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress. Order Code RL 32238. 
Washington, D.C.: The Library of Congress. 
 
22 
 
Portz, John. 1994. ―Plant Closings, Community Definitions and the Local Response.‖ In David 
A. Rochefort and Roger W. Cobb (Eds.), The Politics of Problem Definition: Shaping the 
Policy Agenda (pp. 45). Lawrence: University of Kansas Press. 
Reynolds, Kevin P. 2006. ―Defense Transformation: To What, For What?‖ Strategic Studies 
Institute, The U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, November. 
 
Shapiro, Susan P. 2005. ―Agency Theory.‖ Annual Review of Sociology 31:263-284. 
 
Stulberg, Adam N., Michael D. Salomone and Austin G. Long. 2007. Managing Defense 
Transformation: Agency, Culture and Service Change. Burlington: Ashgate. 
 
U.S. Congress. Senate. Airland Subcommittee on Armed Forces. 2000. General Eric K. Shinseki 
Statement on Army Transformation. 106
th
 Congress, 2
nd
 sess. 18 March. 
 
Waterman, Richard W. and Kenneth J. Meier. 1998. ―Principal-Agent Models: An Expansion?‖ 
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. 8 (April): 173-202. 
 
Wilson, James Q. 1989. Bureaucracy: What The Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It.  
New York: Basic Books. 
 
Winton, Harold R. 2000. The Challenge of Change: Military Institutions and New Realities, 
1918 – 1941. Harold R. Winton and David R. Mets, eds. Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska. 
 
Zegart, Amy B. 1999. Flawed By Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC. Palo Alto: 
Stanford. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
CHAPTER 2 
HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF ARMY TRANSFORMATION 
      Transforming a large organization such as the U.S. Army will most likely be challenging. 
If the U.S. Army is not well suited for transformational change, what happens when senior Army 
leadership announces a requirement for transformational change? What does this mean to the 
career Army officers who are then expected to implement and support that change? To what 
extent do those tasked with much of the responsibilities in executing transformation actually 
understand how transformation is to be undertaken? 
 The primary research question in this dissertation is to assess the United States Army‘s 
transformation efforts by determining if there is indeed a gap between how senior Army leaders 
define Army Transformation and the way in which Army lieutenant colonels and majors 
understand it. Specifically, I seek to determine if field grade officers understand Army 
Transformation in the same way as the three Army Chiefs of Staff who have served in that top 
senior leadership position since 1999.  Might a gap exist in how the senior leadership is 
endeavoring to transform the Army in order to achieve some objective end-state and how field 
grade officers visualize that end-state?   To begin answering these questions, it would be useful 
to first identify the background leading up to the on-going Army Transformation efforts. In 
doing so, I will in this chapter examine the historical context of Army transformation by 
providing a brief history of how the Army has attempted to implement significant change 
throughout the 20
th
 Century, beginning with the years prior to  World War I.  
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Military Transformation: A History of Change  
 Peter J. Roman and David W. Tarr (1998) argue that the most powerful institutions in the 
American national security arena are the Army, Navy and the Air Force, and not the Department 
of Defense as a whole, and that these individual services have their own distinctive and enduring 
personalities (Roman and Tarr 1998, 91). Roman and Tarr (1998) continue by arguing that the 
individual military service identities and personalities make then impervious to change from the 
outside; therefore they continue acting autonomously and in a self-interested manner (Roman 
and Tarr 1998, 91). For much of the twentieth-century, Roman and Tarr (1998) argues, the 
command, control and coordination problems associated with the America‘s organizationally 
separated armed forces have been the object of institutional reforms (92). The authors suggest 
that separate service interests and distinctive service personalities constitute the ideological, 
psychological, and doctrinal basis for parochial service orientations (Roman and Tarr 1998, 92). 
These authors describe the nature of the American military that existed for most of the twentieth-
century, which may explain why transformative change has been difficult to achieve, beginning 
as early as World War I.  
 World War I 
 David E. Johnson (2000) argues that at least one U.S. Army Major General in the War 
Department‘s general staff was unable to predict events on the eve of War World War I, because 
of the culture in which he had served throughout his career. Major General Johnson, a member of 
the War Department general staff before World War I, Johnson (2000) continues, was immersed 
in the day-to-day realities of the Army by making the difficult cultural and institutional transition 
from frontier constabulary to the modern Army, from absolute faith in man and animal to 
reliance on machines and science, a transition that began after the Spanish American War and 
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continued during and after World War I (Johnson 2000, 163). Johnson argues that Elihu Root, 
the Secretary of War, was the primary actor that caused fundamental change to occur within the 
Army. Indeed, President McKinley selected Elihu Root as Secretary of War because he believed 
he understood best how the Army would need to undergo a fundamental change in organization, 
administration, and training in order to meet the expectation of the United States becoming a 
world power (Jones 1969, 347).  
 David Segal and Mady W. Segal (1983, 164) argue further that Elihu Root reviewed the 
experiences of the Spanish-American War and decided that most of the mistakes the Army had 
made in that conflict were caused by basic organizational problems. Root‘s most significant 
challenge was the creation of the general staff, with a chief of staff as its leader. Implementation 
of the General Staff Act of 1903 took a decade to implement due to the in-fighting associated 
with the position of commanding general and the powerful bureaus of the time (Johnson 2000, 
164).  
 According to Douglas A. Macgregor (1997) the General Staff Act of 1903 to transform 
the Army allowed Elihu Root to form the general staff met with universal opposition by senior 
leaders within the military; largely because the bill weakened their positions (229).  Despite 
Root‘s efforts, the American Army entered World War I ill-prepared to meet the challenges of 
raising mass armies, delivering mass firepower, and providing for the substantial support 
materiel needed for the war effort such as ammunition, food, and petroleum (Johnson 2000, 165). 
Johnson argues that in hindsight, World War I proved that the constrained general staff and the 
autonomous bureaus could not meet the demands of mobilizing, deploying, or supplying the 
Army Expeditionary Force largely because it had no such previous experience. Johnson (2000) 
argues that under the leadership of Elihu Root the Army began to transform itself from a frontier 
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constabulary. The author continues by arguing that the army had been augmented in time of 
crisis by an infusion of non-professional volunteers, to  what eventually became the modern 
army that did not change all that much, at least organizationally, throughout the twentieth 
century following World War I (Johnson 2000, 164). Since the Army was not ready by all 
accounts for what was to be experienced during World War I, it may not have understood what 
future force it was supposed to transform into. 
 Russell F. Weigley (1973) argues that up until World War I, no one in the United States 
had developed a better method of warfare than that of General Ulysses S. Grant‘s war of 
annihilation (a strategy that provided for an overwhelming defeat of enemy forces) during 
America‘s Civil War (Weigley 1973, 194). The generals and bureaucrats, on the eve of World 
War I, did not appear to embrace change. Weigley argues that the internal combustion engine 
had advanced to the point of making armored vehicles viable in war, and in fact the tank made its 
first appearance about midway through World War I. The generals were not receptive to such 
rapid technological change, and mass armies like the ones that appeared in World War I cost so 
much that statesmen and generals alike were reluctant to spend large sums of money on 
experimental programs to build new systems, such as the tank (Weigley 1973, 195). However, 
there were weapons that had been developed and would have been useful in a war that included 
mass armies. Vincent C. Jones (1969) argues that the Gatling Gun was used by the Army since 
1866 and had been employed successfully in the Indian and Spanish America War. Jones also 
points out that the although the Army had developed the automatic machine gun, it was not 
effectively employed by the Army until World War I fighting commenced; and only then was it 
understood how important the automatic machine gun would become to modern tactics (Jones 
1969, 345).  There would be other lessons learned as a result of World War I, however. Even 
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with legislation from Congress mandating change in the decade after the war, the Army still 
resisted significant change, or at least found significant change to be challenging. 
 
The Inter-war period: 1918 - 1941 
 The National Defense Act of 1920, according to Jones (1969), governed Army 
organization and regulation until 1950 and is thought to be among the most important pieces of 
military legislation in United States history (Jones 1969, 407). According to Johnson (2000), the 
1920 National Defense Act reflected the need for the Army to prepare for modern and total war. 
Johnson argues that the officer corps, who had experienced the Army Expeditionary Force in 
Europe, believed that the act established a system that would correct two shortcomings 
experienced by the U.S. Army in World War I: mobilization of a mass army and the sustainment 
and  supply of such an army in the field (171). General John J. Pershing became Army Chief of 
Staff in 1921 and he reorganized the War Department General Staff on the model of the Army 
Expeditionary Force (AEF) which he commanded in Europe during World War I (Jones 1969, 
408). The most significant change that occurred as a result of that 1920 National Defense Act 
occurred in 1926 with the establishment of the Airs Corps as an equal combat arm and with the 
provision for its enlargement and modernization (Jones 1969, 408)   The United States Navy 
would also take full advantage of the new air technology to transform itself from a battleship 
based fleet to that of an aircraft carrier fleet before World War II. 
 The Unites States Navy, according to Stulberg, Salomone and Long (2007), was initially 
very reluctant to transform from a well established and traditional battleship fleet to that of an 
aircraft carrier based fleet. Proponents for sea-based aviation initially lacked a strong 
institutional base that gave traction to new ideas about carrier innovation (114). The Navy was a 
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battleship-focused service and that service senior leadership in the World War I era and shortly 
after was predisposed to give carrier plans subordinate status (Stulberg, Salomone and Long 
2007, 114).  The Navy did overcome its initial reluctance to transform its fleet and integrated 
technologies, extensive experimentation, entrepreneurial leadership, and a coherent service-wide 
vision of future warfare that included more than just battleship warfare, and doctrinal and 
organizational adjustment; all key ingredients to effective military change (Stulberg, Salomone 
and Long 2007, 101). Stulberg, Salomone and Long (2007) argue that the reason the Navy was 
successful in transforming itself from a battleship-based fleet to that of a carrier fleet was that it 
was able to effectively fund new technologies, provide extensive experimentation, allow for 
entrepreneurial leadership, make available a coherent service-wide vision of future warfare, and 
provide the necessary doctrinal and organizational adjustment (101). Additionally, these authors 
argue, the Navy created a career path for officers so that they could ascend to senior level rank as 
aviators, an opportunity that was traditionally reserved for officers in the battleship fleet 
(Stulberg, Salomone, Long 2007, 104). Like the inter-war Navy, the U.S. Army may have a 
difficult time transforming from a force based on Cold War era heavy combat systems to a 
twenty first century Information Age military force if field grade officers are uncertain about 
promotion opportunities.   
 David E. Johnson (2000) argues that throughout most of the interwar era, planning at the 
War Department remained largely theoretical, and any planning that was conducted was done for 
the sake of the exercise itself since there appeared to be no imminent threat to the United States 
(179). Indeed, according to Johnson (2000), not until 1939, as the world was at the brink of war, 
did strategic planning begin to become more realistic (180). In the interwar period, much of the 
active Army‘s needs came from the stockpiles of equipment left over from World War I (183). 
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Military leaders of the time were certain that in the event of military emergency, American 
industry could respond to the needs of the Army (183). The Army Chief of Staff, General Malin 
Craig, beginning in 1935, made a decision that in effect stopped the research and development of 
new weapons, and decision that came at a time when new military technologies was changing at 
a very rapid pace (183). Instead of funding programs to modernize the Army with new weapon 
systems, General Craig instead chose to spend the Army‘s very limited budget on funding an 
Initial Protective Force of some four-hundred thousand Regular Army and National Guard units 
that would defend the country at the beginning of an emergency. During this period, senior 
leaders appeared to reject significant and innovative suggestions coming from junior officers. 
For instance, according to Johnson (2000), Major George S. Patton, Jr. and Captain Dwight 
David Eisenhower both argued for a greater tactical role for tanks,  beyond serving as simply a 
supporting component to the infantry.  Eisenhower was censured and told to keep his ideas to 
himself, while Patton returned to the cavalry where he wrote about the relevancy of the horse in 
battle (Johnson 2000, 189). 
World War II 
  By rejecting suggestions such as those made by Eisenhower and Patton, it appears that 
the Army may have been ill-prepared for what was really needed for purposes of World War II. 
Regardless, the United States Army was successful in World War II as it employed General 
Ulysses S. Grant‘s war of annihilation strategy, a hard fighting strategy that may have been 
better supported with an earlier regard for the tank in battle (Weigley 1973, 313).  
  The changes began on February 28, 1942 when President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed 
Executive Order 9082 which directed the wholesale reorganization of the War Department 
(Johnson 2000). Johnson states that the intention was to streamline the General Staff and 
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subordinate elements of the Army in order to facilitate speedy and most effective control of 
mobilization and operations (200). This order eliminated an inefficient and decentralized 
structure created by the National Defense Act of 1920 that resulted in some sixty agencies 
having the authority to report to the Chief of Staff (Johnson 2000, 200). This significant change 
of course, while the United States was already involved in the early stages of World War II, 
allowed for an immediate mobilization of resources, training, and supplying of a rapidly 
expanding army of millions, existing weapons design were rushed into mass production (Johnson 
2000, 200).  The Army appeared to change significantly in a rather short period of time; the 
reason being perhaps that it simply saw no other choice.    
 Larry H. Addington (1994) argues that the National Security Act of 1947 created, in 
addition to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Security Council (NSC), the 
basic structure of post-war national defense by creating the departments of the Army, the Navy 
and the Air Force (269). Addington (1994) states that the 1947 Act also created the Secretary of 
Defense, along with civilian secretaries that would preside over each of the new departments. 
These individual service secretaries would report to the Secretary of Defense (269). Additionally, 
Addington (1994) argues that the National Security Act of 1947 also provided statutory 
recognition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which would consist of the chiefs of staff of the Army 
and the Air Force, as well as the Chief of Naval Operations (Addington 1994, 269). However, 
according to Amy Zegart (1999) the Joint Chiefs of Staff that resulted in 1947 was weak by 
design; it had not budget authority, no chairman, and offered no incentives among its members to 
think in joint service terms (Zegart 1999, 133). 
  In 1949, Addington (1994) argues, an amendment to the 1947 Act was provided that 
formally created the Department of Defense, which in effect gave more power to the Secretary of 
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Defense and also created the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Addington 1994, 
269). It appears that this would be the most significant change in Defense Department 
organization until the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986, or some 37 years later.    
Vietnam: A Commander-In-Chief‘s Unconventional Vision  
 Russell F. Weigley (1973) argues that President John F. Kennedy ignored the objections 
of the United States Army when he showed preference for elite forces, or those forces that are 
apart from the mainstream operational forces (456). Kennedy gave the special forces their 
distinctive emblem, the green beret (Weigley 1973, 456 – 457). The Green Berets were trained 
primarily in unconventional warfare, but they were also trained in community organization and 
leadership, preventive medicine, construction techniques, and in nation-building (457). In 1960 
the Communist leaders in Vietnam had established the fight against the anti-communist regime 
in Saigon through the use of subversion and guerrilla war (Weigley 1973, 456). Kennedy 
believed that guerilla warfare required a whole new kind of strategy, apparently a strategy that 
the Army as an institution was not willing to embrace (Weigley 1973, 457). The Army may have 
been more focused on conventional warfare, and not the unconventional warfare President 
Kennedy was anticipating.  
 Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow (1999) argue that when the international environment 
cannot be negotiated, organizations deal with remaining uncertainties by establishing a set of 
standard scenarios that constitute the contingencies for which they prepare (Allison and Zelikow 
1999, 171). The authors continue by arguing that the U.S. Army in the 1960s prepared for large-
scale ground operations that would emphasize American advantages in firepower, and when 
scenarios did not materialize in Vietnam allowing for that emphasis, the Army found it 
agonizingly difficult to adapt (Allison and Zelikow 1999, 171).   
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 The culture of the Army may have been the primary reason for that service not being able 
to adapt to the requirements associated with Vietnam. Stulberg, Salomone and Long (2007) 
argue that Vietnam was largely a counterinsurgency conflict which was considered outside the 
mainstream of the more conventional approach to war; which provided no material benefits that 
encouraged servicemen to invest their careers (163). There were no senior officers with 
counterinsurgency expertise who were permitted to ascend to the four-star rank because they 
were also considered to be removed from the mainstream (Stulberg, Salomone and Long 2007, 
163).  Officers that did ascend to the rank of general officer did so in spite of their 
counterinsurgency views and were promoted based on their more conventional experiences in 
World War II and Korea (Stulberg, Salomone and Long 2007, 164).  
 Creating a career path opportunities to senior level rank may be a necessary ingredient in 
achieving transformation within the Army. By all appearances, the Army  would still not focus 
on counterinsurgency after Vietnam for more than 20 years. One of the reasons the Army may 
have failed to adapt to unconventional warfare following Vietnam may have had more to do with 
a larger and more impending threat.  Eric A. Hollister (2010) argues that in 1968 the Soviet 
Union invaded Czechoslovakia which led to the issuance of National Security Decision 
Memorandum 95 in 1970; which conclude that a credible defense posture in NATO (North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization) was vital and that conventional forces required an increased 
emphasis (Hollister 2010, 2) This direction may have caused the Army to resume its preference 
for conventional war and could therefore be justified, perhaps, in giving little consideration to 
unconventional war preparation.  
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Post-Vietnam Era  
 According to David Cloud and Greg Jaffe (2009) at the end of involvement in Vietnam 
the U.S. Army removed from the curriculum of its war colleges all classes pertaining to 
counterinsurgency, as well as eliminating all field exercises involving counterinsurgency (Cloud 
and Jaffe 2009, 26).   The Army reverted back to its comfort zone of planning for a conventional 
war against its Cold War adversary, the Soviet Union (26). Richard A. Lacquement, Jr. (2010) 
argues that the Army‘s response to Vietnam was to declare as a matter of institutional preference 
that it should not have to fight that sort of war in the future (Lacquement 2010, 30). The author 
goes on to say that society‘s needs matched that of the Army‘s role, so the Army focused on 
preparing for conventional war against similarly structured armies and so recommended to its 
civilian leaders that use of military force be limited to this particular conception of war 
(Lacquement 2010, 30).   
   Clark A. Murdoch, et al (2004) argues that by the mid-1980s, and after a series of 
operational failures in the field – such as the botched attempt to rescue the American hostages in 
Iran, the bombing of the U.S. embassy and Marine Corps barracks in Beirut, and the 
interoperability (joint operations or military services working together) problems during the 
invasion of Grenada – the Congress became convinced that the Department of Defense (DoD) 
was broken and that corrective action needed to be taken. Despite intense resistance from DoD, 
more than four years of Congressional hearings, investigation, and analysis culminated in the 
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Goldwater Nichols Act 
or GNA-1986) – served as a statutory landmark of U.S. defense reform (Murdoch et al 2004, 14) 
. 
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 Amy Zegart (1999) argues that the GNA-1986 was successful because it had the support 
and backing of key members of both the House and Senate. Senator Barry Goldwater and 
Congressman Bill Nichols were both highly respected within the Congress and defense 
community and made good use of their political prestige and capital to influence others, such as 
Senator Sam Nunn and Congressman Les Aspin (146). According to Zegart (1999) GNA - 1986 
was successful for two other reasons:  
 First, the Act passed because some of Congress‘s most honored leaders and military 
supporters staked their careers on it.  Second, President Ronald Reagan stayed out of the political 
fray (146). The president made no grand public stand, issued no strong personal appeals, and 
invested no major presidential capital in either opposing or promoting Pentagon reorganization 
(Zegart 1999, 147).  
  Zegart (1999) argues that Goldwater-Nichols 1986 became a reality because all of the 
right factors converged (147). The success was a result of those rare and unpredictable moments 
when the political stars aligned (Zegart 1999, 147).  According to Amy Zegart (1999, 140) the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 provided the most significant change to United States defense 
policy since the National Security Act of 1947. Regarding Goldwater-Nichols, Douglas A. 
Macgregor argues the act fundamentally rearranged power on the strategic level among 
institutions within the Department of Defense (Macgregor 1997, 187). Congress‘ primary 
purpose in GNA-1986 was to strengthen the power of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and to 
reduce the influence of the service chiefs, including the Army Chief of Staff (Macgregor 1997, 
187)
2
.  
                                                   
2
 According to Macgregor (1996) this change did not occur as intended. The author argues that 
the individual service chiefs still exert a degree of influence over national strategic decisions 
which may be disproportionate to what was envisioned in the original GNA-1986 reforms 
(Macgregor 1997, 189). 
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 Zegart (1999) argues that GNA-1986 also improved the composition and administration 
of the Joint Staff. She argues that the Act requires officers to have a joint service assignment 
before promotion to general officer, which was intended to weaken service parochialism by 
allowing the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to have a say in the promotion of officers, even over 
the objection of their respective service chiefs (Zegart 1999, 141). Finally, Zegart (1999) argues, 
GNA-1986 granted the unified and specified four-star combatant commanders (CINCs)  more 
autonomy and authority over their units; units that are comprised of personnel from all services, 
including the Army (Zegart 1999, 141). Congress believed, according Murdock, et al (2004, 14), 
that by implementing GNA-1986, as just described, it would promote a more unified and joint 
Defense Department.  
 Murdock et al. (2004) argue that although GNA-1986 may be perceived as successful 
given the numerous military successes since its enactment, there are some unintended 
consequences that must be addressed. In 1986, the authors continue, the U.S. was still engaged in 
the Cold War with a conventional but not necessarily predictable opponent, the Soviet Union. 
Today, although the U.S. is the sole superpower, it is involved in a war on terror and must cope 
with widespread uncertainty at both the nation-state and sub-state levels.  
Post Desert Storm (1991 – 1997) 
 Frederick W. Kagan (2006) argues that Army Chief of Staff General Gordan Sullivan 
began a significant effort to transform the Army immediately following the first Gulf War in 
1991(Kagan 2006, 201). General Sullivan believed that the current Army was well configured to 
fight and win in the industrial-age and it could also win an agrarian-age foe as well in the 21
st
 
Century (203). The Chief of Staff said that the Army had begun to evolve into a new force for a 
new century and he referred to the Army as Force XXI (203). Thomas K. Adams (2008) argues 
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that Army leadership believed that Desert Storm in 1991 was the model for future wars of the 
Twenty-first Century, and that the Army of the Twenty-First Century, or Army XXI, would best 
be a capabilities-based rather than a threat-based Army since there was no pending threat in a 
new uni-polar world (Adams 2008, 34).  
 Kagan (2006, 203) argues that General Sullivan believed that Force XXI would 
synthesize the science and computer technology as well as the art of integrating doctrine and 
organization. The Chief of Staff said, according to Kagan (2006, 202), that the goal was to create 
new military units or organizations within the Army that operate at even greater performance 
levels in speed, space and time and that Force XXI would use command and control technology 
to leverage the power of the information age. According to Kagan (2006) both the National 
Defense Panel (NDP) and the Congressionally-mandated Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
3
 
in 1997 rejected the Army‘s defense of its own role in major war (233). Nevertheless, Kagan 
(2006) argues, General Sullivan as Chief of Staff, Dennis Reimer, continued Force XXI 
initiatives, largely because Reimer had been involved in developing Force XXI as Commander 
of the U.S. Army Forces Command (Kagan 2006, 239). It appeared that Congress wanted the 
Department of Defense to change in order to meet current and future threats; a change that may 
have included the departure from the more conventional Cold War strategy. Adams (2008) 
argues that the QDR mandated change and that the contemplative approach of the Army lacked 
such urgency (51). While Force XXI, which involved digitizing existing heavy combat systems, 
would still be the vehicle for the Army‘s pursuit of a capabilities-based military in the future, 
Adams (2008, 51) argues that the mandate for change in the QDR left the Army without a clear 
understanding of how it would implement such change. Adams (2008) argues that ultimately the 
Army could not afford to sustain the heavy Force XXI weapon systems while at the same time 
                                                   
3
 Both the NDP and QDR will be discussed in greater detailed below. 
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investing in a lighter more mobile force capability that was required for the Twenty-first 
Century. Transformation away from the existing weapon systems, which included Force XXI 
initiatives, of the Twentieth Century became a path the Army would attempt to follow (76).   
  The Road to the Current Transformation Effort 
 Frederick W. Kagan (2006) argues that the Congressionally-mandated Quadrennial 
Defense Review (QDR) in 1997 served as the catalyst that drove the current Defense 
transformation efforts. The 1997 QDR was required under Section 923 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for fiscal year 1997 (Military Force Structure Review Act of 1996, Section 
923). This Act required that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, to conduct a comprehensive examination of the defense strategy, the force 
structure of the active, guard and reserve components, force modernization plans, infrastructure, 
and other elements of the defense programs and policies in order to determine and express the 
defense strategy of the Unites States. Subsequent reports would be issued at the beginning of 
each newly elected Presidential administration; the first report would be required in 1997 (10 
U.S.C. § 111
4
). Kagan (2006) adds that QDR-1997, the first such report, proposed to reduce the 
size of the military while at the same time sustaining a two-war fighting force; this apparent 
contradiction was no mistake. The QDR recognized that the military‘s role was growing, but it 
proposed a reduction in troop strength to pay for the information technology that would be 
needed in a ―transformed‖ military (Kagan 2006, 233-235).  
 According to Kagan (2006), the National Defense Panel (NDP) in 1997 suggested that 
DoD was focusing on an unlikely two-war scenario in order to justify its current force structure.  
The NDP was also required under Section 924 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
fiscal year 1997. This panel was composed of a chairman and eight other individuals appointed 
                                                   
4
 Military Force Restructure Review Act of 1996, P.L. 104-201, Section 925 
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by the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the chairman and ranking member of the 
Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the chairman and ranking member of the 
Committee on National Security of the House of Representatives (Military Force Structure Act 
of 1996, Section 924). Thomas K. Adams (2008) argues that the 1997 NDP criticized the QDR, 
issued the same year, as being too weak. Adams argues that the NDP believed that the Defense 
Department was focusing too much on traditional threats using conventional means as an 
assumption that would inhibit transformation of the American military (Adams 2008, 49). 
Adams (2008) continues by arguing that Congress believed the 1997 QDR represented ―business 
as usual‖ and not  what they had in mind when Congress passed the 1997 Defense Act. While the 
NDP recommendations were much more provocative in what they suggested for the future, the  
actual findings were vague and did not provide Congress with a good idea of what the force 
structure needed to be for the future (Adams 2008, 49). The NDP opined that resources should be 
directed to requirements for any future military force needs and that current threat scenarios, a 
low-probability, will be supported by our allies (Kagan 2006, 238). Kagan argues that the NDP 
demanded that the Army focus on becoming lighter, more deployable, and more strategically 
agile (Kagan 2006, 239).  
 Later in this chapter, and more specifically in Chapter 5, we will see that achieving a 
lighter and more agile force may have been a goal of the Army Chiefs of Staff over the last 
decade, but defining how that goal was to be achieved may have been, and indeed may remain 
problematic. In addition to responding to the findings of the QDR and NDP, the Army may have 
been influenced in its transformation efforts from a political aspect. 
    Andrew J. Bacevich (2005) argues that George W. Bush campaigned in 2000 on the 
promise of transforming the Department of Defense if he were to be elected president of the 
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United States (172). Mr. Bush did win that election and immediately directed his Secretary of 
Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, to proceed with transforming the military.  
 He did not get very far. Bacevich argues that the generals and admirals were engaged in 
efforts  of what they deemed to be transformation for their respective services; however, they 
were largely wedded to their existing weapon systems, force structure and strategies. Adams 
(2008) argues that generals may have been on a course to modify existing weapon systems, a 
path that the NDP advised against when it suggested that nothing less than a transformation of 
the entire U.S. military was needed to meet challenging threats (49). The generals were more 
than willing to allow Secretary Rumsfeld to talk about transformation so long as he did not 
interfere with their priorities (Bacevich 2005, 173).  
 John Yoo (2009) argues that Secretary Rumsfeld and the uniformed military struggled 
over the Bush administration‘s transformation policy to make America‘s military forces lighter, 
faster and better equipped for unconventional conflict by relying on high-technology and 
information advantages (Yoo 2009, 2288). Yoo (2009) argues that U.S. Army Chief of Staff 
General Eric Shinseki may have favored keeping the focus on the large armored units designed 
for a broad conflict against a major power in the early months of the Bush Administration 
(2296). If Yoo‘s view of General Shinseki‘s preference for heavy armored systems is accurate, 
then it appears to contradict General Shinseki‘s vision of  a lighter and more mobile military 
forces. According to Yoo (2009) there was a conflict between Bush administration officials who 
preferred a force shaped for smaller conflicts, civil wars, nation building, and humanitarian 
missions that better reflected the realities of the 1990s, while military leaders, such as General 
Shinseki, preferred the conflicts that emphasized defeating an enemy quickly with an 
overwhelming force, defined goals, and a clear exit strategy (Yoo 2009, 2296). General 
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Shinseki‘s plan to achieve a lighter force for the future may not have been aggressive enough for 
Secretary Rumsfeld.  
 Andrew F. Krepinevich (2008) argues that General Shinseki envisioned a more 
expeditionary force that would be achieved as technology became available; a force that would 
still concentrate on decisively winning conventional style battles and giving little consideration 
to the other capabilities highlighted by Bush administration officials (Krepinevich 2008, 9 – 10). 
Jeremy Shapiro and Lynn Davis (2003) argue that General Shinseki wanted to create a light 
armored force capable of being deployed very quickly anywhere in the world. In order to achieve 
this vision, General Shinseki wanted to keep the current heavy force, buy an interim but lighter 
set of weapon systems that had already been developed (off-the-shelf), and design a future force 
(the Future Combat Systems) that would be lighter but equivalent to the current heavy weapon 
systems (Shapiro and Davis 2003, 22). Efforts to transform the Army early in the Bush 
administration appeared to pit civilian authority against military expertise. The effectiveness of 
that same authority may be necessary if the Army is to be successful in achieving such radical 
change in the future.   
 
Conclusion 
 
 By all appearances the United States Army is now attempting to transform from the 
heavy fighting force of the twentieth century to a lighter, modular, and more mobile force needed 
to confront the threats of the twenty-first century. In order to fully transform, or to achieve 
radical change the culture of the Army may first need to be changed.  According to Richard 
Lacquement, Jr. (2010) in order to get the large bureaucracy of the Army to understand 
fundamentals requires an apparatus to organize, train, equip, maintain and operate. Lacquement 
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(2010) argues that the Army must build flexibility and versatility into its very nature; that it must 
see ―modularity not only as a way to organize forces but also as a way to organize itself as an 
organization (Lacquement 2010, 31). If what Lacquement (2010) provides is true, then an 
inference may be that the Army, after over a decade of effort, has not transformed itself as 
General Shinseki had envisioned. 
 If the Army is to depart from its focus on conventional warfare, then what evidence is 
there that the focus has indeed shifted to the non-conventional threats of the twenty-first century?  
Andrew Krepinevich (2009) argues that the Army has proposed spending over $150 billion on 
the Future Combat Systems (FCS) family of combat vehicles. Krepinevich (2009) argues that the 
FCS is optimized for traditional conventional warfare rather than the persistent irregular warfare 
that is being confronted in the 21
st
 Century.  Although Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, has in 
effect cancelled all procurement of FCS, as Krepinevich (2009) continues, the Army‘s senior 
leadership is still stuck in the 20
th
 Century and planning against what it knows best; the 
conventional threat of another heavy force sponsored by a nation-state? If this is true then this 
could present a problem. If senior leaders refuse to let go of conventional methods of warfare 
while framing them in the context of Army Transformation, and field grade officers are 
considering Army Transformation through a paradigm of warfare in the 21
st
 Century then there 
could be a significant gap.    
      Christopher Paparone (2004) argues that the Army assumes that strategic leaders, or 
those in the highest positions, are its most influential members. There is no way of knowing, 
Paparone argues, if members of the Army organization will understand or even act on strategic 
leaders‘ intentions. Paparone says it is doubtful if military leaders in positions of authority can 
control how people make sense of the world. This top-down Army Transformation process may 
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be a problem in dealing with the cultural transformation that also needs to occur (Paporone 2004, 
4).  There may be a gap in how Army Transformation which may be indicative of a much 
broader concern.    
 The Army is a culture that may not respond to change very easily. According to Paul 
Yingling (2007) America‘s defeat in Vietnam is the most egregious failure in the history of 
American arms. Yingling blames general officers for not preparing the Army to fight 
unconventional wars, despite warnings that such preparations were necessary. Yingling says that 
President Kennedy warned of ―another type of war‖ new in its intensity, ancient in its origin – 
war by guerillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat, by 
infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory by evading and exhausting the enemy instead 
of engaging him. Yingling goes on to argue that President Kennedy undertook a comprehensive 
plan to prepare U.S. armed forces for counterinsurgency. America‘s generals, led by then Chief 
of Staff of the Army General George Decker, failed to prepare the army for counterinsurgency, 
insisting that soldiers could handle guerilla tactics and therefore proceeded into Vietnam with a 
conventional mindset (Yingling 2007). This is an example of at least one broader concern if 
senior level leaders, namely the Chief of Staff of the Army acting in his role as principal, and 
mid-career officers, namely lieutenant colonels and majors in the role of agents, are not in 
agreement on what Army Transformation means.  
 This gap could be significant in the context of trying to radically change a large 
bureaucratic organization. The research questions remain relevant. Is there a gap between how 
senior Army leaders define Army Transformation and the way in which Army lieutenant 
colonels and majors understand it?  Does the term Army Transformation indeed have a different 
meaning based on whether you are the Chief of Staff of the Army or whether you are a lieutenant 
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colonel or a major? This difference in definition, if there is one, could result in a communication 
problem throughout this large bureaucratic organization. If there is a gap in how Army 
Transformation is defined or understood, then how do U.S. Army planners define Army 
Transformation? Do Army planners focus on the well established conventional aspect of 
twentieth century warfare, or do they take into consideration the irregular scenarios that may 
exist in the twenty-first century? If planners are supporting the Army Chiefs of Staff in preparing 
the Army for future scenarios, then how do the planners define Transformation? If there is no 
clear threat scenario that can be identified in the context of the twenty-first century, does Army 
Transformation need to be defined in the first place? Does the Army simply plan for what it 
knows how to do best and within the cultural framework that currently exists? If transformation 
does not need to be defined, then perhaps the senior leadership of the Army should not use 
transformation in describing what it is trying to achieve. The complexity associated with trying 
to transform a large bureaucracy is a challenging undertaking for any public or private 
organization. How the goal of transformation is conveyed by senior leadership, and how that 
goal is understood by mid-career actors, is the purpose of this dissertation.   
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CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
      The first chapter of this dissertation identified the problem that exists in defining Army 
Transformation and discussed the gap that may exist in the literature pertaining to significant 
change in a large bureaucratic organization. The second chapter provided a background of 
transformation efforts within the U.S. Army throughout the Twentieth Century. In this chapter, I 
will review past research which could prove useful when examining the transformation of large 
bureaucratic organizations such as the United States Army.  
 The current literature will be reviewed in order to determine under what conditions 
effective transformative change may occur within a large bureaucracy.  Specifically, the 
literature will be reviewed in order to determine what may cause transformation to either succeed 
or fail. This literature review will address the theoretical aspects associated with bureaucracies 
and how they plan for significant or radical change. Stulberg, Salomone and Long (2007) argue 
that military transformation is a dynamic process that translates vague visions of war into 
mature, innovative outcomes resulting in changes of goals, existing strategies and the military 
organization itself (Stulberg, Salomone and Long 2007, 14).  The ability to execute this dynamic 
change may face a number of difficulties inherent in changing large organizations. 
 This literature review will also examine how experts on the topic of military organization 
change view Army Transformation. As much as the Army seeks to transform itself from that of 
the Cold War era, the organizational culture of this particular bureaucracy may only serve to 
limit the successes that may be achieved. Failure may be possible if goals are not well defined 
and understood throughout the bureaucracy.  
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       Transforming the United States Army from that of the Cold War era to an army that is 
needed to confront the international threats of today may involve a significant policy challenge. 
The purpose here is to determine how the United States Army senior leadership has confronted 
transformation and how field grade officers view those efforts.  Engaging in significant 
organizational change, or transforming, from what currently is to what needs to be is perhaps the 
most significant issue facing the United States Army today.  Due to the high investment of 
resources necessary to achieve Army Transformation, it is important also to know if senior Army 
leaders and field grade officers view transformation similarly. It is also important that Army 
planners understand the meaning of transformation so that the directives that are provided by 
senior-Army leaders are expressed accurately by way of changes to Army doctrine and 
organizational structure.   
 The literature may show that by using a term such as ―transformation‖ to describe how a 
large bureaucracy is changing significantly may not necessarily be clear to mid-level leaders 
within such an organization. If the term ―Army Transformation‖ has a different meaning to 
different actors, especially over time, is it important to even define the term within the 
bureaucracy?  The subcultures that may exist within the culture of the Army may never agree on 
the meaning of Army Transformation.  Any agreement within the Army may be especially 
difficult to achieve if senior leaders refer to transformation as both an end-state tied to a specific 
goal, or as a process for which there is no specific goal.  According to Graham T. Allison (1969), 
the government consists of organizations with each having standard operating procedures (SOPs) 
and established programs. The behavior of these organizations, Allison argues, is determined by 
routines that have been previously established. Graham states that change does occur but that 
learning takes place gradually over time.  
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 Graham (1969) argues that dramatic organizational change, or transformative change, 
occurs in response to a major crisis but that both learning and change occur based on existing 
organizational capabilities (Allison 1969, 698). It is difficult to determine what specific major 
crisis, as Allison argues, the Army may be responding to that would necessitate dramatic 
organizational change. The Army appears to be attempting transformative change in order to 
avert a major crisis for which it believes it is currently not prepared to address. Radical change 
may therefore be difficult to achieve. 
The Difficulty of Defining Goals 
 Radical change as a goal may not only be hard to define, but it may also be difficult to 
achieve once it is understood. Greenwood and Hinings (1996) argue that radical change occurs 
when an organization moves from one template to another, in that this radical change represents 
the breaking of the mold defined by an interpretive scheme associated with what may be 
currently known (Greenwood and Hinings 1996, 1026). The authors continue by adding that the 
more embedded processes are the more problematic  the achievement of radical change may 
become. If U.S. Army officers tasked with implementing aspect of transformation are unclear 
about what radical change means to them, then they may be more committed to the status quo, or 
the prevailing institutional template of which they are more familiar (Greenwood and Hinings 
1996, 1035).   
 Additionally, Adrianna Kezar (2005) argues that radical change involves the busting 
loose from an existing orientation and the entire transformation of organizing principles and 
structures (Kezar 2005, 636). The author continues by stating that radical change is complex and 
wide-ranging, requiring dramatic changes in strategy and abrupt departures from traditional 
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work, structures, job requirements, and cultures which in turn necessitate a complete overhaul of 
the way things are organized (Kezar 2005, 636). If this is accurate, then field grade officers may 
prefer the status quo if they cannot grasp the complex nature of transformative change. 
 Louis C. Gawthrop (1969) argues that in any large and complex bureaucratic 
organization, goals can rarely be stated in clear and precise terms. Gawthrop states that goals are 
not intended to provide objective and rational definitions of purpose, but are intended to provide 
the basic elements needed to gain an emotional, ethical, or normative commitment from the 
individual manager within the bureaucracy (Gawthrop 1969, 13). Gawthrop continues by 
offering that goals in large organizations represent broad generalizations which are quite 
ambiguous but are at the same time easily adaptable throughout the organization.  
 But are these goals being adapted as intended? Gawthrop (1969) argues that goals must 
be expressed in terms that are understood by the different subcultures that may exist within the 
organization. Gawthrop continues by arguing that in order for all of the subunits to adapt, the 
organization must lose some control over its component subunits, largely as a result of those 
subunits implementing new goals with some level of discretion (Gawthrop 1969, 13). If goals at 
the top of the bureaucracy are ambiguous, as provided by Gawthrop (1969), then there may be a 
conflict in how well top-down policy implementation works within a large bureaucracy.  When 
field grade officers, or mid-level bureaucrats, are allowed to implement new goals with some 
level of discretion, then the true meaning of transformation, as intended from the top levels of the 
organization, may be lost. 
  Janet Coble Vincent and Lane Crothers (1998) argue that the top-down implementation 
model assumes that policy directives are to be turned into programs with as little deviation as 
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possible (Vincent and Crothers 1998, 57). These authors argue that policy makers provide only 
important decisions and that street-level actors may only serve to follow the correct 
implementation process, or to thwart it by making changes. Vincent and Crothers argue that any 
deviation from the policy would be seen as illegitimate (Vincent and Crothers 1998, 57). 
Changes in policy may be made by field grade officers, or street-level bureaucrats, as they 
endeavor to implement programs as a result of not understanding what the policy truly means. 
The field grade officers may therefore be integral to the success of transformation by having an 
understanding of the actual intent of senior level officers, and then implementing their respective 
programs that will result in successful transformation throughout the Army.. 
Army Transformation: A Principal-Agent Challenge? 
The relationship between the Army Chief of Staff and the lieutenant colonels and majors 
may best be described in the context of Principal-Agent Theory. Thomas Sowers  (2005) argues 
that Principal-Agent Theory began in the area of microeconomic analysis and was used in the 
context of business (388). Sowers states that Principal-Agent Theory is primarily concerned with 
hierarchical relationships between two sets of actors, principals and agents (Sowers 2005, 388). 
Principals are the actors, Sowers continues, within a hierarchical relationship in which authority 
ultimately resides; agents are the actors hired by the principals and delegated a certain level 
authority to perform actions on the principal‘s behalf (Sowers 2005, 388).  
Terry M. Moe (1984) makes a similar distinction by offering that the principal and agent 
is an analytic expression of the agency relationship in which the principal enters into a 
contractual relationship with the agent with the idea that the agent will produce results that are 
desired by the principal (Moe 1984, 756). There are numerous examples of a principal-agent 
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relationship, according to Moe, that include: lawyer-client, doctor-patient, broker-investor; 
politician-citizen, and employer-employee (Moe 1984, 756).  
The last example, that of the employer-employee relationship within a hierarchical 
structure, may be representative of  the Principal-Agent association shared by the Army Chief of 
Staff and lieutenant colonels and majors. Sowers (2005) argues that the way higher military 
authorities influence subordinate commands are representative of power, delegation, monitoring 
and punishment found in the principal-agent model (Sowers 2005, 391). Sowers (2005) 
continues by stating that higher military principals delegate power to subordinate military agents; 
these agents in turn become principals, delegating their power to their military subordinates. At 
each level, relationships with subordinates meet the criteria of an established hierarchy and a 
delegation contract (Sowers 2005, 391).  
If the Chief of Staff of the Army (only one senior leader at a time fills that particular role 
in the Army) is the principal and the lieutenant colonels and majors (of which there are several 
thousand serving in uniform at any given time
5
) are the agents, then Principal-Agency Theory 
may be useful in addressing the relationship between these two levels within the Army. Although 
there are many colonels as well as general officers between the Chief of Staff of the Army and 
these two levels of field grade officers (lieutenant colonels and majors), one may accept that the 
Chief of Staff, as a principal, provides the vision and goals for the lieutenant colonels and 
majors, the agents, to achieve.   
A senior Army officer is appointed to serve as the Chief of Staff of the Army by the 
President of the United States. That appointee is then confirmed by the United States Senate for 
                                                   
5
 CGSC estimates that there are between 15,000 and 17,000 lieutenant colonels and between 
20,000 and 22,000 majors serving on active duty in the Army at any given time.  
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that position. Although the Chief of Staff is the most senior uniformed actor in the Army, he may 
not be able to change everything that he desires. Susan Shapiro (2005) argues, it is not 
necessarily the case that the principal is ―in the driver‘s seat‖ on all matters pertaining to 
specifying preferences, creating incentives and making contracts that agents must follow. 
Shapiro argues that when principals are ―one-shotters‖, as in the case of Army Chiefs of Staff 
(that is to say that being an Army Chief of Staff is in effect a four-year political appointment and 
that those actors come and go and serve at the pleasure of the president) and agents are repeat 
players, as in the case of lieutenant colonels and majors (these field grade officers may serve at 
these two levels for up to 10 years total), then the asymmetry of power shifts from the principal 
to the agents (Shapiro 2005, 267). As agents outlast their principals, Shapiro continues, the 
balance of power between principal and agent may shift in favor of the agents (Shapiro 2005, 
269).  The inference is that just because someone is appointed Chief of Staff of the Army does 
not mean that person will have complete knowledge, or indeed control, over all aspects of the 
organization; in the case of the United States Army, the field grade officers, as agents, may 
possess an information advantage. The complex Principal-Agent relationship between these two 
levels of officers within the Army may be exacerbated when civilian leaders are involved.  
Terry M. Moe (1984) argues that the principal-agent model is an analytic expression of 
the agency relationship, in which two parties consisting of a ―principal‖ and an ―agent‖ enter into 
a contractual relationship with one another. The agent is therefore expected to produce the 
outcomes desired by the principal (Moe 1984, 746). However, the principal may be at a 
disadvantage with regard to knowledge. The principal seeks out agents, Moe argues, for a variety 
of reasons, but one notable reason would be due to the size and complexity of a certain task 
requiring coordinated action, such as in the case of Army Transformation.  
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Shapiro (2005) argues that although principals delegate authority to agents, the goals of 
principals and agents may conflict due to asymmetries of information. Principals therefore, 
according to Shapiro, cannot be assured that agents are carrying out their will (Shapiro 2005, 
271). Despite these information asymmetries, Moe (1984) argues, bureaucratic superiors try to 
control bureaucratic subordinates. Moe provides also that different types of bureaucrats will 
exercise control toward different ends, depending on which motivational methods are appropriate 
for their purposes. Political appointees, such as in the case of the Army Chiefs of Staff, will not 
exercise control in the same way as career officials. (Moe 1984, 764).  
Andrew J. Bacevich (2005) argues that the military is led by an officer corps that has 
evolved its own and well-defined worldview and political agenda. Senior military officers have 
sought to wield clout well beyond the realm falling within their normal purview. Bacevich 
(2005) states that they not only want to execute policy but they want a large say in its 
formulation. These senior officers, Bacevich continues, have demonstrated considerable skill at 
waging bureaucratic warfare by manipulating the press as well as playing the executive branch 
off against the legislative branch in order to achieve their ends (Bacevich 2005, 30). Career 
officials who operate within the Army‘s bureaucracy may be less inclined to seek control in the 
same way as the Chief of Staff. The manner in which Army Transformation is pursued may be 
different from one Army Chief of Staff to the next. These changes in leadership may cause field 
grade officers to receive mixed messages about what is truly intended. 
Richard Waterman and Kenneth Meier (1998) argue that the principal seeks to 
manipulate and mold the behavior of agents so that they will perform according to the principal‘s 
expectations. The authors also suggest that there is a likelihood of shirking if the preferences of 
principals and agents diverge, if there are high levels of uncertainty, or if the agent has a distinct 
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information advantage (Waterman and Meier 1998, 176-177). Waterman and Meier continue to 
argue that because there is goal conflict between principals and agents, agents have the incentive 
to shirk, or to engage in activities that do not meet the expectations of the principal. The 
information asymmetry allows bureaucrats to be unresponsive. A problem may exist, argues 
Waterman and Meier, when there may be multiple principals that may not agree on goals. Goal 
conflict among principals makes the relationship between principals and agents exceedingly 
complex (Waterman and Meier 1998, 179). Army field grade officers, at the lieutenant colonel 
and major level, may view there being numerous principals consisting of the complete command 
structure that exists within the Army between these field grade officers and the Chief of Staff, 
which may cause some confusion regarding what the Army Chief of Staff really intends by 
Army Transformation.   
      Stulberg, Salomone and Long (2007) argue that in order to be successful, military 
transformation must develop from a strategic interaction between service entrepreneurs, serving 
as the principals who decide new general directions and how to evaluate their progress, and their 
subordinate organizations, or agents that possess the expertise and responsibility for refining and 
carrying out innovative practices (Stulberg, Salomone and Long 2007, 184). That is, the 
principals who are empowered to introduce fundamental (revolutionary, transformative, or 
reform) change and to set performance targets within an organization depend on agents, those 
with greater technical expertise and that are closer to the practical effects of change. These 
agents will be best for refining, assessing and implementing new visions and forms of behavior 
(Stulberg, Salomone and Long 2007, 38). In order to maximize the effect of this relationship, the 
agents (field grade officers) will most likely need to clearly understand and support the intent of 
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the principal, in this case, the Chief of Staff of the Army. However, agents may not always be 
willing to support the principal even if the goal is well understood by them. 
      Agents may adversely affect Army Transformation efforts that have been either clearly 
expressed or vaguely conveyed by the principals.  According to Stulberg, Salomone and Long 
(2007, 42) agents can fail to put forward a good faith effort in support of the principal‘s interests, 
even colluding with other agencies to slow the effects of transformation. If senior leaders are not 
clear where they are headed with transformation, agents can exploit that lack of specific direction 
by withholding information, providing inadequate advice, and presenting analysis and technical 
data that either supports the status quo or generates questions about the new direction (Stulberg, 
Salomone and Long 2007, 42).  Agents behaving in this matter would be regarded as unethical 
and would not generally be tolerated in the Army, but how would a principal know that this 
sabotage and/or foot dragging even occurred in the first place? Without a clear understanding 
from senior leadership, what responsibilities are the agents shirking? Transformative change may 
be more difficult to accomplish within a relatively short timeframe, whereas an incremental 
approach may produce more favorable results for a large organization, over a longer period, 
because it may be more clearly understood by the agents. 
Bureaucratic Aspects of Army Transformation 
 The previous section described the relationship between principals and agents. Arguably, 
principals and agents exist in their relationship with one another in the context of a large 
organization or institution. It is helpful also to look at the bureaucracy as the venue in which 
these principals and agents must operate.  Any significant change in the Army most likely will 
need to occur within the existing bureaucratic structure of the Army. The accomplishment of 
significant change will rely on the bureaucratic culture, the innovative capability of the 
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bureaucracy, communication processes of the bureaucracy, and the ability of the bureaucracy to 
build consensus throughout the organization. Additionally, achieving significant or 
transformative change may be difficult if not impossible to achieve, within the framework of a 
large bureaucratic organization where there are many actors involved with differing interests. 
Finally, difficulties of identifying problems and defining transformation within a large 
bureaucracy may hinder any large-scale change.  Each of these important points will be 
discussed in the following section. 
Bureaucratic Culture 
 
 James Q. Wilson (1989) argues that all government organizations have one or more 
cultures.  He holds such cultures are comprised of the predisposition of its members, which are 
made up of different personalities. The technology of the organization, and the situational 
imperatives with which the agency must cope, give an organization a unique way of seeing and 
operating in the world (Wilson 1989, 105). Wilson argues that the imperatives of the situation 
more than the attitudes of the worker may shape the way tasks are formed (Wilson 1989, 53). 
Wilson goes on to say that the further managers (i.e. senior leaders within the Army) are 
removed from the actual work of the agency, the more their lives are shaped not by the tasks 
being performed, or the goals the agency is serving, but by the constraints placed on the agency 
by the political environment (Wilson 1989, 260).  If senior Army leaders are influenced more by 
the external environment that includes Congress, other executive agencies and departments, as 
well as the Department of Defense, then there is perhaps little room, comparatively, to consider 
the opinions of field grade officers within the Army framework on matters pertaining to 
transformation. 
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      Wilson (1989) states that tasks that are not part of the agency culture will not be 
supported with the same level of energy and resources as are devoted to traditional tasks.  For 
instance, Wilson uses the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as an example of an agency that 
resisted the new tasks of investigating organized crime and narcotics trafficking, even though 
these two areas were clearly federal violations and could easily have been within the FBI‘s 
jurisdiction (Wilson 1989, 107). Investigating these two areas, Wilson argues, required FBI 
agents to behave in ways that ran counter to the agency‘s culture and was therefore deemed to be 
too risky by some key officials.  
Where two or more cultures struggle for supremacy there will be a serious conflict as 
defenders of one aspect of the organization endeavors to dominate representatives of the other. 
Agencies will tend to resist taking on new tasks that seem incompatible with its dominant culture 
(Wilson 1989, 107-109). Using Wilson‘s (1989) argument, there may be a hesitancy of some 
within the Army to accept the Future Combat Systems (FCS) as the panacea for Army 
Transformation. If a bureaucrat‘s program (i.e. a weapon system) does not fit into the FCS 
model, then it may be reasonable for them to assume that their program may be at risk and 
therefore they may be resistant to change. 
      In a bureaucratic organization such as the Army James Q. Wilson (1989) argues that 
standard operating procedures (SOPs) are pervasive. In fact SOPs are so pervasive that how 
operators go about their jobs is more important than whether doing those jobs produces the 
desired results (Wilson 1989, 164). In other words, there is little opportunity to ―change‖ a 
method of operation and to make recommendations up the chain of command to senior leaders. 
This perhaps best represents the environment of the peace-time Army. In war the SOPs, or 
procedural methods, are replaced by craft organizations. A craft organization, Wilson argues, is 
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one in which members do not operate under the direct guidance of managers. A craft 
organization, unlike a procedural organization where a manager can observe what subordinates 
are doing but are not necessarily able to observe a particular outcome, consists of subordinates 
whose activities are hard to observe but whose outcomes are relatively easy to evaluate (Wilson 
1989, 163-165). If Army Transformation is occurring in the context of a peace-time Army 
dominated by SOPs and procedures, then how do senior leaders engage in effective 
communication with the operators at the lieutenant colonel and major level?  Allison and 
Zelikow (1999) argue that organizations, such as the U.S. Army, are so large that they prevent 
any single central authority from making all important decisions or directing all important 
activities (167). This fact may add credence to the need for standard operating procedures, which 
allow for procedures to be standardized but prevent them from being changed quickly or easily 
(Allison and Zelikow 1999, 169).   
Bureaucratic Innovation 
 
      James Q. Wilson (1989) argues that government agencies resist innovation because they 
are supposed to resist it. The author argues that SOPs are not the enemy of the organization, they 
are instead the very essence of organization and that organizations will readily accept inventions 
that facilitate the performance of existing arrangements (Wilson 1989, 221- 222). For example, 
Wilson argues that improvements in communications tend to be used by higher-level 
commanders to reduce initiative and the discretion of lower-level commanders. Wilson continues 
by arguing that armies that are most successful are those that did not attempt to control 
everything from the top, and instead allowed subordinate commanders considerable latitude 
(Wilson 1989, 228). If one of the attributes of FCS, as the transformation centerpiece, is to 
provide top-level commanders with complete battlefield information, thereby encroaching on the 
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discretion of subordinate commanders to make on-the-ground decisions, then lieutenant colonels 
and majors may be resistant to this type of intrusive capability.  
 A case in point, Wilson (1989) argues, is that the American Army might have been more 
effective in Vietnam had it not been organized around technological innovations that turned out 
to be inappropriate to the circumstances. Wilson says that the availability of the helicopter, the 
computer and sophisticated communications systems made it very convenient to centralize 
control of the war in the hands of a distant headquarters. Jobs once performed by sergeants, 
captains and majors, Wilson argues, were being performed by colonels, generals and politicians 
(Wilson 1989, 43).  If lieutenant colonels and majors view the Army Chief of Staff‘s intentions 
of fielding FCS, or any other high technology capability, as an ability to centralize control at the 
highest level, then there may be a resistance in complying with senior leadership‘s goals.    
Donald Van Meter and Carl Van Horn (1975) argue that a reason reform may fail has to 
do with the amount of change that is actually required and the level of consensus that is required.  
Van Meter and Van Horn suggest that implementation will be most successful where only 
marginal change is required and goal consensus is high.  If Army senior leadership intends to 
make broad sweeping changes in doctrine, weaponry and force structure, over a relatively short 
period of time, then there is less likelihood of success because of the magnitude that may be 
involved and the general lack of consensus on the part of bureaucrats and street-level actors. 
Herbert Kaufman (1960) argues that a high degree of conformity presents a certain set of risks, 
where in a dynamic world where changes occur, policies and procedures must change if an 
organization is to survive and prosper (234). Kaufman states that flexibility depends on the 
conception of new ideas and the adoption of the best ones.  Middle-managers and street-level 
bureaucrats who are committed to an established organization‘s goals and customary ways, and 
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dedicated to its traditions, are not likely to experiment a great deal (Kaufman 1960).  This means 
that actors at this level may be comfortable with the status quo, because they at least understand 
it and are not threatened by validating something new that they do not entirely understand or 
endorse.  
 Senior Army leadership may not be overly concerned with creativity and receptivity at 
the middle-level management level.  The three and four-star level Army officers, along with 
senior level bureaucrats and political appointees, may not be interested in the opinions of middle-
level managers or street-level bureaucrats.  Status, or differences in rank, serves as a divisive 
element in many organizations which cause a filtering and a distorting of communications up and 
down the chain of command (Kaufman 1960, 235 – 236).  Because most career officers do not 
want to rock the boat, they may tell senior Army leaders, when given the opportunity, only what 
they think they want to hear.  Additionally, senior officials may not even be concerned with or 
take seriously what subordinates have to say, and do not give them the same level of respect as 
information received from another senior official (Kaufman 1960, 66). If this is the case, then the 
degree to which middle-level managers and street-level bureaucrats can impact successful 
implementation in the Army will always be less than optimal unless the culture is changed. 
Bureaucratic Communication 
 
  Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky (1984) argue that successful implementation 
depends upon some collaboration between different organizations and departments at the local 
level. If there is action that is required by a number of agencies or organizations, as in the case of 
Army Transformation, then the degree of cooperation between those groups needs to be nearly 
perfect if there is to be successful implementation. Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) argue that if 
linkages between organizations is less than 100%, then those small deficits will accumulate and 
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create a large shortfall, or implementation deficit.  The Army, up and down and across the chain 
of command, may be in general agreement that transformation needs to occur, indeed they may 
be in general agreement about what needs to occur, but if there is any lack of commitment and or 
availability of resources then there may be an implementation deficit that could cause significant 
problems, not the least of which is some level of goal failure. 
      Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) argue that a policy‘s content shapes implementation by 
defining the arena in which the process takes place, the identity and role of the principal actors, 
the range of permissible tools for action, and supplying of resources (Pressman and Wildavsky 
1984, 174). This framework sets the stage for what should result in successful implementation, 
or goal success. All participants should be ready to contribute, as a result of effective 
coordination, to achieve a common purpose at the right time and in the right amount. If this does 
not occur, the authors claim, then it is possible that actors are ineffective because of ignorance, 
or they may disagree with how the goal is to be achieved, thereby demonstrating some level of 
disobedience.  If actors A and B disagree with goal C, then they will only coordinate by being 
told what to do by someone in the chain of command (Pressman and Wildavsky1984, 133).   
This type of coercive power may not be ideal when ―buy-in‖, collaboration, coordination and 
understanding may be needed for effective implementation in an organization the size of the 
United States Army.   
 The Army may need to depart from existing ―Cold War‖ standard operating procedures 
and begin the process of considering what is needed for  a non-bipolar world environment; where 
there is only one hegemonic force (the United States) faced with uncertain threats. Stulberg, 
Salomone and Long (2007) argue that military organizations are run by commanders who set 
doctrinal, strategic, operational, tactical, procurement objectives; and sub-units that are 
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responsible for implementing these tasks. The success of the military, these authors provide, 
depends on the senior levels of the military operating in unison with the sub-units, thereby 
permitting a smooth implementation of recognized new ways of war (Stulberg, Salomone and 
Long 2007, 184).  The authors indicate that there is a natural conflict of interest, however, 
between these two levels within the military. The sub-units seek to maintain professional 
autonomy and are committed to performing their tasks subject to the constraints imposed by 
commanders; while commanders are primarily interested in those tasks performed by the sub-
units that bear directly on their preferred objectives (184 – 185).  
 Stulberg, Salomone and Long (2007) add that when a new task is added it serves to be 
even more problematic. Senior leaders must therefore put in place mechanisms that lower the 
costs of monitoring and enforcing change for the commanders and that increase the incentives 
and inclinations for compliance among sub-units (Stulberg, Salomone and Long 2007, 185). Any 
new organizational change, especially significant change, may then be met with resistance and  
necessary coordination may not be achieved.    
Bureaucratic Consensus 
 
Charles Lindblom ([1959] 2005) argues that for complex problems to be solved there is 
an assumption that intellectual capacities and sources of information exist, along with the 
necessary time and money, as needed. Lindblom states that public administrators are most often 
discouraged from tackling complex problems and are instead encouraged to address problems by 
using a more incremental approach (Lindblom [1959] 2005, 27). Army Transformation, 
according to Lindblom‘s incremental theory, may have a better chance of success if it is executed 
over a longer period of time. John Kingdon (2003) argues that proposals that call for change are 
more likely to survive if they are compatible with the specialists, or those individuals who will 
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assess the technical feasibility of the proposed change. According to Kingdon, proposals may not 
be taken seriously if it does not represent any mainstream thinking. Any proposal that does not 
fit with the specialists‘ values have less of a chance for survival than those that do (Kingdon 
2003, 132-133). If Army lieutenant colonels and majors can be substituted for Kingdon‘s term 
―specialists‖, then Army Transformation may be difficult to achieve if these field grade officers 
do not incorporate this change into their existing set of values. 
 Charles Lindblom ([1959] 2005) argues that policy-makers, or public administrators 
along the line of senior Army leaders, realize that policies will only achieve some of what was 
intended and at the same time produce unintended consequences that they would prefer to avoid. 
By taking a more incremental approach to policy implementation or in implementing change, 
mistakes can be avoided. Lindblom says that (1) past experiences will provide foresight 
regarding consequences of further steps; (2) they need not take such big steps that would require 
predictions beyond anyone else‘s knowledge because a single step is not the last step; (3) they 
are able to test their previous predictions as they move on to the next step; and, (4) they can 
resolve an earlier error rather quickly, certainly more quickly than if there were more steps 
spread out over a longer period of time (Lindblom [1959] 2005, 37). This step process may be 
helpful as policymakers and implementers learn more about the change that they are trying to 
achieve. Charles Lindblom argues that most people approach policy problems within a 
framework given by their view of a chain of successive policy choices made up to the current 
time. Finally, Lindblom argues that the policymaker and the implementers do not share common 
knowledge, and consequently they may be thinking about the policy in different ways that may 
be puzzling to both (Lindblom [1959] 2005, 39).   This difference in understanding between the 
policymaker and implementers may be quite costly because the consequences could result in 
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significant policy failure.  Policy failure in terms of Army Transformation may be quite costly in 
terms of dollars spent and time wasted on programs that may not be relevant to Army 
Transformation. Even if a change is executed incrementally, there still may be many actors with 
their own interpretation of what needs to be accomplished in order to achieve a goal. 
   Charles E. Lindblom ([1959] 2005) advocates that policy should be achieved through a 
process he refers to as Successive Limited Comparisons.  That is, policy is continually building 
out from the current situation, step-by-step and in small degrees. Changes in policy should be 
limited to those policies that differ in relatively small degrees.  Since he refers to only small 
changes, Lindblom argues that it is only necessary, then, to study those aspects in which the 
changes or alternatives differ from the status quo. The status quo, regarding military 
transformation may need an overhaul and may require more than an incremental approach to 
policy change. Public bureaucracies, according to William Lowry (2008), are unlikely to pursue 
controversial policy changes to traditional goals except under particular circumstances. They are: 
(1) formal authorities must endorse the changes in real, explicit, resourceful, and binding ways; 
(2) non-statutory variables including socioeconomic conditions, media attention, public opinion, 
and target-group compliance, must be receptive to change (290). The ―formal authorities‖ to 
whom Lowry refers may include the important political actors referred to by Kingdon (2003) 
earlier. The ―non-statutory‖ variables may include Kingdon‘s (2003) specialists in the policy 
community who may have a stake in the outcome of any significant change.  Since transforming 
the Army may be a rather large undertaking for a public organization to pursue, then formulating 
the policy that will allow that to happen may also be considered a mammoth undertaking. 
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Army Transformation as a Wicked Problem 
 
 To the degree that there are divergent views regarding Army Transformation, a certain 
level of social complexity may exist. Complexity, along with SOP‘s, culture and communication, 
is yet another factor that could hinder the understanding that lieutenant colonels and majors 
should have about transformation.  The more actors that are involved in collaboration, the more 
socially complex activities become.  
 Similarly, the more different the actors are, the more socially complex things become 
(Conklin 2005, 3).  According to Conklin (2005), Rittel argues that with a wicked problem you 
do not understand the problem until you have developed a solution. Wicked problems have no 
stopping rule and solutions are not right or wrong. Every wicked problem is essentially unique 
and novel, thus every solution is a one-shot operation; and, wicked problems have no given 
alternative solutions (Conklin 2005, 10).  Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber (1973) suggest wicked 
problems do not have the clarifying traits relative to those associated with natural sciences or 
mathematics, which are definable and separable and may have solutions that are finable (160). 
Rittel and Webber (1973) continue by arguing that government planning, specifically in the areas 
of social or policy planning, is ill-define and relies upon political judgment, which may be 
inadequate, for resolution. In effect the there is no solution to a Wicked Problem, according to 
Rittel and Webber; the most that can be expected is that they are re-solved over and over again 
(Rittel and Webber 1973, 160).  
 The authors continue their argument by suggesting that wicked problems include nearly 
all public policy issues which may include the location of a freeway, the adjustment of a tax rate, 
the modification of school curricula, or the confrontation of crime (Rittel and Webber 18973, 
160). Rittel and Webber argue that wicked problems, as stated earlier, are different from the 
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natural science, mathematics or engineering problems in that one cannot understand the problem 
without knowing its context; one cannot meaningful search for information without the 
orientation of a solution concept; and, one cannot first understand, and then solve (Rittel and 
Webber 1973, 162). According to Rittel and Webber (1973) there are no true or false answers 
regarding planning for wicked problems. The authors argue that there are many parties that are 
equally equipped, interested or entitled to judge the solutions; although none truly has the power 
to set formal decision rules to determine correctness (163). The judgment of the numerous 
parties are likely to differ widely in order to remain consistent with their group or personal 
interests, their specific values, and their ideological preferences; the assessments coming from 
these different are expressed as ―good‖ or ―bad‖ or, as ―better or worse‖ or, as ―satisfying‖ or 
―good enough‖ (163).  
 Rittel and Webber (1973) argue that any wicked problem solution that is implemented 
will result in significant consequences over an extended period of time (163). The authors argue 
that every implemented solution is consequential and will leave outcomes that cannot be undone. 
Rittel and Webber argue, as an example, that large public works programs are effectively 
irreversible and that the consequences of such projects will irreversibly influence people, and 
will also irreversibly result in the expenditure of a large amount of money (Rittel and Webber 
1973, 163). The authors conclude by adding that when actions are effectively irreversible, and 
that every trial counts in attempting to arrive at the desired solution, every attempt to reverse a 
decision or to correct for the undesired consequences poses another set of wicked problems, 
which are in turn subject to the same dilemmas (Rittel and Webber 1973, 163). The solution for 
effecting Army transformation by one Army Chief of Staff may have irreversible consequences 
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for any subsequent chief of staff who may have a desire to engage in another and perhaps more 
appropriate course of action.  
 According to Rittel and Webber (1973) planners (such as an Army Chief of Staff or 
political actors) may terminate work on wicked problems for external reasons such as running 
out of time, money or patience; justifying a decision as ―that‘s good enough‖ or ―this is the best 
that I can do with limited resources‘ or, ―I like this solution‖ (Rittel and Webber 1973, 162). 
Army transformation may ultimately be defined by a point in time when resources are no longer 
available for transformative programs. As indicated by Rittel and Webber, defining a wicked 
problem (Army transformation is arguably a wicked problem as described by these authors, 
above) may be impossible to accomplish. It may be impossible to arrive at the same definition of 
a problem within a large bureaucratic organization where interests may either be competitive or 
in opposition with one another, and for a variety of reasons.     
Army Transformation: Problem Definition 
      Unless the policy problem is well understood and clear, then political forces throughout 
the large organization will use their ―re-definition‖ as a tool to gain advantage over other groups 
(Rochefort and Cobb 1994, 5).  Problem definition, in the context of any large organization, will 
be interpreted in the framework of standardization in order to guard against uncertainty and the 
possibility of unchartered and uncoordinated action.  This may present a significant challenge 
since transformation involves a dynamic process of translating vague visions of war into mature, 
innovative outcomes (Stulberg, Salomone and Long 2007). A vague vision provided by senior 
leaders may be a reason for why external political forces would be able to define the problem in 
terms that best suits their cause.   On the other hand, if everyone understood Army 
Transformation in the same context, this would reduce the amount of discretion that may occur 
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as a result of an ill-defined problem. Any gap between how senior Army leaders and how field 
grade officers define Army Transformation may exist as a result of an ill-defined problem. 
Conceptually Defining Army Transformation 
 
 A definition for Army Transformation was provided in Chapter 1 of this dissertation. 
However, if Army Transformation means radical change then more discussion is needed in 
describing how an organization goes from one state of affairs to a fundamentally new one. 
Adrianna Kezar (2005) argues that radical change includes busting loose from an existing 
orientation and the entire transformation of organizing principles and structure (Kezar 2005, 
636).  The author states radical change is complex and wide-ranging, requiring dramatic changes 
in strategy and abrupt departures from traditional work, structures, job requirements, and 
cultures. This all results in a complete change in the way things are organized (Kezar 2005, 636). 
Unlike others who may describe radical or transformative change as a process, Kezar argues that 
radical change can be both evolutionary and revolutionary. The author states that while 
evolutionary radical change occurs slowly over time, revolutionary change happens quickly and 
affects all parts of the organization at once. Kezar (2005) goes on to argue that change within an 
organization involves the alteration of values, beliefs, habits, myths, and rituals, which are rarely 
abandoned completely. History and traditions bind an organization and they are very difficult to 
alter. Radical change will only occur, according to Kezar (2005), if traditions or values are no 
longer serving individuals. In fact, Army Transformation has been referred to alternatively as a 
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). If Kezar (2005) is correct when she argues that radical 
change happens quickly, is considered revolutionary and has an end-state, then Army 
Transformation may be more incremental in nature and less radical or transformative.  The three 
Army Chiefs of Staff, who will be addressed in more detail in Chapter 5, may be describing both 
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an evolutionary and revolutionary change in the Army which could result in some level of 
ambiguity. Perhaps the term Army Transformation is a combination of a revolutionary end-state 
and an evolving process. 
             A definition of Army Transformation that combines an evolutionary process with a 
revolutionary end-state might be useful.  If transformation means a significant change from the 
status quo then it may be inferred that such change is radical in nature; it may therefore be useful 
to begin with that premise as a definition. Army Transformation, or indeed transformation 
involving any large bureaucratic organization, may mean to radically change a current 
organizational structure, doctrine, technology, or culture. Transformation may mean to 
fundamentally and completely change from one state of affairs to another; to be different from 
what was before. This may be a process that evolves over time or it may be a revolutionary new 
goal where there is a defined end-state.  Army Transformation may need to be framed by the 
Army Chiefs of Staff as either being evolutionary or revolutionary in order for there to be a clear 
understanding of what goal is being pursued.  
 As John P. Kotter (1996, 143) argues, changing anything of significance in highly 
interdependent systems often means changing nearly everything. Transformation can become a 
huge exercise that plays itself out over years. Kotter argues that transformation can become a 
decade-long process in which hundreds, or even thousands of people help lead and manage 
dozens of change projects. Outstanding leaders, Kotter argues, will think long-term; decades or 
even centuries are not impossible to consider.  Kotter argues that leaders should take the time to 
ensure that all the new practices are firmly grounded in the organization‘s culture before moving 
on to another assignment (Kotter 1996, 143-144). While firmly grounding new practices into an 
organization‘s culture, as provided by Kotter, it may still be difficult to actually change the 
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culture of the organization from one Chief of Staff to the next. Kotter‘s arguments may add 
credence to the definition of transformation that has been constructed here.  
 Leaders may need to first cause a revolutionary thought process to occur regarding 
significant change, and then ensure through evolutionary practices that the new state of affairs 
becomes embedded in the organization‘s culture.  G. Royston and C.R. Hinings (1996) argue that 
radical change occurs when an organization moves from one  well established set of procedures 
and practices to another. These authors continue by arguing that if an organization were to move 
from one template to another, the change would be radical because it represents the breaking of 
the mold defined by some interpretive scheme. For instance, the authors provide an example that 
if members of a professional accounting organization hired a non-accountant as chief executive 
officer, charged with the responsibility of monitoring and evaluating senior professionals, there 
may be a possible movement toward a new template; the new structure and responsibilities 
would not fit the established clan orientation, or existing interpretative scheme (Royston and 
Hinings 1996, 1026). This interpretive scheme, albeit it somewhat different within the Army 
where senior leaders tend to rise up through the existing rank structure, to which Royston and 
Hinings refer is key in trying to determine if field grade officers interpret Army Transformation 
as the Army Chiefs of Staff had intended.          
 Is there a gap between how senior Army leaders define Army Transformation and the 
way in which Army lieutenant colonels and majors understand it? If ―transformation‖ is a term 
that is comparable to the term ―radical,‖ then a definition of Army Transformation may not be all 
that easy to determine, and therefore it is unlikely that all members of an organization have the 
same understanding. This difference in understanding may be as a result of differing sub-
cultures, norms and practices that may exist within a large bureaucratic organization.  
71 
 
 T. Mahnken and J.R. FitzSimmons (2003) argue that radical change in a military 
organization may in fact be open to interpretation. Possibly due to their views of what 
transformation means, officers within a military service may consider any transformation to be 
only marginal improvements to current weapon systems, force structure and doctrine, as opposed 
to a fundamentally new organizational structure and capability (Mahnken and FitzSimmons 
2003, 143). Mahnken and FitzSimmons also argue that it is difficult to implement ―radical‖ or 
―transformative‖ change unless there is broad support within the officer corps (2003, 113). Since 
the military will be the practitioners of any new method of fighting, those service members need 
to be enthusiastic about any new technology, operational concepts, or organizational structure 
that they are asked to embrace. Indeed, officers are experts in military matters and perhaps 
should be leading efforts in adopting new and transformative methods of war-fighting (Mahnken 
and FitzSimmons 2003, 114).  
 These authors also argue that few officers will arise as true innovators. However the 
existence of a climate that promotes innovation within the officer corps may encourage 
individuals both to generate new ideas and to remain in the service to bring them about (114). 
Mahnken and FitzSimonds (2003) argue that a large percentage of career oriented officers (i.e. 
field grade officers) will rise to senior leadership positions within their services in the next ten to 
twenty years. Career officers are the recognized experts, the authors continue, in military affairs 
in the United States. They should be expected to take a leading role in determining the need for 
any change (Mahnken and FitzSimonds 2003, 114). However, these authors argue that currently 
most officers in the U.S. military are uncertain about what needs to be done for the U.S. to 
compete effectively with future adversaries (138). Mahnken and FitzSimonds argue that a large 
percentage of officers are not confident in their understanding of radical change and what 
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technology, concepts and organizations might be needed (Mahnken and FitzSimonds 2003, 138).  
If the future senior leaders have a difficult time understanding what is needed in the way of a 
Twenty-First Century force, based on current transformation efforts, then the Army may be at 
risk in not achieving its desired goals.   The immediate problem may have more to do with a 
principal (the Chief of Staff of the Army) not enjoying positive results from agents, or field 
grade officers. Perhaps there is a need for a change in the decision making process that is 
currently being used at an attempt to achieve transformation.  
General Limits of Change in the Military 
      In order to address how military reform is being accomplished through existing decision 
making efforts, it is useful to move away from the more theoretical discussion and into an area 
that describes the general limitations of military transformation. Transformation, by definition, 
indicates that such change is most likely not incremental in nature. Stulberg, Salomone and Long 
(2007, 15) argue that transformation does not merely encompass the development and use of new 
technologies, but constitute qualitative changes in organizational strategies, procedures and 
measures of effectiveness for performing critical tasks. Unless the lieutenant colonels and majors 
recognize the course for change then achieving transformative change may be very difficult to 
achieve.  
 According to the authors, military service learning is incremental, which is manifested by 
the combination of experimentation and the updating of ideas on one hand, and the changes in 
core tasks, training and education procedures and mission requirements on the other (Stulberg, 
Salomone and Long 2007, 23).  An incremental change process may also allow for a clearer 
understanding of how field grade officers will be able to advance for the remainder of their 
careers. The authors argue that radical military change is successful if senior commanders, such 
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as the Army Chief of Staff, create promotional pathways for junior officers that encourage the 
latter to spearhead new ways of war and provide avenues for them to eventually dominate the 
service (Stulberg, Salomone and Long 2007, 21). Although the Army may desire some 
transformative change to occur some outside intervention, such as legislative action, may need to 
intervene in order for the rank and file of this military service to understand any radical change 
in the same way.  
 Murdock, et al (2004) argue that a Defense Department designed for a massive, 
industrial-era opponent is clearly not suited for combating covert, non-state actors in the 
Information Age (Murdock, et al 2004, 17-19).  Murdock, et al (2004) argue that the U.S. 
military has outdated organizational structures that remain problematic. The authors indicate that 
the Defense Department is plagued with redundancies and unnecessary bureaucracy that 
consume resources that would be better utilized by operational troops. More to the point, 
Murdock et al (2004) argue that these duplicative procedures and very large headquarters staffs 
have created a wasteful bureaucracy that is drug down into continuous coordination processes 
(Murdock et al 2006, 19). These continuous coordination processes, that Murdock and his 
colleagues identify, may result in some level of confusion of what senior Army leadership 
intends by Army Transformation.  If the bureaucracy in the Defense Department is a reason for 
not achieving Army Transformation, then perhaps the issue needs to be addressed more 
specifically through the legislative process.  
        Frederick Kagan (2006) is instrumental in defining how the military will, at the same 
time, provide for the national security interest of the United States as well as transform the 
military for the Twenty-first Century.  The author argues that the military must incorporate 
political objectives at all levels of planning. He uses the aftermath of the Vietnam War to make 
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the case that the Army may have been in the transformation process since that era. If the Army 
has been in the transformation process since the Vietnam era, then it is clear that the process and 
goals may need to be better defined by the policy makers and political leaders. He argues that 
transformation is a rather weak concept; the term is based almost entirely on the defense policy it 
was coined to describe. Kagan (2006) argues transformation means change; it is used to imply 
large change, but it is difficult to identify what large change means. It is also not clear what the 
objective of transformation is: Is the goal to change the nature of war, or does it seek to change 
the U.S. military as an organization (Kagan 2006, 311)?  Kagan continues by arguing that 
transformation is what someone says it is, and nothing more than that (Kagan 2006, 311). If 
Kagan is accurate, then there may be no need to define Army Transformation unless it is used 
primarily to justify new technology and weapon systems. 
Kagan (2006) argues, again, that Army Transformation is what someone says it is. If that 
someone includes both the Army Chief of Staff and any field grade officer currently serving in 
the Army then there may a difference in how Army Transformation is defined. Chun and Rainey 
(2005) argue that an organizational goal loses meaning and becomes ambiguous when different 
interpretations are either allowed or provided (Chun and Rainey 2005, 2). In this context Kagan 
(2006) as well as Chun and Rainey (2005) both suggest that Army Transformation may very well 
be defined differently depending on which level of leadership position an officer might occupy. 
This difference could also be a challenge when the Army Chief of Staff, in his role as a 
―principal‖, has a goal in mind that he expects field grade officers, as agents, to achieve.  When 
the mission statement is easier to understand, explain, and communicate, there will be less 
leeway for interpretation and more shared agreement about its meaning (Chun and Rainey 2005, 
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3). Any mission statement that might be available regarding Army Transformation may not be 
adequate enough as to inform the agent of the principal‘s intent.  
    Andrew J. Bacevich (2005) argues that lieutenants, captains, and colonels know their 
business on an operational battlefield, whether the leaders at the uppermost echelon of command 
understand the operational and strategic imperatives of war may be another matter (Bacevich 
2005, 230). While the U.S. involvement in Iraq has generated great controversy, the performance 
of three-and four-star U.S. commanders have received little attention; yet Bacevich contends 
their performance has been at best mediocre (Bacevich 2005, 230). If this is descriptive of the 
internal culture of the Army, then it is unlikely that general officers will want to attract the 
attention of political actors, and therefore threaten the discretion that they have been given by 
Congress in determining what the Army should look like for the Twenty-first Century. The 
bureaucracy within the Defense Department in general, and within the Army in particular, may 
need to be revisited if true transformation is to be accomplished. 
 Max Boot (2006) argues that the key to successful innovation is having an effective 
bureaucracy. Boot cites the Prussian military‘s success in the nineteenth century as not being 
based so much on technology, but more on the general staff which determined how best to use 
new innovations (Boot 2006, 463). The author states that the bureaucracy is very important in the 
realization of transformation, or in a revolution of military affairs, which requires more than just 
new technology. He argues that radical change also requires revolutions in organization, 
doctrine, training, and personnel; in short, the bureaucracy as a whole. Boot goes so far as to 
suggest that successful adaptation includes changing the kinds of people who are rewarded 
within the military structure.  
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 Boot argues that in the nineteenth century, with the rise of railroads and steamships, the 
importance of logisticians and engineers increased; two groups that had previously been despised 
by traditional army officers. Boot continues by offering that there is no rule of thumb to suggest 
how much or how little a military should change in response to technological developments. 
Each era is presented with its own peculiar set of challenges, but the questions are generally the 
same. They are: (1) should a country pay for more traditional infantrymen, or push resources into 
transformational programs; and, (2) should they continue to build traditional tanks or switch to 
other platforms (Boot 2006, 466)?  Boot argues that the wisest course of action is to feel one‘s 
way along with a careful study, radical experimentation, and freewheeling war-games; as 
somewhat of a paradox, revolutionary transformation often can be achieved in evolutionary 
increments. Transformation need not sweep aside all old weapons or old ways of doing things, 
the idea is to think about how to make the transition, not about how to eliminate current 
weapons.  How the challenges are effectively addressed may rely on the agility of the 
bureaucracy. Boot (2006) argues that the U.S. military is hindered by a sluggish, bloated 
bureaucracy that has resisted countless reform efforts. If this argument is true, then past military 
success may have occurred not so much based on planning, but as an ―ad-hoc‖ response to an 
emergency or other important set of events that could not be ignored.  
Past Commentary on Current U.S. Army Transformation Efforts 
         The discussion that was just provided addresses the general limits of change in the 
military, but it is also useful to examine how current efforts to transform the Army are being 
viewed. This section will review the commentary and criticisms that are being made regarding 
current transformation efforts within the Army.  Additionally, this section will review the 
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literature of more scholarly and empirical examinations of both past and present transformation 
attempts.    
 Since before the Revolutionary War, the United States has often taken an ―ad hoc‖ 
approach to winning wars (Carafano 2007, 1).  James Carafano (2007, 2) provides this quote by 
Winston Churchill who said, ―Americans can always be counted on to do the right thing…after 
they have exhausted all other possibilities.‖ The United States has successfully engaged in 
peacekeeping operations after it has fought a war, but when transitioning from ―war-fighter‖ to 
―peacekeeper‖ the Army appears to naturally start all over again as if it had never done it before 
(Carafano 2007, 1). Carafano calls this the rhythm of habits, every time we do ―peacekeeping‖ 
we basically have to learn how to perform that role all over again, because the U.S. military 
appears to have purged lessons that might have been learned previously. For instance, Carafano 
argues the U.S. has traditionally done a poor job of doing post-conflict planning before and 
during conflict. The military has normally taken its warfighters, who are not well suited for post-
conflict operations, and has attempted to convert them to a peacekeeping role. Eventually, 
Carafano argues, the U.S. figures out that the military forces that fought so well in battle are not 
well equipped, trained and organized to win the peace (Carafano 2007, 2). Army transformation, 
by all indication, will include being able to respond to the full spectrum of battlefield 
requirements, which include peacekeeping operations after any battle has been fought. Carafano 
argues that the U.S. has never accomplished that part of the mission very well, if the U.S. plans 
for that scenario in the future then some transformation may actually occur in at least this regard. 
 However, Peter Dombrowski and Eugene Gholz (2006) believe current transformation 
efforts will only succeed if they are supported by the nation‘s leaders. They argue that 
contemporary military transformation cannot emerge spontaneously as Carafano argues. Instead, 
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it must be nurtured, encouraged, and promoted by civilian and military leaders who are well-
placed to influence national strategy, military doctrine, and the various implementation processes 
by which the armed forces are trained, organized and equipped (Dombrowski and Gholz 2006, 
7).  
 Military transformation appears to be rather open-ended regarding how services will 
define ―transformation‖ for their own purposes. According to Carafano, Spencer and Gudgel 
(2005), the ―capabilities-based planning‖ component of transformation was embraced by 
Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld, and emphasized developing new military means not tied to 
any one national security threat, but instead focused on what military forces could accomplish 
with different operational concepts
6
, organizations, and technologies. The authors argue that this 
rather open-ended nature of transformation allowed the services to define for themselves what 
the processes would be to arrive at transformation. There were no measurements or metrics 
provided that would hold anyone accountable for progress, or the lack thereof. Carafano, Spencer 
and Gudgel (2005) argue, therefore, that the services, to include the Army, could label 
acquisition programs that had begun before the end of the Cold War as ―transformational‖, or 
define their goals and rationale that had the appropriate adjectives of ―faster‖, ―lighter‖ and more 
―lethal‖ (Carafano, Spencer and Gudgel 2005, 2). In this sense, transformation becomes simply a 
buzzword to justify decisions Army leaders have made. 
 Combat Arms (CA), Combat Support CS), and Combat Service Support (CSS)  officers 
as sub-groups within the Army may each have a different perception of what transformation 
                                                   
6
 The operational concept frames how Army forces, operating as a part of a joint force (in 
association with the sister military services) conduct operations.  It describes how Army forces 
adapt to meet the distinct requirements of land operations. The concept is broad enough to 
describe operations now and in the future. The Army‘s operational concept is full spectrum 
operations; it includes the concepts of offensive, defensive and stability or civil support 
operations simultaneously (Army Field Manual 3-0 2008, 1-31).  
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means to them. All officers may view transformation in the context of new equipment and 
weapon systems that are being fielded. However, doctrine that includes changing tactics and 
other new techniques and procedures may cause subgroups to view transformation somewhat 
differently. Some officers may serve most of their entire careers in tactical organizations (TOE 
or table of organization and equipment) while others may serve most of their careers in 
administrative organizations (TDA or table of distribution and allowances).  
 Although one‘s branch is a clear indication of who an Army officer is, an officer‘s 
perception of transformation may be influenced more by his or her history of assignments within 
the Army. However, officers tend to be personally associated with a subculture within the Army 
based primarily on their branch insignia (infantry, armor, artillery, quartermaster, etc). 
  If Army officers do not share the same view of  transformation due as a result of any 
subcultures differences that may exist within the Army, then those differences may be 
representative of a larger problem that defense organizations experience when trying to 
implement change. Amy Zegart (1999) makes the point that if National Defense focused 
agencies have a hard time collaborating and cooperating, how will we be able to determine the 
force that is necessary to deal with  various contingencies in the future? She argues that agencies 
and departments have their own agendas, missions, cultures, routines, and ways of viewing the 
world – resources, goals, and incentives of various agencies all differ from the president‘s goals 
and objectives. This embedded culture will make transformation a difficult and complex task; 
assuming it can be achieved without an emergency which causes an ad-hoc solution that will 
then be institutionalized for the future (Zegart,1999).   The difficulty in achieving Army 
Transformation may be in part as a result of policy makers and political leaders not providing 
clear planning guidance.  
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The Role of Future Combat Systems 
 
      Senior Defense Department leaders, such as former Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld, believed that the military of the Twenty-first Century will be more heavily dependent 
on high-technology information systems and less reliant on ground troops, such as infantrymen 
(McNaugher 2008).  Others in the defense establishment believe, however, that high-technology 
is but one aspect of the equation needed to successfully transform the Army for the Twenty-first 
Century. Max Boot argues that for there to be a successful revolution in military affairs (i.e. 
transformation) the adaptation of the military organization (which includes infantrymen), along 
with requisite changes in training and doctrine, will also need to adapt in order to meet Twenty-
first Century threats (McNaugher 2008).  These two differing positions are the reason for the 
primary research question: What does the term Army Transformation mean to both senior 
leaders and field grade officers?     
           Greg Jaffe (2006) argues that four-star generals, the Army‘s top-ranking military officers 
who entered the military in the early 1970s, spent most of their careers rebuilding an Army that 
had been damaged by an unpopular Vietnam War.  Jaffe (2006) points out that these officers 
were shaped by the Cold War and their focus was on how to defeat a Soviet-style army. 
Conversely, Jaffe (2006) adds, today‘s younger officers up to and including majors and 
lieutenant colonels, have been shaped by experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan and they may see 
the world differently. The research question directly addresses these separate views and how 
those views may result in a divergent definition of what Army Transformation means to these 
separate groups.  Does the development of a new weapon system that can address both a 
conventional threat more closely aligned with past experiences, as well as any perceived threat of 
the future serve as an adequate indication for how senior Army leaders view transformation?   
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      Under President George W. Bush‘s administration, Defense Department research, 
development, test and evaluation funding increased significantly with the intent of creating 
battlefield technology is needed for the future. The guiding principle is that if significant 
advances are made in precision munitions, real-time data dissemination, and other modern 
technologies, combined with appropriate war-fighting doctrine and organization, then the U.S. 
can transform warfare (O‘Hanlon 2005).  The inference that can be made is that if the Defense 
Department provides new technological capabilities, then the doctrine and military organization 
required to support the new technologies will follow. The Army‘s response to this new 
technological mandate is the development of the Future Combat Systems. 
 Other authors have suggested that current efforts transformation are about  more than just 
about FCS. FCS is important to Army transformation because, as we will see in Chapter 5, the 
Army chiefs of staff have so indicated. While FCS may indeed be very important in achieving 
transformation, there are other factors that are also relevant. David Kassing (2003) argues that in 
the context of transformation, the FCS is but one piece (277). To the degree that there is a lack of 
consensus  as to whether FCS represents the preponderancy of the Army‘s transformation efforts, 
then there may be a gap  that exists in the meaning of transformation.  Kassing argues that the 
overarching goal of Army transformation is to make the Army‘s heavy forces more responsive 
and its light forces more sustainable in combat operations. (276). The author argues in 2003 that 
the Army had originally intended to proceed along three paths toward transformation: 1. To 
modernize and maintain readiness with the Current Force (i.e., today‘s army); 2. To develop an 
Interim Force that can be obtained rather quickly by purchasing weapon systems that have 
already been developed; and 3. Preparing for the operational and organizational concepts of the 
Objective Force, the army of the future (Kassing 2003, 276). While others, including the chiefs 
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of staff that will be  discussed later in this dissertation, may have the viewpoint that FCS is either 
the centerpiece of or at least a very key component of transformation, Kassing (2003) argues that 
transformation includes more than just the FCS; it includes new helicopters and the artillery‘s 
Indirect Fire program (277). Kassing argues that there will also be significant costs for new 
command, control, computer and communications equipment, along with intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. These new capabilities are in addition to what is 
formally known as the FCS program (Kassing 2003, 277).  
 Andrew Krepinevich (2009) argues that the Army has proposed spending over $150 
billion on FCS; yet the FCS systems are optimized for traditional conventional warfare rather 
than the persistent irregular warfare the Army now confronts (Krepinevich 2009, 31). As 
Krepinevich (2009) argues, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates cancelled the eight combat 
vehicles portion of the FCS program which in effect terminated the procurement program (31). 
Kassing (2003) argued that Army transformation included more than just FCS; if FCS is no 
longer, then what other initiatives have also ceased to exist? Again, as we will see in Chapter 5, 
the chiefs of staff view FCS as the major component of transformation. Others, including field 
grade officers and defense experts, may have a different view of how FCS drives transformation. 
If FCS does not survive as a program but the Army remains resilient in its efforts to transform, 
then it appears that the Army  may have gone down a long road, over the last decade or so, 
having indicated that transformation was mostly about FCS. 
The Role of the Entire Organization 
 
      While FCS may be viewed as the centerpiece of Army Transformation by senior Army 
leaders, transformation is fundamentally an organizational issue, according to Stulberg and his 
colleagues (Stulberg, Salomone and Long 2007). To them, Army transformation involves 
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changes in goals, actual strategies and/or the structure of a military organization. The way to 
measure success is based on the adoption of a new primary mission, new technologies, and new 
operational methods that, taken as a whole, lead to a major restructuring of the existing 
organizational landscape. They argue that transformation consists of a new way of war, with new 
ideas of how the components of the organization relate to each other and to the enemy, and new 
organizational procedures conform to those ideas (Stulberg, Salomone and Long 2007, 15).  
These authors clearly indicate that Army transformation is far more than just a family of new 
military vehicles, for example, the standard operating procedures (SOPs) of a peace time 
bureaucracy must also be re-considered in order to reflect new and projected organizational 
needs. SOP‘s must be revised to reflect a transformed military. SOP‘s represent processes and 
procedures that describe how tasks are to be accomplished within a large bureaucracy like the 
U.S. Army. If an army transforms itself into a new or different organization, then new SOP‘s will 
need to be available that reflect that transformed organization. However, being able to consider 
Army Transformation in the context of more than just a new family of weapon systems may be 
restricted by the experiences of senior Army leaders; and well established processes and 
procedures may not be all that easy to change. 
 Andrew Bacevich (2010) argues that the planning that preceded Operation Desert Storm 
in 1991 looked to the past more than to the future. This was going to be a conventional war in 
that the Army would disregard experiences in Vietnam and instead focus on heavy combat 
operations. The Army, Bacevich provides, had incrementally developed heavy weapon systems, 
such as the tank, that would have impressed any officer who had served from the 1940s to the 
1980s.  Additionally, those same officers would have also recognized the organizational 
structure, operations, and institutional culture that went with these newer systems (Bacevich 
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2010, 156). The point is that the Army organization during that era, to include its weapon 
systems, was clearly understood by all; this clarity would not be the case as the Army departed 
from the well established organizational structure that was familiar to so many.  According to 
Bacevich (2010), the institutional Army has changed so much that it is barely recognizable. 
Specifically, those solders who served from the 1940s to the 1980s, or even the 1990s, would 
find the language being used by senior Army leaders today incomprehensible. According to 
Bacevich, the Army‘s senior leadership is using terms that are completely divorced from 
historical experiences and may in fact be at radical odds with what is going on right now 
(Bacevich 2010, 175-177). If the author is correct, then there is good reason to believe that Army 
Transformation may indeed mean something different up and down the chain of command. 
Previous Empirical Examinations of Military Change  
 Having discussed past attempts to reform the U.S. military in Chapter 2, and having 
discussed some of the potential limitations to organizational change, generally, and commentary 
on Army transformation attempts, specifically, in this chapter, it would be useful at this point to 
examine scholarly empirical examinations into the effectiveness of military transformation 
efforts.  Three studies provide some insight into how the military manages transformation. The 
first study provides an overview of how the Defense Department prepares for war during 
peacetime generally, focusing primarily on the late- and post-Vietnam eras. The second study 
endeavored to determine whether Army personnel believed the current Army transformation 
effort is either revolutionary or evolutionary in nature – that is, whether junior and 
noncommissioned officers believe transformation is leading to a radical shift in how the Army 
operates, or is instead simply resulting in incremental changes. The last study sought to 
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determine the things that serve as facilitators and as obstacles in achieving significant change 
within the Department of Defense.  
 Suzanne Nielsen (2003) conducted the first study examining how the U.S. military 
prepared for war. In this work she looked at the dynamics of peacetime military reform and was 
able to provide a good comparison of how previous military transformation efforts have fared. 
She takes a ―structured, focused comparison7‖ approach and draws out lessons in interrelated 
case studies by applying them to a single comprehensive analytical framework. She employs 
―process-tracing8‖ making the decision-making process the center of the investigation.  This may 
be an important consideration when viewing how senior leaders make decisions regarding Army 
transformation matters. Nielsen used the U.S. Army environment of the late 1960s and 1970s as 
the timeframe for her research. The author specifically looked at the efforts of General William 
C. Westmoreland (1968-1972), Generals Creighton W. Abrams and Frederick C. Weyand (1972-
1976), and the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)
9
 from 1973-
1982. Nielsen chose these three generals who served as Army chiefs of staff, along with 
TRADOC, for purposes of her dissertation largely because these individuals and this Army 
organization, in the timeframe of the 1970s and the early 1980s, were involved in the process of 
                                                   
7
 A structured, focused comparison is an attempt to draw out lessons available in the interrelated 
case studies in Nielsen‘s dissertation by applying to them a single comprehensive analytical 
framework (Nielsen 2003, 43).   
8
 A decision-making process that is the center of investigation. It attempts to uncover what 
stimuli the actors attend to; the decision process that makes use of these stimuli to arrive at 
decisions; and the actual behavior that then occurs; the effects of various institutional 
arrangements on attention, processing, and behavior (Nielsen 2003, 44).  
9
 TRADOC is a four-star level organization within the Army that was established on July 1, 1973 
for the initial purpose of redirecting the Army‘s effort in training and force modernization after 
the end of the Vietnam War, and the need to respond to the lessons of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War 
in the Middle East. By making General William E. DePuy, the former Army Vice-Chief of Staff, 
the first commander of TRADOC, there was an expectation that this new senior command would 
have immediate legitimacy throughout the Army.  
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the Army recovery following Vietnam and what it needed to accomplish in any future war that 
might occur in Europe.  
 Her focus centered on the dynamics of peacetime military reform, in this case, the change 
that was pursued by the U.S. Army toward the end and after the Vietnam War. She compared 
other reform efforts that included the U.S. Army in the 1950s (following World War II and the 
Korean War), the French Army between the Franco-Prussian War and World War I, and the 
British and German Armies between World War I and World War II.  
 Nielsen (2003) presents four basic findings. First, she finds that uniformed military 
leaders are essential to the process of military reform. Although this point may be intuitively 
obvious, Nielsen argues serious problems result when uniformed leaders  disagree about an 
army‘s role within a country‘s national security strategy . Nielsen may be suggesting that 
uniformed military leaders need to form some consensus in order to effectively support the 
national security strategy.  
 She uses the U.S. Army during Eisenhower Administration of the 1950s as an example. 
President Eisenhower‘s viewed the Army‘s role in a future war was largely to provide the needed 
police force after nuclear devastation. However, this view conflicted with the view held by senior 
officers in the military. This conflict contributed to a disconnect within the Army leadership and 
ultimately led to dysfunctional efforts to change the structure of its combat divisions (Nielsen 
2003, 468).
10
  
                                                   
10
 In 1956 General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chief of Staff, formed the new Pentomic Division and 
would have them fielded by the end of fiscal year 1958. This required the Army to change the 
structure of all of its combat divisions. Pentomic refers to a division‘s grouping of 5 for 
subordinate commands (brigades, battalions, companies), while the second half refers to the 
division's organic nuclear capability (Nielsen (2003, 352). 
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 According to Nielsen, General Matthew B. Ridgway, Army Chief of Staff from 1953 – 
1955, did not agree with Eisenhower‘s view of the Army‘s role and was not re-nominated to 
continue as chief of staff. His successor, General Maxwell D. Taylor, Army Chief of Staff from 
1955 – 1959, responded by creating the Pentomic divisions. The dysfunctional aspect that 
Nielsen refers to may be a result of the fact that the Pentomic divisions were structured to take 
advantage of advances in communications technology, as well as vehicle and equipment 
modernization efforts that were not forthcoming. Additionally, in these new divisions there were 
fewer opportunities for field grade command and staff opportunities, which created a morale 
problem within the officer ranks. To make matters worse, as a result of budget cuts during the 
1950s, the Army went from the 20 divisions it had during the Korean War to 14 divisions in 
1961; this made even fewer command and staff opportunities available for field grade officers. In 
the end, the Pentomic division experiment would prove to be a failure and the Army would 
return to its traditional division structure during the Vietnam War (Nielsen (2003, 355–360).  
 In the 1950s the chiefs of staff appeared to have rejected the president‘s vision for the 
Army‘s role, and when the Army did respond by fielding Pentomic divisions, it produced a 
divisional organization that was not fully functional and had to be replaced with a more 
traditional divisional organization. Ridgway did not respond in the way the president expected 
and was not allowed to continue as the chief of staff. Taylor responded by fielding a divisional 
model that was not effective. It is difficult to determine if the senior Army leadership was 
entirely responsible for not meeting the expectations of the Commander-In-Chief, in Nielsen‘s 
illustration, or if the institutional Army rejected the idea as a whole. The army that would fight 
the Vietnam War in the 1960s and 1970s would also have its challenges.  
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 The era beginning with General Westmoreland as Army Chief of Staff, to be followed by 
General Abrams and General Weyand and the establishment of TRADOC, may be viewed as a 
period of significant change within the Army. The Army had engaged in an unconventional war 
based largely on counterinsurgency operations, it wanted to now return to its more conventional 
roots where it would focus on the likely scenario of a large Soviet force engaging in large 
offensive operations in Western Europe.  Nielsen mentioned that Army Chief of Staff General 
William Westmoreland focused on the threat to the Army‘s claim on manpower that stemmed 
from the all-volunteer manpower policy and his awareness of the Army‘s internal problems. The 
internal problems had more to do with re-building an army that had been seriously strained 
during the course of a long and protracted war in Vietnam (Nielsen (2003,75-76).Westmoreland 
described his tasks as ―building a force structure to support national strategy; developing 
professional competence; restoring standards weakened by the stresses and strains of a lengthy 
war; making Army life more attractive by providing adequate facilities and amenities; and 
developing the weapons, equipment and tactical doctrine necessary to deal successfully with 
conflicts of the future (Nielsen (2003, 76). Westmoreland accomplished much of what he 
achieved as chief of staff by commissioning studies and then following up on programs. His 
reforms involved personnel management systems as well as professional education and training. 
According to Nielsen, Westmoreland made less progress in implementing organizational 
recommendations and in modernization efforts. The reason that Westmoreland may not have 
achieved his plans had to do with the overall condition of the Army and the political landscape at 
the time (Nielsen (2003, 151-153). 
  Generals Abrams and Weyand were U.S. Army Chiefs of Staff from October 1972 – 
September 1976. Nielsen refers to both of these chiefs of staff in a single era because General 
89 
 
Abrams died in office in 1974, or halfway through his appointment as chief of staff, and 
Weyand, the Vice Chief of Staff under Abrams, would serve the remainder of his time, or until 
1976. Abrams and Weyand were able to benefit from the actions General Westmoreland took to 
evolve from a military of conscription to that of a volunteer army, and the plans that he made for 
rebuilding a war-fatigued army. The issues that Abrams and Weyand had to address were the 
threats to the Army in the areas of resources and stability, while at the same time enabling the 
Army to be able to respond to the demands of the current national security strategy and the 
nature of future conflict. (Nielsen (2003, 469).  These officers developed strong relationships 
with civilian leaders in DoD, set clear priorities, avoided staffing key decisions through a 
consensus-oriented process, and developed and articulated a strategic rationale for the role of the 
Army. Abram‘s, as well as Weyand‘s. major reforms included the reorganization and the 
streamlining of the Army‘s staff and command structure, creating a 16 division army, 
reinvigorating the active Army‘s relationship with the reserve components, and setting the stage 
for the Army‘s future modernization. Part of the reorganization efforts of 1973 included the 
creation of TRADOC (Nielsen (2003, 218-221).  
  Nielsen also found that peacetime military reform is about more than doctrinal change, 
or the way in which an army prepares for, conducts and concludes military operations. In order 
for a military organization to be able to implement its doctrine successfully, reform must also 
come with appropriate training practices, personnel policies, organization, equipment, and leader 
development programs in place in order to implement the change.  Because of the importance of 
comprehensive change, military organizations require an entity with broad authority over the 
development of the organization to bring it about. Nielsen uses the transformation of the 
German Army as an example of how an entity with broad authority made a positive difference 
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for change. Nielsen argues that the German Army embarked on a comprehensive program that 
would effectively the German army as an organization (Nielsen (2003, 439). She points out that 
at the top of the organizational structure there was a single individual, the army commander-in-
chief that had broad authority over the development of the entire army and a budget office that 
worked directly for him. Additionally there were two entities below him, the general staff and 
the weapons office. The general staff was responsible, largely, for controlling the military‘s day-
to-day organization. The weapons office was responsible for research and development as well 
as equipment purchasing. Under a single authority, Nielsen argues, a single individual ensured 
that the general staff and weapons office pursued a coherent program. In addition, a system of 
personnel rotation between the general staff and the weapons office further insured that their 
efforts would be closely integrated (Nielsen (2003, 440).  
 Suzanne Nielsen‘s research indicates that successful transformation within the Army 
depends largely on senior leadership creating an environment that promotes and encourages 
ideas leading to significant change. Additionally, she describes an army that pushed back from 
the Commander-In-Chief and his vision for a post-nuclear army, and instead concentrated on 
promoting a conventional and more traditional division-based army that would address all future 
threat scenarios. Because of the Army‘s preference for conventional warfare, it was ill-prepared 
for the guerilla and counter-insurgency tactics of the Vietnam War. Nielsen‘s findings are 
consistent with this research and the Army‘s initiative to transform itself over the last decade. 
Beginning in 1999, the chiefs of staff appear to have a vision for transforming the army that may 
not have been consistent with that of political leaders, up to and including the Commander-In-
Chief. At the same time, it is important that the chief of staff, or a single senior actor with broad 
authority to effect change, ensures an environment for change and mitigates any conflict that 
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may occur during the process. Nielsen indicates that there will be disagreement within the Army 
for how change occurs; that appears to be the case as transformation encounters similar 
difficulties in the 21
st
 Century.   
 John M. House (2005) provides a study to determine whether current U.S. Army 
transformation efforts is evolutionary or revolutionary.  He mentions that revolutionary change 
can give the U.S. Army the opportunity to obtain an operational capability advantage over an 
opponent. The enemy will therefore be hard-pressed to match such an advantage in the short-
term. House (2005) argues that evolutionary transformation takes a longer time to achieve. If 
evolutionary transformation is possible then it would not offer the Army the same advantage in 
that an opponent could become familiar with such change over time.  
 House argues that the Army has experienced a mixture of evolutionary and revolutionary 
change throughout its history. Most combat development programs produced evolutionary 
change with a focus on conventional ground combat. House also argues that the Army has 
modernized its weapon systems many times. However these modernization programs have not 
brought a revolution in military operations (House 2005, 260). House argues that the Army 
might have engaged in revolutionary change in the 1950s had it followed through on adopting 
the Pentomic divisions by having nuclear weapons as an integral part of the battlefield. However, 
a lack of resources and a general lack of enthusiasm by the Army prevented that revolutionary 
event from occurring (House 2005, 260). House argues that the Department of Defense should 
provide a definition of evolutionary and revolutionary change in order to clarify discussion in 
military circles and enhance the understanding of the impact of such change in the military 
environment (Nielsen (2003, 264). He states that a key factor in maintaining any vision for 
change is retaining senior leadership. Changing senior leaders puts any program of change at 
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risk. New leaders may choose to alter the vision or change the implementation of a program of 
change. If retaining senior leaders is not possible, then it is important, House argues, for the 
replacement leadership to share their predecessor‘s vision (277).  If the program does not 
transcend from one senior leader to the next (in other words, programs that do not survive when 
senior Army leadership changes), then transformation will become evolutionary and hence 
become simply a modernization program rather than an opportunity to fundamentally change the 
nature of warfare (271). 
 House sought to develop a definition for the term ―revolutionary change‖ by examining 
other literature on change. His findings conclude that the views between commissioned officers 
and noncommissioned officer ranks, regarding transformation differ significantly. The 
noncommissioned officers considered the characteristics of transformation as being more 
revolutionary in nature than did the commissioned officers. While the author did not specifically 
address what may have contributed to significant difference in the views of commissioned and 
noncommissioned officers, he did argue that these two groups are the leaders who implement the 
directed changes that do come down from the top. The perceptions that these two groups may 
have of transformation may be an indication of the success or failure the senior Army leaders 
have had in translating their vision into useful concepts that can be understood at this level (253).  
Thus, it appears that ―transformation‖ may indeed mean something different to different people. 
 Marzena Majewska-Button (2010) conducted a qualitative meta-analysis of 76 different 
case studies prepared by other authors to examine the dynamics of large-scale organizational 
change and to document the presence or absence and relative strength of certain factors that can 
help or hinder these change efforts (46). She selected authors who were in some way affiliated 
with the DoD with 38% of the authors being directly associated with the U.S. Army and the 
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remainder affiliated with the other military services. Most of the papers written by authors 
directly associated with the Army came from students at the U.S. Army War College as well as 
those who had written a master‘s degree thesis (53).  
 In her analysis, Majewska-Button found that revolutionary change occurs in leaps, spurts 
and disruptions, and not in an incremental or linear fashion. She argues that there are both 
barriers and enhancers to transformative change within a DoD organization. Barriers to 
successful change can occur for the very reasons the transformation process was undertaken in 
the first place. For instance, Majewska-Button argues that the ideas of transformation may ignore 
the problems of a complex structure or an inefficient work organization, She states that 
organizations will turn to basic thinking and will focus on the bare minimum of what is not 
working and then fix that piece. In effect, the intended transformation does not occur (Majewska-
Button 2010, 157).  
 According to Majewska-Button, leadership plays a role, or specifically the leader‘s 
personality and the leader‘s decisions play a role in whether they are barriers or enhancers to 
transformation. She also found individuals in the organization are important, as is effective 
communication, and an organizational culture that embraces change. Majewska-Button argues 
that both leaders and employees within a DoD organization are important in that they can serve 
as either enhancers or as barriers to transformative change. She states that leaders are the number 
one barrier to transformative change, while employees (the rank and file of a DoD organization) 
are ranked number two for being both barriers and enhancers.  
 Regarding leadership, she argues that DoD experiences issued with authority 
responsibility, freedom of deciding and command and control. She states that unity of command 
is the most important issue in that only one responsible commander should be the rule and that 
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any violation of this creates confusion, undermines authority and threatens stability (78). 
Leadership as a barrier occurs when the leader does not embrace change.  
 Majewska-Button argues that employees are the most valuable assets of the organization. 
Employees have enough collective power to either help the organization transform or to cause 
the effort to fail (49). Leaders and employees within DoD organizations operate within a 
structure that is not common to civilian agencies or private organizations. This author states that 
DoD organizations, most often, operate within an old and law-regulated structure, chain of 
command, specific ways of working, and tones of other procedures and policies. Civilian leaders 
may be free to adjust things such as communicating strategies, or to reorganize what is not 
working, while military commanders are heavily restricted on picking up an idea and applying it 
to their units. If transformation is not perceived as being in line with established procedures 
(such as SOPs), then it will not be accepted. Similarly, if transformation is not perceived as 
beneficial in at least some aspects, the employees, and perhaps the leaders as well, they have a 
strong motivation to oppose it Majewska-Button 2010, 2-7). Leaders and employees, together, 
use a communication process as a matter of course in order to get tasks completed; this 
established communication process may represent a culture that will either enhance 
transformative change, or will seek to serve as a barrier. 
 Majewska-Button‘s finding included that barriers to organizational change are largely 
pre-existing, which means that they do not occur during the change and are not new issues. They 
were in the organization previously and worked well in the ―old‖ environment, except for some 
employees and their resistance to change. She has also found that since the organization‘s 
operating environment has often changed in many respects (as a result of geopolitical, 
technological or financial reasons or pressures) the previous structure‘s procedures and cultures 
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all of the sudden have lost their effectiveness (Majewska-Button 2010, 107). Once a barrier is 
identified, and adjustments are made based on the new situation, it usually undergoes a 
transformation process and becomes a change enhancer. Once the barriers endured during the 
change process in DoD were identified there were attempts to eliminate them, which in turn 
made them enhancers to change as opposed to obstacles.  Unlike House (2005) who advocated 
for longer-serving senior leaders who would see transformative change through to the end, 
Majewska-Button argued that since leadership is among the most important variables and may 
serve as either an enhancer or as a barrier, the Army‘s policy of changing leaders on a regular 
basis is a good one in the event that any one leader is, in fact, a barrier to change.  
Conclusion 
 Douglas A. Macgregor (1997) states that in 1947 Army Chief of Staff General James 
Gavin mentioned that ―we professional soldiers are traditionally laggard in facing and adopting 
changes, especially radical changes that upset proven methods and the ways in which we have 
been doing things for years past‖ (Macgregor 1997, 167). For more than a decade, the U.S. 
Army‘s leadership appears to be have been committed to changing the Army. It is not clear 
whether that change is truly transformative or radical, in the context of authors that have been 
discussed here. If transformation is the goal, then the Army may be failing in achieving that goal. 
Roper and Kiper (2010, 38) argue that there are three different types of failure, they are: (1) 
failure to learn; (2) failure to anticipate; and, (3) failure to adapt. The authors suggest that the 
Army has failed to anticipate by citing former Army Vice-Chief of Staff General Jack Keane: 
―We put an Army on the battlefield that I had been a part of for 37 years. It doesn‘t have any 
doctrine, nor was it educated and trained, to deal with an insurgency. After the Vietnam War, the 
Army purged itself of everything that had to do with irregular warfare or insurgency, because it 
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had to do with how the U.S. lost the war; in hindsight, that was a bad decision‖ (Roper and Kiper 
2010, 38).    
 Richard A. Lacquement (2010) argues that in the wake of the Vietnam War, which was 
for the most part a counterinsurgency, the Army chose to return to the more conventional force, 
modeled after the success of World War II, to continue its confrontation of the Soviet Union. The 
Army focused on preparing for conventional war and therefore recommended to civilian leaders 
that any military force be limited to this concept of war (Lacquement 2010, 30). The author 
argues that it cannot be assumed that the lessons-learned in recent conflicts will be automatically 
integrated into the Army as a whole (Lacquement 2010, 31). If formulating and implementing 
radical change still remains a challenge for the Army, then identifying what transformative 
change means may continue to be a challenge as well.  
       This literature review demonstrates that transformative change may be difficult to 
achieve in a large bureaucratic organization. The Principal-Agent Theory was used to describe 
the relationship between each of the Army Chiefs of Staff and field grade officers. There is an 
expectation of the principal that the agent will seek to accomplish the objectives of the principal. 
Agents may perceive the objectives as being vague, for whatever reason, and may not 
accomplish those expected outcomes. Additionally, the framework of the bureaucracy may 
contribute to the difficulty with accomplishing Army transformation. The sub-cultures that exist 
within the organization may interpret transformation goals differently. Large bureaucracies tend 
to resist innovation and prefer standard operating procedures that do not change all that much, 
especially within a relatively short period of time. It is difficult to achieve a consensus of what 
transformation means and how it should be accomplished within a large bureaucracy.  
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 Army transformation may be difficult to achieve because it may be too complex and hard 
to define. Some experts view transformation as being too open-ended and not well defined, 
which may in turn allow senior Army leaders to define transformation in their own terms. Others 
view Army transformation efforts as too centered on a technological solution while 
transformation may include all aspects of the organization. The challenge of Army 
transformation is well represented in the literature of Principal-Agent Theory and the theory of 
how the bureaucracy adapts to change. 
  The research presented in the following chapters of this dissertation will add to the body 
of knowledge on Army transformation. It does so with an eye on what is needed to change such a 
large and complex organization.  The question is specific: I seek to determine whether a gap 
exists between how senior Army leaders define Army transformation as compared to the 
definition that Army lieutenant colonels and majors might possess. Such an examination can 
shed light on whether transformation is actually occurring, whether it is either evolutionary or 
revolutionary, whether majors and lieutenant colonels are serving as effective agents in carrying 
out the Army chief of staffs‘ visions, or whether the bureaucratic obstacles identified by scholars 
are indeed hindering the translation of vision into action.      
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CHAPTER 4 
 
HYPOTHESES AND METHODS 
 
 The first three chapters of this dissertation focused on the challenges to implementing 
transformative change in large bureaucratic organizations such as the United States Army. 
Chapter One presents the purpose of this research which is to determine the extent to which field 
grade officers understand how senior Army leaders define Army transformation. Chapter Two 
presented a historical context of Army transformation and how any such change is challenging. 
Chapter Three established both a theoretical framework that largely described the difficulty 
associated with significant change within a bureaucracy, as well as a description of how other 
scholars view Army transformation.  In this chapter I will generate and test five hypotheses. 
Additionally I will describe the methods that were used to collect data for the case study of the 
three Army chiefs of staff in Chapter 5, and the survey the results of which are presented in 
Chapter 6. The case study and the survey results will be used to confirm the validity of the five 
hypotheses statements in Chapter 6.   
Type of Study 
 This research evolved into a mixed-methods study in that it consists of both qualitative 
and quantitative components. The qualitative part of the study included an ethnographic protocol 
that was developed to explore the shared culture of a group of people. The ethnography was best 
represented in the open-ended interview process whereby participants included officers attending 
Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, as well as current 
CGSC faculty and staff members.  
103 
 
 The second qualitative component consisted of narrative research. In this case the 
narrative research consisted of an examination of what the U.S. Army chiefs of staff have stated 
regarding Army transformation through official documents and speeches.  The second part of 
this mixed-methods study is the quantitative component, which consisted primarily of an 
electronic survey that provided objective results and frequency counts. Specifically, a survey of 
student officers attending the United States Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) 
at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas was conducted.  J. Amos Hatch (2002) argues that a Constructivist 
paradigm, while acknowledging that elements are often shared across social groups, provides 
that multiple realities exist that are inherently unique because they are constructed by individuals 
who experience the world from their own vantage points (Hatch 2002, 15).   In the Constructivist 
paradigm, researchers work with informants to co-construct understandings; in this case by using 
the open-ended interview as the mechanism for developing those understandings (Lucas 2007). 
The three components of this mixed-methods study (case study, survey, and interviews) will 
provide a triangulation of information that will be useful in answering the research questions, as 
well as developing a better understanding of Army Transformation in general. The primary 
research question guiding this dissertation is: 
 
Do U.S. Army lieutenant colonels and majors understand Army transformation in the 
same way as the three Army chiefs of staff who have served since 1999?  
 
If field grade officers believe they understand what is meant by Army transformation as 
defined by senior level leadership, it may be possible that there exist numerous views of what 
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transformation means among field grade officers.  Kaufman (1960) argues that attitudinal 
barriers appear when people have totally different frames of reference; the same facts may be 
apparent, but differing perspectives may lead to different conclusions. Therefore, there are often 
wide discrepancies, even among people with the same values and attitudes within an agency, 
between what members of organizations communicate to each other and what they actually 
convey (Kaufman 1960, 69-71).  
It is an important component of this research to determine if field grade officers even 
acknowledge that significant change has occurred since 1999. Vincent and Crothers (1998) argue 
that there is an assumption that top-down policy directives will be implemented with as little 
deviation as possible. The authors argue that any deviation from the policy is considered to be 
illegitimate. The Army may be restricted in achieving transformation based on differences that 
may exist in how senior Army leaders and field grade officers in general view such significant 
change efforts. Field grade officers may need to visualize any significant change that is being 
pursued in the context of the missions and duties they are currently performing. 
 Wilson (1989) argues that new tasks will not be supported with the same level of energy 
and resources as are traditional tasks.  Agencies, including the U.S. Army, will tend to resist 
taking on new tasks that seem incompatible with existing or dominant practices (Wilson 1989). 
Therefore, when an Army chief of staff expresses a vision for some transformative change, it 
may not be accepted by field grade officers across the board because they may be heavily 
involved in implementing current operational requirements.  
Given the evidence established in Chapter 3, Literature Review, resistance may be a 
logical reaction to perceptions of significant change. Resistance may act as a mechanism that 
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causes field grade officers to perceive change as being significant change. Over the last 12 years 
the U.S. Army has been on a course to transform itself. The three chiefs of staff that have served 
since 1999 have all indicated that the U.S. Army must transform (This will be discussed further 
in Chapter 5 of this dissertation). Transforming a large bureaucratic organization such as the U.S. 
Army may be viewed as a significant occurrence.  Adrianna Kezar (2005) argues that radical (i.e. 
transformative) change requires dramatic changes and radical departures from traditional work 
(636). Such change would most likely be viewed as significant by field grade officers. Small 
changes in an organization may be less intrusive whereby transformative change may be viewed 
as being both significant as well as intrusive. Thomas K. Adams (2008) argues that serious 
changes in a military organization are often contentious in that militaries are notoriously 
committed to tradition and can be counted on to resist radical change (13). The contemporary 
army dating back to the end of World War II, Adams (2008) continues, made no fundamental 
changes in 60 years. The author argues that armies have preferred incremental changes in force 
structure and in command and control processes, and have preferred to incorporate new 
technologies as they were developed. Only recently has there been recognition to do things 
differently (Adams 2008, 13). If incremental change has been preferred by the Army, then any 
transformative change may be viewed as significant in the minds of field grade officers. This 
leads to the first hypothesis statement:  
 
H1:  Field grade officers will view the Army‘s transformation as being significant. 
While field grade officers as a group may define transformation in a variety of ways, they 
may therefore define the term differently as compared to the Army chief of staff.   Kagan (2006) 
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and Chun and Rainey (2005) suggest that Army Transformation may be defined based on which 
level of leadership position an officer might occupy. These differing points of view could be a 
challenge when an Army chief of staff, in his role as a ―principal‖, has a goal in mind that he 
expects field grade officers, as ―agents‖, to achieve. Shapiro (2005) argues that when principals 
are ―one-shotters‖, as in the case of an Army chief of staff who serves only a relatively short 
period of time and therefore has little time to effect policy changes, and agents who are repeat 
players, or individuals who serve as field grade officers for 10 years or more, the asymmetry of 
power shifts from principals to agents. Field grade officers may therefore have an information 
advantage and as a result may define transformation differently than does the Army chief of 
staff.  
 Additionally, Douglas Macgregor (1997) argues that professional soldiers are slow in 
facing and adopting changes, especially transformative and radical changes that go counter to 
established methods and the processes that have been used for doing things for years (167). If 
field grade officers have been trained to perform certain tasks a certain way throughout the 
course of a career, it may be difficult for all field grade officers to then suddenly change (if that 
is what transformation calls for) and then perform significantly different tasks that they may not 
fully understand.   
Macgregor argues that for such significant change to occur the anticipation of how the 
prior experiences of the rank-and-file professional military that is resistant to change, but will 
nevertheless be responsible for leading the Army through a slow or otherwise misdirected period 
of change, will need to be taken into consideration (Macgregor 1997, 229).    The Army‘s 
perceived resistance to change that Macgregor refers to may be a result of the differences in how 
change is defined within the Army among field grade officers and senior level leadership. The 
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possibility that field grade officers may define transformation differently among themselves, and 
that field grade officers may define transformation differently than do the chiefs of staff leads us 
to the second and third hypotheses statements: 
 
H2:  Field grade officers will define transformation differently from one another.  
H3:  Field grade officers will define transformation differently than the chiefs of  staff. 
 
The degree to which field grade officers define transformation differently among 
themselves, as well as how field grade officers, collectively, define transformation differently 
than the Army chiefs of staff may have to do with how technology and innovation influences the 
perception of significant change. General Shinseki made it clear that the in order to achieve the 
Objective Force, the Army was going to have to make significant investments in science and 
technology. Shinseki (2000) stated that ―the critical path of the transformation leads to the 
Objective Force…a major science and technology effort to develop technologies that will give 
the Objective Force its desired characteristics – responsiveness, agility, versatility, deployability, 
lethality, survivability, and sustainability.‖ General Shinseki makes it clear that technology will 
be a key component in achieving the Objective Force which is to say, from his point of view, 
Army transformation. The results of the evolving technology to which General Shinseki refers 
would include the Brigade Combat Team (BCT), consisting of newly developed Future Combat 
Systems, that would meet the characteristics that he outlined above. Those characteristics were 
not only emphasized by General Shinseki, but by his successors, General Schoomaker and 
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General Casey, as well. In short, the need to obtain new technology and innovation, in pursuit of 
transformation, has been an emphasis of senior Army leaders for the last decade.  
Peter Dombrowski and Eugene Gholz (2006) corroborate General Shinseki‘s 2000 
statement by arguing that the Army‘s transformation is billed as the most significant change for 
the service since World War I that is to result in an Objective Force that will meet the 
characteristics of being responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and 
sustainable by using the network-intensive Future Combat System (8). The emphasis on 
technological innovation made by the chiefs of staff, along with these authors and other writers, 
could not have been lost on field grade officers, which brings us to the fourth hypothesis 
statement: 
 
H4:  Field grade officers believe that Army transformation is determined primarily by 
technological innovation. 
 
Military equipment may be viewed as very important by field grade officers regarding 
any success on the battlefield; therefore significant changes in military equipment may be a key 
in how transformation is defined by this group of officers. Field grade officers may also look at 
changes in technology as intrusive. Wilson (1989) argues that improvements in communications 
tend to be used by higher-level commanders to reduce initiative and discretion of lower-level 
commanders as they proceed to execute missions. If a goal of transformation is to provide top-
level commanders with complete battlefield information, thereby encroaching on the discretion 
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of subordinate commanders to make on-the-ground decisions, then lieutenant colonels and 
majors may have a negative view of this type of intrusiveness.  
Goal ambiguity may cause field grade officers to form a negative perception of 
transformation. According to Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) all participants should be ready to 
contribute, as a result of effective coordination (the assumption can made that this also includes 
effective communication) to achieve a common purpose. The authors argue that if this does not 
occur, then it is possible that actors are ineffective because of ignorance, or they disagree with 
how the goal is to be achieved; thereby demonstrating some level of disobedience (Pressman and 
Wildavsky 1984, 17). The disobedience these authors refer to may be as a result of a negative 
perception of either what the goal includes or an uncertainty of the goal itself.  
Waterman and Meier (1998) argue that if there is a goal conflict between the principal 
and agents then agents have an incentive to shirk, or to engage in activities that do not meet the 
expectations of the principal. These authors argue that shirking may occur if the preferences of 
the principals and agents diverge, if there is a high degree of uncertainty, or if the agent has a 
distinct information advantage (Waterman and Meier 198, 176-177). If the goal is not clear, then 
field grade officers may hold a high degree of uncertainty which could indicate a negative view 
of transformation.  If lieutenant colonels and majors view the Army chief of staff‘s intentions in 
fielding new high technological capabilities in order to centralize control at the highest level then 
field grade officers may have a negative view of those goals. 
Field grade officers may be more inclined to operate within a system that they know and 
understand as opposed to changing to something that they do not clearly understand or embrace. 
Greenwood and Hinings (1996) argue that the more embedded processes become the more 
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problematic the achievement of transformation will become. As stated in the literature review, if 
U.S. Army officers tasked with the implementing aspect of transformation are unclear about 
what radical change means to them, then they may be more committed to the status quo, or the 
prevailing institutional template of which they are more familiar. Mahnken and FitzSimmons 
(2003) argue that it is difficult to implement ―radical‖ or ―transformative‖ change unless there is 
broad support within the officer corps. Since the military will be the practitioners of any new 
methods of fighting, those service members need to be enthusiastic about any new technology, 
operational concepts, or organizational structure if they are being asked to depart from the status 
quo, or from what they currently know. This leads to the fifth hypothesis statement: 
 
H5:  Field grade officers will view Army transformation efforts critically. 
  
 These five statements of hypothesis will be tested with the survey data and interviews 
results in Chapter 6, Chapter 7. When tested, these hypotheses will examine whether indeed a 
gap that exists between how Army chiefs of staff and field grade officers define transformation. 
The research question is representative of a problem that may exist in the larger topical area of 
implementing significant change in a large bureaucracy. The problem may be as a result of the 
relationship between a principal and an agent, or it could have to do with the cultural aspects of 
how actors within the organization both understand and respond to the need for significant 
change.  
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The Case Study 
           The case study is used to investigate the contextualized contemporary phenomenon of 
describing what Army Transformation might mean in a practical context (Hatch 2002, 30).  J. 
Amos Hatch (2002, 30) argues that defining boundaries and specifying the unit of analysis (i.e. 
what it is you want to be able to say at the end of the study) are the key decision point in case 
study design (Hatch 2002). John Gerring (2004) argues that a case study is an intensive study of 
a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of similar units. The statements that 
have been made by each of the three U.S. Army chiefs of staff may be viewed as a unit of 
analysis, while the three chiefs of staff, collectively, may fit Gerring‘s description of a larger 
class or similar units. Since it was not practical to seek an interview with each of these three 
senior Army leaders, Chapter 5 of this research examines their comments in speeches, testimony 
and official documents  in order to determine what they have stated regarding Army 
transformation.   
 The primary sources of information regarding the views of the chiefs of staff were 
speeches, testimony before Congress, and statements and directives they have made within the 
Army itself.  Appendix A lists all of the primary and secondary sources included in the analysis. 
For instance, U.S. Army publications were reviewed which included Army manuals that 
specifically addressed transformation efforts. These documents were prepared by Army planners 
who served to articulate the vision of the Army Chief of Staff serving at the time.  These 
documents included the Army Transformation Roadmap, Army White-Paper Studies, and 
official directives and announcements.  The speeches that were made over the last decade by the 
three chiefs of staff, such as at the annual meeting of the Association of the United States Army 
(AUSA), also provided information about the future direction that they had in mind, individually, 
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for the Army.  In addition to the specific views of the chiefs of staff, it was also relevant to 
include the views of other observers and their thoughts of how effective the chiefs of staff were 
in achieving Army transformation goals.  
  There were numerous sources of secondary information. The Congressional Research 
Service (CRS), the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the General Accountability Office 
(GAO) all provided useful information regarding the initiatives and progress of Army 
transformation under the chiefs of staff.  
 
The Survey Instrument  
 On May 20, 2008, my dissertation chair, Dr. William D. Schreckhise, and I met with Dr. 
Ralph O. Doughty (Major General, USA Retired), the Transformation Chair at the U.S. Army 
Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The purpose of the visit was 
to provide an overview of the proposed research, which included an in-depth discussion of the 
research questions listed above, and to gain his support for allowing me to conduct a survey and 
interviews at CGSC. Dr. Doughty did refer me to the Quality Assurance Office for purposes of 
constructing and launching the survey that eventually took place in the fall 2009 and winter of 
2010.   
      In order to determine how lieutenant colonels and majors view Army transformation it 
was necessary to conduct a survey. Unlike the Army chiefs of staff, where there is only one at a 
time, there are thousands of lieutenant colonels and majors serving throughout the Army at even 
given time. As compared to the Army chiefs of staff, these field grade officers‘ views towards 
transformation are not well known.  
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 A survey allowed for a great deal of information to be collected over a relatively short 
period of time from a target group of field grade officers. The field grade officers who are 
serving now have the potential of becoming the senior Army leaders over the next decade, up to 
and including becoming the Chief of Staff of the United States Army. Officers who are selected 
to attend the Army‘s Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 
may have a better chance of attaining senior level rank than those officers not selected for 
attendance. Since officers who graduate from CGSC will live with the affects of any Army 
transformation that may occur, it was important to know how they might define Army 
transformation now. The field grade officers attending CGSC are selected based on their future 
potential for advancement, because those that attend CGSC come from a variety of experiences 
and assignments throughout the Army, and accessibility to such a population of field grade 
officers is rare. While there is no guarantee that those officers who attend Military Education 
Level 4 (MEL 4) training such as CGSC will become a general officer, those officers not 
selected for MEL 4 training will, in all probability, not attain general officer rank. In other 
words, the pyramid for promotional opportunities gets narrower the more senior an officer 
becomes. If an officer did not attend MEL 4 training, then the selection for senior rank is most 
likely reserved for those officers who are more competitive due in part to the fact that they did 
complete such training. At the same time, because of other considerations such as performance in 
past assignments and other training experiences, there is no guarantee that an officer will rise to 
the rank of general officer even if MEL 4 training was completed.  
  The principal tool employed to gather quantitative data was the survey instrument (See 
Appendix B). This survey was developed throughout the summer of 2009 and was approved by 
both the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of Arkansas and the Quality 
114 
 
Assurance Office (QAO) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. I received IRB approval on July 28, 2009 
and the survey was formatted to meet QAO guidelines in August 2009. The QAO required that 
the survey be put into a format (Inquisite Survey
tm
 software
11
) that is common to all research 
conducted at CGSC. The original intent was to issue the survey via e-mail over the CGSC 
intranet system, in September 2009 and collect data over a two to three week period. As it turned 
out, there was such a small sample size and a correspondingly low response rate that it became 
necessary to seek out a larger group of students at CGSC. There were some information systems 
issues occurring at Fort Leavenworth, between September 2009 and January 2010, which may 
have affected the low response rate in the initial attempt. The QAO determined that for students 
living off-base in the Fort Leavenworth area, accessibility to the survey may have been 
problematic. The problem appeared to have been fixed by February 2010.  
 On Friday, February 19, 2010, the survey was e-mailed to 837 student-officers via the 
CGSC intra-net system. Although there were over 1,000 officers in this particular group of 
officers, a portion of them come from the armed forces of other countries and from the U.S. 
Navy, Air Force, and Marines. I requested that the survey be sent only to Regular U.S. Army, 
U.S. Army Reserve and U.S. Army National Guard officers. There was a follow-up reminder 
issued on Tuesday, February 23, 2010. The survey period closed at midnight, March 1, 2010. 
Ideally, it would have been preferred to have had at least one more week with at least one more 
follow-up, but QAO believed it would not serve a useful purpose. Additionally, QAO indicated 
that there were four other surveys from other researchers issued at the same time as this one and 
they feared that students might experience some survey fatigue if we continued any longer. 
                                                   
11
 Inquisite Survey
tm 
software is the standard method by which the QAO at CGSC launches and 
manages all surveys in support of independent research efforts. All surveys must be configured 
into this format before QAO agrees to support any survey needed by external researchers.  
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Regardless, out of the 837 officers who were sent the survey, there were 216 officers who 
responded, which provided a response rate of 25.8%. Of the 216 officers who responded to the 
survey, 19 of those officers identified themselves as other than Active Army, Army Reserve, or 
Army National Guard. That would have brought the response rate down to 24.3%. This response 
rate represents 197 respondents which is consistent with the maximum number of officers who 
responded to any one survey item.  
 Although a higher response rate would have been preferred, Dr. David Bitters (2011)
12
, a 
statistician at CGSC, indicated that a response rate of between 20 – 25% is normal, based on his 
experience of over 15 years in working with surveys at CGSC. Bitters mentioned that response 
rates were somewhat higher at the beginning of a new class of CGSC students (in this case the 
fall of 2009) and by the time that officers received this survey (February 2010), they may have 
reached some level of ―survey fatigue,‖ given the large number of surveys that are issued on 
behalf of a variety of researchers.  Hal G. Rainey and Barry Bozeman (2000) argue that there are 
many studies that compare public and private organizations with relatively low survey response 
rates of 35-45 percent, while this research does not necessarily seek to compare private and 
public organizations, I am concerned about how a large public organization addresses significant 
change. Rainey and Bozeman argue that much if not the majority of the published organization 
research have rather low overall survey response rates (Rainey and Bozeman 2000, 465). Dr. 
Bitters confirmed that the results of the survey regarding Army transformation provides for just 
under a 95 percent confidence level by using 197 respondents from a population of 837. The 217 
actual respondents provide for a greater than 95% level of confidence.  The management of the 
survey was largely out of my control. The QAO manages all surveys that are issued to CGSC 
                                                   
12
 David Bitters, telephone interview and e-mail correspondence, July 1, 2011 
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students. It is difficult to determine that if the survey would have been available for an addit ional 
week, with an additional follow-up request being issued by the QAO via e-mail to the student 
population, whether a greater response rate would have been achieved. The QAO forwarded the 
survey results to me on Friday, March 5, 2010, in SPSS, excel, and MS Word formats. The 
survey results will be presented in Chapter 6 of this dissertation. 
          The survey participants were military officers attending a military school and literally all 
data collection resources were provided by the Quality Assurance Office at CGSC. For these 
reasons, it is necessary to regard the survey section of the data collection as ―quasi-
experimental‖. Campbell and Stanley (1963) argue that final interpretation of an experiment and 
the attempt to fit it into a developing science is imperfect; however, the idea is to design the very 
best instrument which the situation allows. It is necessary to seek out those artificial and natural 
laboratories which provide for the best opportunities for control (Campbell and Stanley 1963, 
34). This provides for the basis in selecting a quasi-experimental approach for conducting a 
survey at CGSC. The other relevant aspect of the survey as a tool for data collection relates to 
the expert nature of the informants. Rossi, Lipsey and Freeman (2004) argue that the easiest 
approach to estimating the extent of a social problem is to ask key informants or persons whose 
experience should provide them with some knowledge of the magnitude and distribution of the 
problem. These informants can provide useful information about the nature of target populations, 
in this case O-4 and O-5 field grade Army officers, and the nature of their understanding of a 
military service need, i.e., a clear understanding of Army Transformation (Rossi, Lipsey and 
Freeman 2004, 114-115). 
 The survey specifically addresses areas of interest emerging from the literature review in 
presented in Chapter 3, as well as in the case study that was conducted in Chapter 5 of this 
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research. After the demographic information was determined, Table 4.1 illustrates the survey 
items that cause the participants to acknowledge whether significant change has actually 
occurred over the last decade, if the term significant and transformation have the same meaning, 
and if the participants understand the meaning of transformation. The empirical information is 
useful in determining whether the participants acknowledge the occurrence of significant change, 
whether the transformation goals that have been provided by senior level leaders are understood, 
and if the term transformation is understood by them. For nearly all questions on the survey, 
respondents choose from a five-point Lickert scale the option that most closely matches their 
opinions, ranging from ―strongly agree‖ to ―strongly disagree.‖ 
 
Table 4.1 
Views of Army Transformation 
 
The U.S. Army has experienced significant organizational change since 1999.       
       
Significant change and transformation are synonymous relative to current U.S. 
Army goals.        
 
 
 The survey then moves into the area of leadership. Table 4.2 provides statements that 
pertain directly to the Army chiefs of staff and the combatant commanders and how they view 
transformation. Combatant commanders are the four-star generals or admirals who are 
responsible for military operations in specific regions of the world, such as the Central 
Command (CENTCOM) Commander who is responsible for military operations in the Middle. 
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These items aim to determine to what extent the respondents believe the Army chiefs have been 
consistent and clear about defining transformation‘s goals, and to what extent they have 
influence vis-à-vis the operational combatant commanders. 
 
Table 4.2 
 
Basis of Army Transformation 
 
U.S. Army transformation is based largely on the integration of technology into 
weapon systems. 
       
U.S. Army transformation is based largely on changes in force structure. 
       
U.S. Army transformation is a process and not an end-state. 
        
U.S. Army transformation addresses the complete ―battle-space‖ (all aspects of the 
battlefield before, during and after combat operations). 
         
U.S. Army transformation addresses all aspects of the U.S. Army mission       
 
 If significant or transformative change does exist, it is important to know how the 
informants interpret the basis for such change. Table 4.3 provides the five areas of the survey 
that addresses the basis for transformative change within the Army. In Chapters 2, 3 and 5 of this 
dissertation, technology is prominent in the discussion on transformation (FCS, information 
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systems, modularity, etc.).   Similarly, force structure, or how the Army as an organization is 
structured, may be a key determinant for how transformation is implemented. A topic of specific 
interest has to do with whether Army transformation is a process or an end-state.  The Army 
chiefs of staff have all indicated that transformation is both an end-state (fielding FCS in order to 
meet the threats of the Twenty-first Century) and as a process (transformation is a journey and 
will be continuous).  Whether field grade officers view transformation as either a process or an 
end-state may help determine the gap that may exist in how the term is intended by senior Army 
leaders. Additionally, it is important to determine if field grade officers view transformation as 
being a part of all aspects of the battlefield. The ―before part‖ of the battle-space has to do with 
those capabilities that are required in advance of heavy combat involvement (surveillance, low-
intensity operations, etc.); the ―during part‖ of the battle-space has to do with the capabilities that 
are needed to execute combat operations; and, the ―after part‖ addresses the Army‘s capabilities 
that are needed for peacekeeping operations once hostilities have ended.   
 It is also important to know whether the informants view Army transformation 
holistically. Does transformation include everything that the Army does in the context of its vast 
variety of missions (roles and responsibilities)? The Army is involved in research, development, 
test and evaluation of new technology; it is involved in the procurement of weapon systems and a 
variety of goods and services; and, it is involved in recruiting and retention of soldiers, just to 
name a few of the missions that are not directly related to battlefield operations.   
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Table 4.3 
Perceptions of Technology’s Role in Army Transformation 
 
The weapon systems development time-line is a key aspect of determining 
successful transformation. 
       
The U.S. Army will rely on technology to drive transformation goals. 
         
Field grade officers believe that Network Centric Warfare is a significant 
component of transformation. 
         
Field grade officers believe that Future Combat Systems is a significant 
transformation factor.       
 
 The respondent‘s perception of Army transformation on an organizational level is 
important to determine. Table 4.4 provides a variety of organizational components that have 
been addressed throughout this dissertation. There is a question of whether the Army can even 
remain relevant if it fails to achieve its transformation goals. Perhaps one of the obstacles in 
achieving transformation has to do with the development and fielding of new weapon systems. 
Does the Army‘s vast educational system clearly express the chief of staff‘s goals for achieving 
transformation?  
 The Army may rely on technology that may be late-breaking or that has not yet been 
developed in order to achieve its future transformation goals. It is important to determine 
whether the informants perceive the Army chiefs of staff goals for Army transformation as being 
clear and understood. As discussed in Chapter 3, a clear expression of what transformation 
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means from the top may be impossible to achieve as the goals expressed by senior leaders are 
filtered down through the various subcultures that may exist within the Army. Indeed, the 
informants may be indicating that in order for the Army to transform, the culture within the 
Army may first have to change. 
 
Table 4.4 
 
Views of Leadership on Army Transformation 
 
 The term transformation is well understood by field grade officers in terms of U.S. 
Army change objectives.   
       
The meaning of Army transformation changes from one chief of staff to the next. 
       
The Combatant Commanders (CINCs) have greater influence in defining 
transformation than does the Army chief of staff. 
       
I believe senior Army leadership has been clear in defining transformation goals. 
        
The U.S. Army transformation goals should be more clearly stated by senior Army 
leadership. 
       
Field grade officers have an opportunity to provide input in determining what 
Army transformation means. 
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Field grade officers have flexibility in implementing Army transformation goals. 
       
Significant change in U.S. Army organizational goals are clearly understood by 
field grade officers.       
 
 Finally, it is important to determine from the informant‘s perspective how field grade 
officers, in general, view transformation. The responses may be considered rather normative 
based on the informant‘s collective experiences and associations with other field grade officers 
over the course of a career, and most particularly over the previous decade. It is very possible 
that a bias may occur as the informants, as field grade officers, may interject their view, and not 
take into consideration what field grade officers may believe. Table 4.5 represents that part of the 
survey that seeks to determine how, in the opinion of the informants, field grade officers view 
transformation. The Literature Review revealed the possibility that senior level officials within a 
bureaucracy may not be all that interested in what mid-level officials think about significant 
change; it will be interesting to know if field grade officers feel any different.  Also, it may be 
useful to determine if field grade officers have a certain amount of flexibility or discretion in 
how transformation is implemented within their area of control. It is also important to determine 
if field grade officers believe that transformation is even needed at all as the Army prepares for 
the threat scenarios in the future. Do field grade officers believe that information technology, 
along the lines of Network Centric Warfare, is a must if the Army is to truly transform? A 
Network Centric Warfare capability was to be a major component of the FCS program; it is 
important to determine if field grade officers still view FCS as a key component of 
transformation. Finally, if it is possible for the informants to represent the views of their 
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colleagues throughout the Army, do field grade officers believe transformation is a process or an 
end-state.   
      In addition to the informant‘s response to the objective items in the survey, there was an 
opportunity for the informants to provide comments that should allow for more insight into their 
views. In summary, the survey provides an efficient way to gather information from a large 
number of key informants, in a very controlled environment and within a relatively short period 
of time. As will be addressed in Chapter 6, these key informants have considerable and relevant 
military experience, and many have previously formed some opinion of what transformation 
means to the Army. The important aspect here is to determine whether the officers‘ perceptions 
are the same as those expressed by senior Army leadership.  In addition to the analysis of the 
survey results, another way to determine whether that perception is similar is to conduct an open-
ended interview with individual field grade officers.  
 
The Open-ended Interviews 
      This research is interested in a phenomenon that includes a few specific questions, with 
one being ―What does Army transformation mean to you?‖  Because Army transformation may 
appear to be ambiguous, using an open-ended interview method will allow for digressions in the 
interview that may provide additional insight by the informants or participants.  Hatch (2002) 
argues that ―qualitative interviewers create a special kind of speech event during which they ask 
open-ended questions, encourage informants to explain their unique perspectives on the issues at 
hand, and listen intently for special language and other clues that reveal meaning structures 
informants use to understand their worlds‖ (Hatch 2002, 23). Additionally, the interviews moved 
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in a positive direction because of the subject matter expertise possessed by the informants.  
Flexibility is needed to create interaction and a shared responsibility for both the questions and 
the answers that are needed for a meaningful interview (Hatch 2002, 23).  
 According to Christopher J. Lucas (2007) the open-ended interview process allows the 
researcher to get to the important question by creating a monologue. Lucas argues that open-
ended questions encourage informants to explain unique perspectives and requires the researcher 
to listen intently to better understand ―the world‖. In addition to the basic demographic 
information, Lucas (2007) recommends that the interview consist of 8-10 questions. Lucas 
suggested that up to 20 interviews are usually too much, but 8 – 10 may be good enough (2007). 
Interviews with student officers, as well as staff and faculty, all of whom were in the grade of 
lieutenant colonel or major were conducted on Wednesday, January 13, 2010. 
           The Quality Assurance Office referred me to the Deputy Chief, U.S. Student Division, at 
CGSC to arrange for the interview participants. The Deputy selected eight officers to participate 
and consisted of four staff/faculty and four student officers. I did not have any influence in 
determining how officers were asked to participate in the interviews. There were no female or 
minority officers selected to participate. The interviews consisted of open-ended questions that 
allowed for greater benefit of the informants‘ insight and experience (see Appendix C for the 
interview protocol).  There were eight interview participants; however the record of one of the 
participants did not survive.
13
 The interviews were conducted individually beginning at 8:00 a.m. 
The Deputy Director of the U.S. Student Division reserved a classroom in which the interviews 
                                                   
13
 One of the mini-cassette tapes used to record an interview could not be used for purposes of 
transcription; the information on that particular tape could not be retrieved due to an equipment 
malfunction. 
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were conducted. Individual interviews lasted between 45 and 60 minutes; there were four 
interviews in the morning and four in the afternoon. 
 Before the beginning of each interview, an informed consent form was presented to the 
participant, one signed copy was given to the officer and another signed copy was placed in my 
file. The interview questions ensured that basic demographic information would be collected 
from each officer. The interviews allowed for a confidential interchange to occur between the 
interviewee and the informant. The opportunity to have this interchange would not only allow for 
me to triangulate this information with that provided in the surveys, it allowed for a 
personalization to occur on a subject that is extremely important within the Army itself. Case 
study and survey analysis is very good in the research process, but actually talking with 
individuals who live the reality of the research at issue is irreplaceable.   
 The results of the interviews are included in Chapter Six. It is important to discuss why 
these particular open-ended questions were relevant for purposes of addressing the research 
questions. In Appendix C, interview questions five through seven causes each participant to take 
a position on any change that may have occurred within the Army since 1999. Has the Army 
experienced any organizational change since 1999? Questions eight through 11 ask the informant 
to identify the individual he/she believes is responsible for change within the Army, and whether 
or not a vision for that change has been established. Questions 12 through 14 give the informant 
the opportunity to determine a reason for why change occurs within the Army. The national 
security threat that is different than that of the Cold War, along with terms such as faster, mobile, 
lighter, more lethal, and one with less of a logistics footprint were purposely excluded in 
anticipation that the informant would present his/her own terms in this open-ended format. 
Finally, questions 15 and 16 provide the informant the opportunity to acknowledge any 
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difference in how senior Army leaders and field grade officers define Army transformation. 
Although these questions may appear to direct an informant in a pre-determined direction, this 
open-ended interview did result in gaining considerable insight from the informants. 
Research Considerations 
  Having discussed the data collection process, it is important now to briefly discuss what 
is expected as a result of the data analysis in Chapter Seven. Additionally, there are some 
limitations to this study that need to be highlighted. Limitations need to be addressed in order to 
keep the research findings in a proper perspective. Regardless of the results of this study, 
hopefully the findings here will be relevant for future research. Finally, there were ethical issues 
that needed to be taken into consideration throughout the course of this study.  While acts of 
reciprocity may not be available in the short-term to the officers who participated in the surveys 
and interviews, perhaps the benefits of this research will provide some benefit in the future. 
Data Analysis 
 
 Analyses will be conducted that links the case study, the survey and the interview results 
together. This analysis will be provided for in Chapter Seven of this dissertation. Hatch (2002, 
148) argues that data analysis is a systematic search for meaning. The author continues by 
arguing that data analysis provides the researcher with a way to see patterns, identify themes, 
discover relationships, develop explanations, make interpretations, mount critiques or generate 
theories. Therefore, for the purposes of this research, should provide insight into the degree to 
which field grade officers understand transformation in ways similar to how senior Army leaders 
define it.  
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Limitations of the Research 
      The analysis of the case study in Chapter Five and the survey data and interview results 
of Chapter Six will be the focus of Chapter Seven. The case study does include primary material 
that provides for statements and directives that were made by the Army chiefs of staff regarding 
transformation. However, those statements do not account for all of the other possible statements 
and comments that were made in various meetings within the Army that are publicly available. 
Additionally, whereas senior civilian leaders of a large bureaucracy may be in a position for 
many years, those serving as Army chief of staff are only in that position for about four years. 
Because of this relatively short tenure, transferability of the findings in this study may be limited 
if used in another context where leaders serve for longer periods of time.  Finally, the military 
bureaucracy simply may be different than civilian bureaucracy. 
 The survey was conducted at the U.S. Army Command and General College over a 
relatively short period of time of two weeks. There was a rather low response rate of 25.8%. 
While such a response rate may be adequate for most social science research, ideally a higher 
response rate would have increased confidence from this particular population. Additionally, this 
survey may be viewed as a survey of convenience given that it was conducted in a rather short 
period of time and where there was a rather high population of field grade officers in a single 
location. Although there may be a high selection rate for attendance at CGSC, not all field grade 
officers attend this school at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Some Army officers who are selected 
for this level of training may attend similar programs sponsored by the Air Force, Navy or 
Marines, in which case their viewpoints would not have been available. Some officers may not 
attend this level of training at all, which again would prevent their viewpoints from being known. 
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 The interviews were conducted in one day. As stated earlier, I did not have any influence 
in who was selected to participate. All interview participants were white males. Out of eight 
participants, it would have been ideal to have had at least some representation of female and 
minority officers. Because of the limited amount of time, and the confidentiality of the 
interviews, a verification of comments was not pursued with the participants.  Some officers 
were faculty and staff and some officers were students attending CGSC. There may have been a 
certain level of apprehension in revealing personal viewpoints, depending on if you represented 
one group or the other. Students may have been much more reserved and apprehensive as 
compared to faculty and staff. 
 Regardless of which of these two groups represented here, they still only represent a 
small group of field grade officers who happen to be stationed at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; 
their opinions may not be absolutely reflective of all field grade officers serving in the U.S. 
Army.     
Ethical Considerations and Reciprocity 
 An informed consent form was provided to all participants prior to the survey or prior to 
the interview. The informed consent form was approved by the Compliance Coordinator, in the 
Research and Cosponsored Programs Research Compliance Office, at the University of 
Arkansas, as well as by the Quality Assurance Office and the U.S. Student Division at the 
Command and General Staff College. The informed consent form appeared at the beginning of 
the survey, and by selecting to take the survey informed consent was granted by the participants. 
For those officers that participated in the interview process, an informed consent form was 
provided to them for their review and signature. The officer being interviewed kept a copy and I 
kept a copy for my files. The interviews were recorded with the officers‘ permission. All notes 
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made by me, along with the tapes of the interviews, have been retained in my possession and are 
not accessible by anyone else.  
 The officers who are either attending CGSC as a student or who are assigned there as a 
faculty or staff member will benefit as a result of this research. Individuals that are currently 
serving as U.S. Army lieutenant colonels and majors will be senior leaders in the future. The 
officers who participated in this study will benefit directly if this research is a part of a larger 
process that better defines what the Army needs to look like in the future. The senior Army 
leaders who might review this research may consider it as at least one more data point as 
transformation efforts continue. If this research results in a better flow of information and 
communication within the current Army structure, then it will have served its purpose.  
 
Summary  
     The methodology used for collecting the data for this research has resulted in a study that 
should provide greater insight on how significant change occurs in a large bureaucracy. 
Specifically, the case study, survey, and interviews have all revealed information that addresses 
the research questions. As a result of the methods that have been used here, Chapter Seven could 
reveal that some gap exists between how senior Army leaders define transformation and what 
that term means to field grade officers. It is important that the lieutenant colonels and majors 
serving now understand what senior leaders mean by transformation. The transformation 
initiatives that are pursued now will result in programs that future senior leaders will implement, 
whether they agree with those programs or not. A common understanding of transformation may 
result in goal congruence in this vital area, which may increase efficiency and reduce the costs 
associated with pursuing programs that do not support transformation.   
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United States Army Command and General Staff College 
Army Transformation Survey 
Researcher(s): Administrator(s): 
David H. Jerome, Graduate Student, Public Policy Ph.D. Program  
 
Researchers:                Compliance Contact Person: 
 
David H. Jerome, Graduate Student                 Ro Windwalker, Compliance Coordinator 
William D. Schreckhise, Ph.D., Faculty Advisor   Research & Sponsored Programs 
University of Arkansas     Research Compliance 
College of Arts and Sciences    University of Arkansas 
Public Policy Ph.D. Program    120 Ozark Hall 
428 Old Main      Fayetteville, AR 72701-1201 
Fayetteville, AR 72701     479-575-2208 
479-575-3356      irb@uark.edu 
djerome@uark.edu 
 
Description: The present study will investigate the meaning of ―Army Transformation‖ as 
defined by senior U.S. Army leaders and U.S. Army lieutenant colonels and majors. You are 
asked to voluntarily participate in this survey. 
 
Risks and Benefits: The benefits include contributing to the knowledge base pertaining to the 
meaning of the term ―Army Transformation‖. By engaging in the survey you should continue to 
consider the meaning of ―Army Transformation‖, perhaps throughout your career, and its 
importance to senior level planners and decision-makers. There are no anticipated risks to 
participating in the survey. 
 
Voluntary Participation: Your participation in the research is completely voluntary.  
 
Confidentiality:  All information will be kept confidential to the extent allowed by law and 
University policy. Results from the research will be reported as aggregate data. 
 
Right to Withdraw: You are free to refuse to participate in the research and to withdraw from this 
study at any time. Your decision to withdraw will bring no negative consequences — no penalty 
to you. 
 
Purpose of the survey: The following survey is a part of a doctoral research project concerning 
United States Army transformation efforts that have occurred since 1999. The survey will take 
roughly 15 minutes to complete. The questions below will be used to understand differences in 
perception among different groups. There will be no attempts to identify individual responses. 
The aggregated summary information will be used by the researcher but will otherwise remain 
confidential. If you do not feel comfortable answering a question, leave it blank. Your 
participation in this survey is very much appreciated.  
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Demographic Information 
1.  Current rank 
      A. O4 
      B. O5 
      C. 06 
      D. Other, specify: _____ 
2.  Army Component 
     A. Active Army 
     B. Army Reserves 
     C. Army National Guard 
     D. Other, specify: ____________________ 
3.  Current Duty Position 
     A.  CGSC Student Officer 
     B.  CGSC Staff 
     C.  CGSC Faculty 
     D. Other, specify: _________________ 
4.  Total number of years of active duty service: __________ 
5. Gender 
    A. Male 
    B. Female 
6. Age: ____ 
7. Race: ______ 
8. Highest level of education achieved: 
    A. Bachelor‘s Degree 
    B. Master‘s Degree 
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    C. Doctorate  
    D. Other: _______________ 
9. Source of U.S. Army Commission: 
    A. Military Academy 
    B. OCS 
    C. ROTC 
    D. Direct 
    E. Other: _______________________________ 
10. Branch (i.e. Infantry, Artillery, Acquisition Corps):_____________________ 
 
Please respond to all of the remaining survey comments by using the following scale: 
 
     Strongly                                                            Strongly        Don‘t  
     Agree       Agree       Neutral     Disagree         Disagree        Know     
         5               4                3                 2                    1 
   
Terminology 
The purpose of this section is to gain an understanding of what the term “transformation” 
means to you 
1.  The U.S. Army has experienced significant organizational change since 1999. 
    5                4                3                 2                1            Don‘t Know 
 
2.  Significant change in U.S. Army organizational goals by field grade officers. 
     5                4                3                 2                1            Don‘t Know 
 
3.  ―Significant change‖ and ―transformation‖ are synonymous relative to current U.S. Army 
goals.    
     5                4                3                 2                1            Don‘t Know 
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4.  The term ―transformation‖ is well understood by field grade officers in terms of U.S. Army 
change objectives. 
      5                4                3                 2                1            Don‘t Know 
5.  I believe senior Army leadership has been clear in defining ―transformation‖ goals 
   5                4                3                 2                1            Don‘t Know 
6. The meaning of Army transformation changes from one Army Chief of Staff to the next. 
     5                4                3                 2                 1              Don‘t Know 
7. Combatant Commanders (CINCs) have greater influence in defining Army Transformation 
than does the Army Chief of Staff. 
    5                4                 3                 2                 1         Don‘t Know 
Comments 
 
What “transformation” means to the Army 
The purpose of this section is to gain an understanding of what transformation means to 
the Army. 
8. U.S. Army transformation is based largely on the integration of technology into weapon 
systems. 
   5                4                3                 2                 1        Don‘t Know 
9. U.S. Army transformation is based largely on changes in force structure. 
     5                 4                3                 2                1        Don‘t Know 
10. U.S. Army transformation is based largely on information technology. 
             5                4                3                 2                1         Don‘t Know 
11. U.S. Army transformation is a process and not an end-state. 
      5                4                3                 2                1         Don‘t Know 
12. U.S. Army transformation addresses the complete ―battle-space‖ (all aspects of the 
battlefield, before, during and after combat operations). 
     5                4                3                 2                1          Don‘t Know 
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13. Transformation addresses all aspects of the U.S. Army mission. 
    5                4                 3                 2                1          Don‘t Know 
14. The U.S. Army will remain relevant even if transformation goals are not achieved. 
   5                4                3                 2                1          Don‘t Know        
15. The weapon systems development time-line is a key aspect in determining successful 
transformation. 
    5                4                3                 2                1          Don‘t Know 
16. Military training and educational institutions clearly express a senior level description of 
what ―Army Transformation‖ means. 
 5                4                3                 2                 1         Don‘t Know 
Comments 
 
 
Field Grade Officer views about transformation 
The purpose of this section is to get your perceptions of what other field grade officers 
think about “transformation” 
17. Field grade officers have an opportunity to provide input in determining what ―Army 
Transformation‖ means. 
      5                4                3                 2                   1          Don‘t Know 
18. Field grade officers have flexibility in implementing ―Army Transformation‖ goals. 
   5                4                3                 2                   1          Don‘t Know 
19. Field grade officers believe transformation is necessary based on 21
st
 century threats v. 20
th
 
century threats 
   5                4                3                 2                   1           Don‘t Know 
20.  Field grade officers believe that Network Centric Warfare is a significant component of 
transformation 
   5                4                3                 2                   1            Don‘t Know 
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21.  Field grade officers believe that the Future Combat System is a significant transformation 
factor 
5                4                3                 2                   1            Don‘t Know 
22. Field grade officers believe that the U.S. Army transformation is a ―process‖ as opposed to 
an ―end-state‖ 
5                4                3                 2                   1            Don‘t Know  
 
Comments 
 
What the U.S. Army should consider for Transformation in the future 
23.  The U.S. Army will rely on technology to drive transformation goals and objectives 
   5                4                3                 2                   1           Don‘t Know 
24.   U.S. Army Transformation goals and objectives should be more clearly stated by senior 
Army leadership. 
5                4                3                 2                   1           Don‘t Know 
25.  U.S. Army leadership must change the culture within the Army in order to achieve 
transformation. 
   5                4                3                 2                   1           Don‘t Know 
 
Comments 
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OPEN-ENDED INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
 
Informed Consent 
 
Title: Army Transformation: What does it mean? 
Researcher(s): Administrator(s): 
David H. Jerome, Graduate Student, Public Policy Ph.D. Program  
Researchers:                Compliance Contact Person: 
David H. Jerome, Graduate Student                 Ro Windwalker, Compliance Coordinator 
William D. Schreckhise, Ph.D., Faculty Advisor   Research & Sponsored Programs 
University of Arkansas     Research Compliance 
College of Arts and Sciences    University of Arkansas 
Public Policy Ph.D. Program    120 Ozark Hall 
428 Old Main      Fayetteville, AR 72701-1201 
Fayetteville, AR 72701     479-575-2208 
479-575-3356      irb@uark.edu 
djerome@uark.edu 
 
Description: The present study will investigate the meaning of ―Army Transformation‖ as 
defined by senior U.S. Army leaders and U.S. Army lieutenant colonels and majors. You will be 
asked to participate in an open-interview. 
 
Risks and Benefits: The benefits include contributing to the knowledge base pertaining to the 
meaning of the term ―Army Transformation‖. By engaging in the interview you should continue 
to consider the meaning of ―Army Transformation‖, perhaps throughout your career, and its 
importance to senior level planners and decision-makers. There are no anticipated risks to 
participating in the study. 
 
Voluntary Participation: Your participation in the research is completely voluntary.  
 
Confidentiality: You will be assigned a code number that will be used to match the responses to 
the interview questions. Only the researcher will know your name, but will not divulge it or 
identify your answers to anyone. All information will be kept confidential to the extent allowed 
by law and University policy. Results from the research will be reported as aggregate data. 
 
Right to Withdraw: You are free to refuse to participate in the research and to withdraw from this 
study at any time. Your decision to withdraw will bring no negative consequences — no penalty 
to you. 
 
Informed Consent: I, _____________________________________________, have read the             
                                                                                 (print your name) 
description including the purpose of the study, the procedures to be used, the potential risks and 
side effects, the confidentiality, as well as the option to withdraw from the study at any time. 
Each of these items has been explained to me by the investigator. The investigator has answered 
all of my questions regarding the study, and I believe I understand what is involved. My 
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signature below indicates that I freely agree to participate in this experimental study and that I 
have received a copy of this agreement from the investigator. 
 
 
________________________________________________  
Signature/Date 
 
Open-Ended Interview Questions 
U.S. Army Command & General Staff College 
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 
Demographic Information 
1.  What is your rank? 
2.  How many years have you served in the Army? 
3.  Are you a student of staff member at CGSC? 
4.  Male/Female  
Core Questions 
5.  Has the Army experienced any organizational change since 1999? 
 
6. If yes, has that change been significant or incremental since 1999? 
 
7. If no, has there been a need for the Army to make any changes since 1999? 
 
8.  In your opinion, who is responsible for expressing what organizational change is needed for 
the U.S. Army? 
 
9. Has a vision for change in the U.S. Army been expressed? 
 
10.  If yes, would you consider that expressed vision for change as incremental or significant? 
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11. If no, is it important to have an expressed vision for change? 
 
12.  What role does technology play in U.S. Army organizational change, if any? 
 
13. What role does force structure play in U.S. Army organizational change, if any? 
 
14. What role does the Defense Budget play in U.S. Army organizational change, if any? 
 
15. Do field grade officers and senior leaders view change in the same way? 
 
16. What does ―Army Transformation‖ mean to you? 
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CHAPTER 5 
ARMY TRANSFORMATION: THE CASE OF THE THREE CHIEFS OF STAFF 
 The purpose of this chapter is to examine how the three U.S. Army Chiefs of Staff who 
have served since1999 viewed Army transformation. The focus will be on what was actually said 
by these senior Army leaders. A comprehensive review was made of Congressional testimony, 
public speeches and documents, that were either prepared by the chiefs of staff or for them, 
pertaining to what they have stated relative to Army transformation. 
       There is but one U.S. Army Chief of Staff at any given time. The person that serves in 
that position may arguably be the most influential person in the U.S. Army. Because the U.S. 
Army Chief of Staff has the ear of the Executive and Legislative branches of government, 
regarding matters pertaining to the Army, it is reasonable to assume that the Chief of Staff may 
have an opportunity to influence high-level decision makers along a path that he prefers. If this 
level of influence does exist, then how does the Chief of Staff effectively communicate a 
preference for how transformation will occur within the bureaucracy of the Army?  
 The three chiefs examined are: General Eric K. Shinseki (June 1999 – June 2003), 
General Peter J. Schoomaker (August 2003 – April 2007), and, General George W. Casey, Jr. 
(April 2007 – April 2011). These three Army Chiefs of Staff have been the principals who have 
been responsible for their military service‘s ability to respond to any current national security 
contingency, as well as preparing the Army for any future threat. All three of the Army Chiefs 
have expressed the need for the Army to transform. It is important, here, to review what these 
senior Army leaders have actually stated in terms of why and how the Army needs to be able to 
transform.  
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General Eric K. Shinseki (June 1999-June 2003): The Army Must Remain Relevant 
 General Eric Shinseki appears to have concluded, in the 1990s, that there was a 
significant mismatch in what the Army was capable of performing and what it needed to be able 
to respond to in the Twenty-first Century. Prior to becoming the Army Chief of Staff, and while 
serving as the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Army Europe (USAEUR), which included 
responsibility for the peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, Shinseki must have been able to clearly 
observe the shortcomings of the current military force attempting to fulfill the requirements of 
that role. If peacekeeping operations and counter-terrorism were going to be issues that the Army 
would need to address, then Shinseki believed the Army would need to transform itself in order 
to fulfill those mission requirements.   
 Kagan (2006) corroborates this point by arguing that the National Defense Panel (NDP) 
in its 1997 report demanded that the Army focus on becoming lighter, more deployable and more 
strategically agile. Operation Applied Force in Bosnia convinced the Army leaders such as 
General Shinseki that any previous attempts to change the Army would have to be fundamentally 
re-directed. Shinseki, according to Kagan, observed that his predecessors had talked about 
changing the Army since the end of the Cold War, but had left office with the task uncompleted. 
General Shinseki was determined to make his efforts so rooted in place that any successor would 
need to continue his transformation initiatives well into the future (Kagan 2006, 242).  
 General Shinseki appears to have been the first chief of staff that specifically addressed 
transforming the Army. In his statement before Congress in March 2000 he expressed that ―the 
critical path of the transformation leads to the Objective Force (Shinseki 2000). He may not have 
known in 2000 what would result in the Objective Force. He continued by stating that ―a major 
science and technology effort to develop technologies that will give the Objective Force its 
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desired characteristics-responsiveness, agility, versatility, deployability, Lethality, survivability 
and sustainability (Shinseki 2000). In short, it appears in this statement that the Objective Force 
was still on the drawing board and perhaps no one at this time knew for sure what it would 
consist of in the end. Just a few months after becoming Army Chief of Staff he made this 
proclamation on October 12, 1999: “…Our commitment to meeting these challenges compels 
comprehensive transformation of the Army. To this end, we will begin immediately to transition 
the entire Army into a force that is strategically responsive and dominant at every point on the 
spectrum of operations. We will jumpstart the process by investing in today's off-the-shelf 
technology to stimulate the development of doctrine, organizational design, and leader training 
even as we begin a search for new technologies for the objective force‖ (Shinseki 1999a).  
 Two weeks later in testimony before Congress, General Shinseki expressed the vision for 
the transformed force as: ―Soldiers on point for the Nation transforming the most respected 
Army into a strategically responsive force that is dominant across the full spectrum of 
operations‖ (Shinseki 1999b, 5). In order to achieve this vision, Shinseki said that it ―would 
require the Army to commit to a comprehensive transformation.‖ Shinseki added that the Army 
would be turned into ―a full spectrum force that is strategically responsive and dominant at every 
point on the spectrum of operations.‖ The General knew that the Army was capable of 
successfully performing heavy combat operations (based on the overwhelming success of 
Operation Desert Storm in 1991). But in order to satisfy the full spectrum of Army 
responsibilities it was necessary for a transformation to occur in order to effectively engage in 
broader areas such as peacekeeping operations and counter-terrorism. By all indication, General 
Shinseki believed that the U.S. Army was ill-suited to accomplish those two critical 
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responsibilities, along with others, that would most likely be prevalent in the twenty-first 
century.   
  General Shinseki may have believed that Army would be in a better position to meet the 
new demands being placed on the U.S. military by deploying smaller self-sustaining Army units 
more quickly. In testimony before  Congress in October 1999, he expressed  that the Army‘s 
―goal is to deploy a combat-capable brigade of 3,000 to 5,000 soldiers anywhere in the world 
within 96 hours after receipt of an order to execute lift-off; a division on the ground within 120 
hours; and, five divisions in 30 days‖ (Shinseki1999b, 5). He went on to argue that ―these forces 
will be light enough to deploy, lethal enough and survivable enough to fight and win, agile 
enough to transition from peacemaking to war-fighting and back again, and versatile enough to 
enforce peace or fight wars. And they will be lean and efficient enough to sustain themselves, 
whatever the mission‖ (Shinseki 1999b, 5). In 1999 the U.S. Army did not possess the capability 
to deploy smaller units that were able to sustain themselves for long periods of time. General 
Shinseki believed that this capability would be key to any transformation that the Army would 
pursue beginning on his watch as chief of staff. 
      General Shinseki believed that in order to transform the Army it would be necessary do 
to three things simultaneously. First of all, in order to ensure that current Army capability was in 
no way diminished, the current or ―legacy force‖ that was derived based on Cold War era 
conventional warfare requirements would need to be maintained and upgraded. Additionally, the 
Army would pursue an ―interim force‖ based primarily on weapon systems and technology that 
could be purchased off-the-shelf that would help shape future Army doctrine and training; and 
finally, the Army would achieve an ―objective force‖, based largely on technology that was 
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emerging, that would enable the Army to effectively respond to all known possible threats early 
in the new millennia.  
 Specifically, the three forces referred to by Shinseki are described as follows: 
1. Legacy Force: This will be composed of current weapon systems that will 
maintain the capabilities the Army currently has and add others that soon becoming 
available (Shinseki 2000, 7).  
2. Interim Force:  Successfully fielding the Brigade Combat Team (BCT)14 is the 
first step in achieving the interim force. The BCT will give the Army an enhanced 
capability for operational deployment to meet worldwide requirements. The initial BCT 
will validate an organizational and operational model for the Interim Force. The interim 
force will possess some Objective Force characteristics, those that are available within 
the constraints of current and emerging technology. These interim BCT‘s will be the 
vanguard of the future Objective Force (Shinseki 2000, 7).  
3. Objective Force: The full-spectrum force that is organized, manned, equipped and 
trained to be more strategically responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable 
and sustainable across the entire spectrum of military operations from Major Theater 
Wars through counter terrorism to Homeland Security (Shinseki 2001, iv).  
  The message that General Shinseki delivered in October 1999 would remain constant as 
he continued to make the argument for Army transformation throughout his tenure as chief of 
                                                   
14
 The Brigade Combat Teams are the basic building block of the Army‘s tactical formations. 
They are the principal means of executing engagements. Three standardized BCT designs exist: 
heavy, infantry and Stryker. These are modular organizations that begin as cohesive combined 
arms teams that can be further task organized. Commands often augment forces for a specific 
mission with capabilities not organic to the BCT structure. Augmentation might include lift or 
attack aviation, armor, cannon or rocket artillery, air defense, military police, civil affairs, 
psychological operations elements, combat engineers, or additional information systems assets. 
This organizational flexibility allows BCTs to function across the spectrum of conflict (Army 
Field Manual 3-0 2008, 2-8).  
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staff.  He expressed the Army‘s transformation strategy in testimony before the U.S. Senate as 
the need ―to maintain a legacy force that will allow the Army to maintain capabilities that are 
currently needed; to establish an interim force that will allow the Army to respond to immediate 
operational requirements; and, an objective force that will give the Army the desired 
characteristics of responsiveness, agility, versatility, deployability, lethality, survivability and 
sustainability. He added that it would be necessary to invest in off-the-shelf (i.e. commercially 
developed) equipment to stimulate the development of doctrine, organizational design, and 
leadership training as a search is made for the new technologies that will deliver the new materiel 
for the Objective Force, the force that would represent the attainment of Army transformation   
(Shinseki 2000b, 6).  
 It may be clear as to what the legacy forces consisted of, since they were either fielded or 
about to be fielded. However, by the descriptions given above of what the interim and objective 
forces would be able to provide in the way of new capability, it is not altogether clear what the 
force would look like. General Shinseki, in all fairness, may also not have known what those two 
forces would look like since much of the technology was either in the process of being integrated 
or had not been discovered.      
 It is apparent that General Shinseki knew that transformation would be difficult to 
achieve in a large bureaucracy such as in the U.S. Army.  General Shinseki argued that change in 
a large organization is not easy (Shinseki 2001, 20).  He stated that leaders must embrace the 
Army vision for transformation and become agents and disciples themselves. In order to effect 
such significant change, leaders must establish an environment of innovation and encourage 
initiative that will harness the creative energy required in the development of the Objective Force 
concept (Shinseki 2001, 20).  
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 Shinseki may have understood that intermediate steps would need to be taken first lest 
moving right to the Objective Force would cause some level of culture shock within the Army. 
In testimony before the U.S. Senate, General Shinseki (Shinseki 2000b, 8) argued that in order to 
evolve to the Objective Force, the Army must first establish intermediate objectives and 
conditions that must be met before implementing subsequent changes. He believed that by 
achieving these interim capabilities, while on the path to the Objective Force, there will be an 
enhancement of readiness as well as for the development of doctrine, training and organizational 
structures that will eventually result in the Objective Force (Shinseki 2000b, 8). He may have 
understood that some incremental change was necessary in order for the Army as a whole to 
understand and accept his vision for transformation.   
 Although General Shinseki knew that achieving the Objective Force was going to take 
time, he also viewed that future force as an objective, or in other words, as an end-state. He 
described the Future Combat System (FCS) as ―a new family of ground systems…networked 
system-of-systems – a key to fielding the Objective Force – will allow leaders and soldiers to 
harness the power of digitized information systems‖ (Shinseki 2002, 17). To corroborate this 
point, the Congressional Budget Office (2009) states that the FCS program was a means for 
transforming all of the combat units in the Army. If this is true then General Shinseki must have 
had known that by developing a new family of weapon systems that was somewhat dependent on 
the development of future technology would result in his vision of Army transformation. This 
may especially be true since General Shinseki introduced the Future Combat Systems which was 
expected to be available as early as 2009 (CBO 2009, 1). Andrew Krepinevich (2008) 
corroborates this point by adding  that General Shinseki initiated the Future Combat System 
(FCS) program and added that if the systems are not fielded by the end of the decade (i.e. 2010), 
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then the Army would lose its relevancy (39).  Maintaining the Legacy Force and acquiring the 
Interim Force were necessary for both maintaining and improving Army capability, but they 
appear to be simply the means to achieving an end:  transforming the Army to an Objective 
Force.  General Shinseki may have envisioned that Objective Force based on some concept of 
the Future Combat System.  
 Although General Shinseki (2000b) described the full-spectrum force
15
, it may be 
difficult for the rank and file to synthesize the true meaning of what full-spectrum really means 
to them personally. General Shinseki‘s strategy for accomplishing Army Transformation may not 
have been, therefore, all that clear to field grade officers. In order to ensure that everyone in 
the U.S. Army knew that the organization was pursuing transformational change, General 
Shinseki made an emblematic change to the head gear worn by all soldiers by directing: ―To 
symbolize the Army‘s commitment to transforming itself into the Objective Force, the Army will 
adopt the black beret for wear Army-wide‖ (Shinseki 2000a). General Shinseki (2000a) went on 
to state that the Army must change to maintain its relevance for the evolving strategic 
environment and that as technology allows, the Army will begin to erase the distinctions between 
heavy and light forces. Shinseki (2000a) expressed that ―we are transforming the most powerful 
Army in the world from a Cold War Legacy Force to an Objective Force with early entry 
capabilities that operate jointly, without access to fixed forward bases, and still have the power to 
slug it out and win campaigns decisively; this transformation will correct the condition in today‘s 
                                                   
15
 General Shinseki described the full-spectrum force as being one that is capable of dominating 
every point on the spectrum of military operations. He believed that the Army faced strategic 
deployment problems that inhibited the Army‘s ability to rapidly transition from peacetime 
operations in one part of the world to small-scale contingencies or war-fighting in another. He 
believed that it was necessary for the Army to deploy quickly in order to meet the full-spectrum 
of possibilities. 
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Legacy Force where our heavy forces are too heavy and our light forces lack staying power‖ 
(Shinseki 2000a).  
 Shinseki (Shinseki 2001, 1) argued that the United States would be faced with threats of 
weapons of mass destruction and that cyber attacks would be a part of that threat framework. He 
argued that the Objective Force must be prepared and equipped to deal with these realities. In 
this atmosphere of constant change, no military force desiring to remain effective and relevant 
can remain stagnant (Shinseki 2001, 3). Does this important point mean that transformation is 
evolutionary and ever changing, and not revolutionary nor seeking an end-state as would be 
indicated by the achievement of an ―Objective Force‖?  General Shinseki advocated for the 
Objective Force and provided testimony that the Objective Force would represent the 
achievement of Army Transformation. This is language that General Schoomaker, his successor 
as the next chief of staff, would not use. 
 
General Peter J. Schoomaker (August 2003 – April 2007: 
A Modular Approach to Transformation 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld convinced General Peter J. Schoomaker to leave 
retirement and to succeed General Shinseki as Army Chief of Staff in the summer of 2003. 
General Schoomaker would continue with pursuing his predecessor‘s vision of transforming the 
Army, including the continuation of the Future Combat Systems program initiated by General 
Shinseki. While General Shinseki did talk about the advantages of modularity, General 
Schoomaker appears to have turned modularity into his focus of what Army transformation 
would involve. General Schoomaker modularity in the context of Brigade Combat Teams 
(BCT‘s) that are ―designed as modules, or self-sufficient and standardized, that can be more 
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readily deployed and combined with other Army and joint forces to meet the precise needs of the 
Combatant Commanders‖ (Schoomaker 2005, 10). Where General Shinseki gave the impression 
that Army transformation was an end-state, or the attainment of some objective force, General 
Schoomaker would make it clear that transformation is an on-going process and not an end-state.  
James Carafano (2004) corroborates this point by arguing that General Schoomaker almost 
immediately began revising Army Transformation plans for how it would accomplish its goals 
(Carafano 2004, 1).  
General Schoomaker wasted little time, after becoming the Army Chief of Staff in 
August 2003 in expressing his vision of Army transformation. General Schoomaker stated that 
although he intended to continue much of the transformation that was initiated by General 
Shinseki, he would not be using terms like ―legacy,‖ ―interim‖ and ―objective‘ to describe the 
force (Schoomaker 2003). James Carafano corroborates the chief of staff‘s new vision by stating 
that in August 2003 General Schoomaker re-designated General Shinseki‘s ―objective force‖ as 
the ―future force‖ which would indicate that Army Transformation was more process-oriented 
and open-ended with emphasis on fielding future capabilities with less emphasis on what an 
―objective force‖ would look like (Carafano 2004: 6). The Congressional Budget Office (2009) 
also stated that General Schoomaker‘s legacy is known as the Modularity Initiative; General 
Schoomaker argued that breaking the Army into a greater number of smaller units would allow 
commanders to create forces suited to their needs by combining the appropriate mix of 
standardized units, rather than having to take a whole division, which might not include the right 
mix of capabilities (CBO 2009, 1). If Army officers had it in their mind that transformation 
would occur upon the fielding of the Future Combat Systems (FCS) that would represent 
Shinseki‘s Objective Force, then the new Chief of Staff‘s on-going process viewpoint may have 
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created some uncertainty about what the term really means. Although FCS would remain as the 
primary transformation program throughout General Schoomaker‘s tenure as chief of staff, the 
perception of what that program now meant to field grade officers may have become less clear.  
General Schoomaker provided the 2003 Army Transformation Roadmap, a 160-page 
directive on how the Army was going to proceed toward transformation, in response to the 
National Security Strategy (NSS 2002), the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR 2002) and the 
Transformation Planning Guidance (TPG 2003). In the Roadmap, General Schoomaker explicitly 
described transformation as an ongoing process and not an end-state (Schoomaker 2003, XIX). 
General Schoomaker stated that the Army framed the constant change of transformation through 
the interaction of the continuously evolving capabilities of the Current to Future Force (1-5). He 
continued by clarifying that the Current Force is today‘s operational Army and that the Future 
Force is the operational force the Army continuously seeks to become (Schoomaker 2003, 1-5). 
General Schoomaker provided a revised Army Transformation Roadmap in 2004 that said that 
―the Army is changing now and the changes ahead for the Army are significant – the most 
comprehensive transformation of the U.S. Army since World War II‖ (Schoomaker 2004, 19). 
General Schoomaker (2004) went on to  say that ―the Army is using its increased resources and 
unusually high operational tempo (intense activity) to facilitate transformation to a modular, 
brigade-based, campaign-quality army with joint and expeditionary capabilities‖ (Schoomaker 
2004, 17). Although General Schoomaker expressed a vision of transforming to a modular force, 
his vision appears to be more process-oriented, as opposed to achieving some end-state definite 
in the future, a vision more closely associated with that of his predecessor.  
While General Schoomaker would invariably inherit much of what General Shinseki put 
into place with regard to transformation initiatives, Schoomaker appeared to have somewhat 
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different views in how to achieve transformation goals.  General Shinseki initiated his Army 
transformation goals during a time of relative peace. General Schoomaker would inherit the 
initiatives started by his predecessor during a time of war. Transforming a large bureaucratic 
organization like the Army during peacetime is one thing, but trying to achieve such significant 
change in time of war may be something quite different.  
 General Schoomaker offers some insight into how he views the ability for the  
Army to transform itself. He suggests that the Army may be in a better position to  
transform during a time of war as opposed to during peace time where there is  
significant competition for resources. Les Brownlee, the Acting Secretary of the Army,  
and General Schoomaker stated that ―the Army always has changed and always will. But  
an army at war must change the way it changes. In peacetime, armies change slowly and 
deliberately. Modern warfare is immensely complex. The vast array of capabilities, 
skills, techniques, and organizations of war are a recipe for chaos without thoughtful planning to 
assure interoperability, synchronization, and synergy. Brownlee and Schoomaker go on to say 
that ―peacetime also tends to subordinate effectiveness to economy, and joint collaboration to the 
inevitable competition for budgets and programs. Institutional energies tend to focus on 
preserving force structure and budgetary programs of record. Resource risk is spread across 
budget years and programs, including forces in the field‖ (Brownlee and Schoomaker 2004, 8).  
It is not clear if General Schoomaker is suggesting that transformation is easier to  
accomplish during times of war, where there is less competition for resources, as  
opposed to peacetime where transformation efforts may be less urgent and reduced to  
line items in the overall budget. Nevertheless, it is important to know how  
General Schoomaker views transformation.   
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 General Schoomaker is credited more for focusing on modularity initiatives  
and less on achieving some end-state capability. Brownlee and Schoomaker (2004) state that  
the ―foundations of Army Transformation must be diversity and adaptability. The Army  
must retain a wide range of capabilities while significantly improving its agility and  
versatility. Building a joint and expeditionary Army with campaign qualities will require  
versatile forces that can mount smaller, shorter duration operations routinely—without  
penalty to the Army‘s capability for larger, more protracted campaigns. A key prerequisite  
to achieving that capability is developing more modular tactical organizations (13).  While  
these views of where the Army needs to be are important, it is also relevant to explore why  
General Schoomaker perceived the current Army as being inadequate for future purposes.  
 Secretary Brownlee and General Schoomaker state that ―the Army‘s force design was 
based primarily in the context of a large conventional war in which all echelons from platoon to  
the highest level of Army command (divisions, corps, and Army) were deployed. This  
presumption of infrequent large-scale deployment encouraged the Army to centralize certain  
functions at higher echelons of command, and implicitly assumed that deployment would  
largely be complete before significant employment began. Moreover, presuming peace to be  
the default condition, the Army garrisoned the bulk of its tactical units to optimize economic  
efficiency and management convenience rather than combined-arms training and rapid  
deployability (13). 
  Since the end of World War II, the Army had been organized by divisions for purposes 
of deployment and for engaging in tactical and combat operations. A division was typically 
comprised of three combat brigades (a combination of infantry and armor brigades each having 
approximately five battalions) along with division artillery, aviation and engineer units and 
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logistical support. The Army was now transitioning from division-based organizations to brigade 
combat teams, for purposes of deployment and tactical operations. General Schoomaker 
provided testimony before the U.S. Senate regarding his views of transformation where he stated 
that ―…we are restructuring from a division-based to a brigade-based force. These brigades are 
designed as modules, or self-sufficient and standardized Brigade Combat Teams, that can be 
more readily deployed and combined with other Army and joint forces to meet the precise needs 
of the Combatant Commanders.
16
 The result of this transformational initiative will be an 
operational Army that is larger and more powerful, flexible and rapidly deployable‖ 
(Schoomaker 2005, 10 - 11).  During the Cold War, the Army was largely a garrison-based 
military force organized under a division structure. General Schoomaker considered the garrison 
and division-based Army to be inadequate in an environment where smaller units, such as 
brigades, could be deployed more rapidly and with the ability to sustain themselves for a 
relatively long period of time. However, he also did not want to sacrifice the ability to fight a 
large conventional war if it became necessary. The modularity of the Brigade Combat Teams 
(BCTs) may have been his idea of satisfying both scenarios.  
 General Schoomaker makes a case that moving from the division organization model to 
that of a brigade model is not necessarily a new concept. Brownlee and Schoomaker (2004) state 
that  
―although divisions have long been the nominal measure of the Army‘s fighting 
strength, the Army also has a long history of deployment and 
employment of multifunctional brigade combat teams. In addition, the Army 
has a broad array of reinforcing capabilities—both units and headquarters— 
but we can significantly improve their modularity. In the future, by 
                                                   
16
 Combatant Commanders are the war-fighting four-star level commanding officers of joint 
forces (Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines, and Special Forces) that report primarily to the 
Secretary of Defense and the President of the United States. These commanders may be from any 
one of the military branches and do not report to their respective chiefs of staff. Instead the chief 
of staff, in this case the Army, is responsible for supporting their war-fighting needs. 
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shifting to such brigade combat teams as our basic units of action, enabling 
them routinely with adequate combat, combat support, and sustainment 
capabilities, and assuring them connectivity to headquarters and joint assets, we 
can significantly improve the tailorability, scalability, and ‘fightability‘ of 
the Army‘s contribution to the overall joint fight. At the same time, the inherent 
robustness and self-sufficiency of brigade combat teams will enhance their ability 
to deploy rapidly and fight on arrival‖ (14).  
 
If the Army has some tradition or experience in deploying as brigades, then does General 
Schoomaker really advocate for change that can be considered transformative? He may be 
suggesting that the new brigade is going to look different than previous ones, in that they 
will more autonomous and will be less reliant of division and corps command and control 
oversight. The brigades may be able to achieve that autonomy as a result of new or 
evolving technology. 
 As stated earlier, General Schoomaker did inherit many of the initiatives of his 
predecessor. While he chose to change the terminology of transformation from ―Legacy Force‖, 
―Interim Force‖ and ―Objective Force‖ to that of ―modularity‖ and the ―Future Force‖ he 
nevertheless proceeded with programs that reflected the former terms. Brownlee and 
Schoomaker (2004) stated that ―the Future Combat System (FCS) remains the materiel 
centerpiece of the Army‘s commitment to become more expeditionary, 
and will go far to reconciling deployability with sustainable combat power. A year later in 
testimony before Congress General Schoomaker confirmed that ―the FCS is the Army‘s largest 
and most promising science and technology investment‖ (12). He stated that ―when finished the 
FCS will add crucial capabilities to the Army‘s future modular force that is designed to achieve 
Department of Defense transformation goals‖ (Schoomaker 2005, 12). However, Brownlee and 
Schoomaker clearly express that ―we will remain a hybrid force for the foreseeable future, and 
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we will seek ways to improve the deployability of the platforms we already own‖ (Brownlee and 
Schoomaker 2004, 21).  
The platforms that the Army owned during his tenure as chief of staff were both legacy 
and interim systems. The FCS has not been fielded and made available. Brownlee and 
Schoomaker (2004) concluded by stating that: 
―the changes ahead are significant. But they are neither reckless nor revolutionary. 
On the contrary, they reflect years of Army study, experimentation, and 
experience. We have delayed this transformation repeatedly, fearing that we could 
not afford such change in a time of turbulence and reduced resources. Now we 
realize that what we cannot afford is more delay. The best way to anticipate the 
future is to create it. The Army is moving out, and this is merely the beginning. 
Our incentive is not change for change‘s sake… the changes are a mere down 
payment on changes that will follow. But our challenge is to measure ourselves not 
against others, but against our own potential. It is not enough that we are changing. 
The real question is, are we changing enough?‖ (23).  
 
Army transformation appears not to be revolutionary according to Brownlee and 
Schoomaker, but is instead a result of a long drawn out methodical plan that the Army had 
developed over the years and is now in a position, based on circumstances that called for other 
than a large conventional response, where the plan needs to be put into place. 
 After almost eight years since the announcement of the Army‘s vision for transformation, 
the Army Chief of Staff was forced to acknowledge that funding levels were not adequate to both 
fund the Army in the field and to go forward with transformation plans. In testimony before the 
U.S. Senate in February 2007, General Schoomaker indicated that ―the fundamental challenge 
impacting Army readiness and strategic depth is the need to establish a proper balance between 
strategy and resources (Schoomaker 2007, 5). The general went on to add ―that had the U.S. 
Army received funding at the requested levels in recent years, and endorsed policies to assure 
access to all of our capability, we would be in a better strategic posture‖ (Schoomaker 2007, 5).  
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General Schoomaker was clearly indicating that the cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan 
were impacting the Army‘s funding of the FCS program and the Army‘s ability to meet its 
transformation goals. General Schoomaker expressed that  
―to meet the Combatant Commanders‘ immediate wartime needs, we (the Army) 
pooled equipment from across the force to equip Soldiers. This practice, which we 
are continuing today, increases risk for our next-to-deploy units, and limits our 
ability to respond to emerging strategic contingencies‖ (Schoomaker 2007, 3).  
 
The limited ability to which General Schoomaker refers may include the inability of the Army to 
pursue and achieve transformation goals. General Schoomaker adds that ―investments accounts 
were under funded by approximately $100 billion during the previous decade, resulting in nearly 
$56 billion in equipment shortages across the Army‖ (Schoomaker 2007, 3). As resources may 
have been diverted away from Army transformation efforts, such as FCS, to focus more on the 
immediate resource needs of the Army involved in war, it is possible that an understanding of 
what the Army was trying to accomplish in the area of transformation became less clear.         
      General Schoomaker appears to have advocated for a modular force throughout his term 
as Army chief of staff. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, specifically describes the 
Army‘s move toward modular organizations. In 2003, the transition year between General 
Shinseki and General Schoomaker as Army Chiefs of Staff, the Army implemented a brigade-
based force. This was intended as a part of an ongoing transformation process. This move was 
designed to allow the Army to be more responsive to a variety of world events by being able to 
deploy smaller and more versatile combat organizations quicker. Instead of deploying an entire 
corps or division-sized organization, the Army could now deploy smaller brigade size units that 
were more appropriate and capable (FM 3-0 2008).
17
 This description of transforming to a 
                                                   
17
 FM 3-0, Operations states that a corps provides a headquarters that specializes in operations as 
a land component command headquarters (2-4). There may be multiple divisions under the 
command of a corps. The Army has reorganized around smaller, more versatile formations able 
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modular force may have provided General Schoomaker‘s sole view of what Army 
Transformation meant to him as the Army Chief of Staff; FM 3-0 makes no other clear reference 
to Army Transformation. The next Army Chief of Staff, General George Casey would continue 
with the idea that FCS was the major component of Army transformation. It appears that General 
Schoomaker‘s plea to Congress that the Army has been and is underfunded (Schoomaker 2005) 
resulted in some benefit for his successor, in that the Army did receive funding that allowed for 
units coming back from combat to be re-fit (reconstituted to pre-deployment levels) and allowed 
for some transformation initiatives to proceed. 
 
.General George W. Casey, Jr. (April 2007 – April 2011: 
 Transformation is a Process 
―There‘s no catalyst for change like a war.‖ General Casey18 
 This statement may have been derived by General Casey more as a result of new 
experiences in twenty-first century conflict rather than any experiences that he may have had in 
the conventional warfare of the twentieth century. As in the case of General Schoomaker, 
General Casey began his tenure as chief of staff with the Army involved in two wars, Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and with budget constraints that were taking their toll on maintaining an Army in 
the field while at the same time attempting to achieve some level of transformation. He would 
continue the modularity initiatives begun by his predecessor; and even if he wanted to pursue 
another path for transforming, he did not necessarily believe he had that ability. General Casey 
                                                                                                                                                                    
to deploy more promptly. Divisions are the Army‘s primary tactical war-fighting headquarters. 
Their principal task is directing subordinate brigade operations. A division can control up to six 
Brigade Combat Teams in major combat operations (2-5).Brigade combat teams for the basic 
building block of the Army‘s tactical formations. They are the principal means of executing 
engagements (2-8).  
 
18
 Cited in Garamone (2011). 
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stated that upon becoming chief of staff and that ―with everything we had going on, if I had 
made hard turns, it would have derailed the progress…I came in and said let‘s finish it, and we 
kept going‖ (Garamone 2011).   
 General Casey had the idea as a division commander (a two-star command assignment) 
that if a unit could do conventional war, it could do anything. However, after serving for 32 
months in Iraq ―I don‘t believe that anymore. What we realized was its not going to be either 
conventional or counterinsurgency. The wars in the 21
st
 Century are going to be different than 
the wars I grew up trying to fight. We‘re not going to be fighting corps-on-corps operations 
(multiple divisions fighting one another), except maybe in Korea‖ (Garamone 2011).  But Casey 
says that we are not there yet. Casey adds that ―while we have talked about this and thought 
about it, until we start putting brigades out there on the ground and have then do it, we‘re not 
going to crack it. The kicker is that the wheels are falling off the budget and the Army will 
remain its current size through at least 2015‖ (Garamone 2010). This provides an overview of 
how this chief of staff came to the realization, even as a two-star general as late as 2000 and 
2001, that the Army was ill-prepared to confront a threat that was other than a conventional one.   
 The funding that General Schoomaker advocated for previously may have benefited the 
Army, and General Casey, in fiscal year 2007. General Casey, in a statement before the U.S. 
Senate, testified that in fiscal year 2007, the Congress provided over $200 billion to the Army 
which allowed the Army to fully fund its Reset Program, which allows combat units to re-build 
the readiness consumed in combat and prepare for future deployments and contingencies (Casey 
2007b, 1). General Casey continued by testifying that ―the Army must transform to meet the 
demands of the 21
st
 Century. Transformation is a holistic effort to adapt how we fight, train, 
modernize, develop leaders, station, and support our Soldiers, Families and Civilian. 
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Transformation is journey – not a destination. Transformation is also a multi-faceted process 
(Casey 2007b, 5).  
 General Casey expressed the need to 
            
            ―grow the Army to provide and sustain sufficient forces for the full range and duration of 
current operations and future contingencies; we must continuously modernize our forces 
to put our Cold War formation and systems behind us and to provide our Soldiers a 
decisive advantage over our enemies – we will continue to rapidly field the best new 
equipment to our fighting forces, upgrade and modernize existing systems, incorporate 
new technologies derived from the Future Combat Systems research and development, 
and soon to begin to field the Future Combat Systems themselves (platforms that are 
lighter, less logistically dependent, and less manpower intensive); we are over half-way 
through the largest organizational change since World War II – we must continue to 
convert our combat and enabling formation to modular units that are more deployable, 
tailorable (capable of being customized for specific purposes), and versatile; we must 
continue institutional change in processes, policies, and procedures to support an 
expeditionary Army – our transformation cannot be cemented until the institutional 
systems (personnel, education, training, healthcare, and procurement are adapted to meet 
the realities of our current and future environments; we must continue to adapt our 
Reserve Components to an operational reserve; and, we must continue to develop agile 
and adaptive leaders‖ (Casey 2007b, 5 – 6). 
 
 General Casey may have been optimistic in late 2007 when funding levels were increased 
for the Army. In a speech at the Annual meeting of the Association of the United States Army, 
General Casey stated that the Army ―intends to transform the current force into a campaign 
quality, executionary Army
19
, that is capable of supporting across the spectrum of conflict in the 
21
st
 Century…oh by the way, we are about half way there in completing our modular 
transformation, and the rebalancing of our Force. The current Army is out of balance…the 
current demand on our Forces exceeds the sustainable supply. We are consumed with meeting 
the demands of the current fight, and unable to provide ready forces as rapidly as we would like, 
for other contingencies‖ (Casey 2007a).  
 General Casey described transformation as ―a holistic effort to adapt how we fight, how 
we train, modernize, develop leaders, base our Forces, and support our Soldiers, Families and 
                                                   
19
 It is not entirely clear what Casey means here. 
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Civilians‖ (Casey 2007a). Casey goes on to describe four specific aspects of transformation. 
They are: 1. Growth. An increase in the total number of soldiers in order to cover the full range 
of operational requirements now and in the future. 2. Modernization. A continuous process that 
primarily includes the integration of FCS. General Casey places great emphasis on FCS as being 
both the technology as well as the systems that will result in the Army achieving the BCT-FCS. 
Arguably what is intended as the Army‘s primary operational force for the future. 3. Adapting 
the Reserve Component. The active Army relies on support from the Army Reserves and Army 
National Guard in meeting operational requirements. In order to be effective in their support of 
the active component, these reserve components must be resourced similarly. 4. Agile and 
Adaptive Leaders. The Army must have leaders that are effective in the full spectrum of 
operations (pre-conflict, conflict, and post-conflict operations). Because  the Army expects to 
face different threats (terrorists, extremists, sub-state actors, and rogue states) as compared to the 
threats of the 20
th
 Century (the Soviet Union), leadership agility and adaptation are likely more 
complex and require a better understanding of joint operations and a more comprehensive 
understanding of the overall operational environment (Casey 2007a).  
 General Casey may have been especially optimistic when he stated that the FCS program 
was the full spectrum force that was needed for the 21
st
 Century.  Again, he may have had little 
choice in continuing with the program that he had inherited, but it is difficult to imagine that the 
problems that ultimately resulted in the termination of the program were not evident by late 
2007.         
      As stated previously, General Casey continued with many of the modularity initiatives 
that were started during General Schoomaker‘s tenure. Like Schoomaker before him, General 
Casey inherited the FCS program that was initiated during General Shinseki‘s tenure. General 
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Casey mentioned that when he entered as the chief of staff  he did not make any ―hard turns‖ or 
significant changes, lest he de-rail the progress that was being made in programs such as FCS. 
Although he appeared to be more aligned with General Schoomaker‘s modularity initiatives, he 
still appeared to remain a champion for FCS.  On October 10, 2008, General Casey mentioned in 
a speech that the Army transformation efforts remain holistic: ―The Army will increase by 1.1 
million the numbers of soldiers by 2010 and 85% of our units have converted to modular 
formations. We are 60% through the rebalancing to skills required for the Twenty-first Century.  
We will begin fielding the FCS in 2015. Transformation is a journey and transformation is on a 
very good track‖ (Casey 2008, 4). General Casey may be more inclined to look at transformation 
as a process that really never ends by indicating that it is more like a journey, a metaphor that 
may be consistent with General Schoomaker‘s  view and less like General Shinseki‘s ―Objective 
Force‖ and other such end-state focused terms. 
      General Casey believed that the Brigade Combat Team that was built on the concept of 
modularity would be the unit that would best represent a transformed army. The qualities of a 
land force that General Casey describes are directly applicable to a brigade organization that can 
be customized to meet specific operational needs and have the wherewithal to sustain itself over 
an extended period of time. General Casey identified six qualities that land forces must be able to 
demonstrate. They (1) must be versatile by being able to respond to a broad range of tasks; (2) 
must be expeditionary by rapidly responding to unanticipated conflicts and fighting immediately 
upon arrival; (3) need to be agile by adapting quickly in order to exploit opportunities in complex 
environments; (4) need to be lethal in order to defeat enemies; (5) must be sustainable because 
neither the duration nor the character of military campaigns is predictable; and, (6) must be 
interoperable with not only joint forces, but with other agencies and allies (Casey, 2008).  These 
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are the qualities that have been consistently emphasized by the three Army Chiefs of Staff since 
1999. However, according to some experts cited in chapter 3 of this dissertation, the goal of 
Army transformation may still not be well understood. 
 As may be the case in virtually all large organization, the opinions of senior staff may in 
fact reflect the viewpoints of the leader of the organization. If those viewpoints are different, 
then one could reasonably expect some level of conflict up to and including the dismissal of s 
senior staff person. General Casey‘s views on transformation may have been expressed through 
senior Army officers that reported directly to him.  
 Eric A. Hollister (2010) points out that General Casey‘s Deputy Chief of Staff, in March 
2008, stated that the FCS was ―non-negotiable‖ as the program that would be the centerpiece for 
transformation (6). On October 23, 2008, while addressing officers at the U.S. Army Command 
and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, as a part of the Futures Day Panel, 
Hollister adds that the Army Capabilities Integration Center‘s (ARCIC‘S) FCS Capabilities 
Manager (a senior military official that would arguably have represented the views of both the 
Chief of Staff, General Casey, and the Deputy Chief of Staff) supported the position of the Army 
Deputy Chief of Staff by saying: 
 
―I‘d ask you to look down on your uniform and see if you‘ve got the U.S. Army 
there, and if you do, to realize that FCS, per the leadership of the Army, is the 
principal modernization program for the Army. It is our program. It‘s ours. It‘s 
the Army program. So you may not agree with it, and you may not think that it‘s 
going to deliver all that it will – in fact, it probably won‘t deliver all that it 
advertises. But it‘s our program. We spent a ton of money on it already, and a ton 
of energy and time. And we are now, every year now, fighting budget fights for 
FCS. So it‘s important to understand that this is our program. It‘s not the Chief of 
Staff‘s program…it‘s the Army‘s program. So if you are in the Army, you ought 
to understand what it is, you ought to be constructively criticizing it. So if you 
have issues with it, we‘d be happy to take those. But we would ask that you 
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remember, this is the Army‘s program and you‘re in the Army‖ (Hollister 2010, 
6). 
 
      If these positions espoused by both the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army and the 
FCS Capabilities Manager represent the viewpoint of the Chief of Staff of Army on 
matters pertaining to Army Transformation, then the reason may be that field grade 
officers either do not understand what is intended by transformation, or they reject FCS 
as representing the centerpiece of what transformation means. This viewpoint from senior 
Army leadership may indicate that a gap may exist in the meaning of Army 
Transformation.  A few months after the FCS Capabilities Manager admonished the 
officers at the Command and General Staff College to get behind the program, Secretary 
of Defense Robert Gates, argues Hollister, cancelled the vehicle portion of the program, 
which in effect ended the acquisition component of the FCS program (Hollister 2010, 6). 
In the absence of FCS the Army appeared to still be on the path to some form of 
transformation. General Casey stated 2010 that ―the Army will continue to rebalance the 
force to handle the range of conflicts the nation faces today.  
 The fiscal year 2011 budget contained the resources to finish Army 
transformation from a Cold War-era formation to one that is relevant in the twenty-first 
century (Garamone 2010). The fiscal year 2011 budget that was submitted to Congress by 
the current administration has not been passed at this point. Since funding is only 
available under a Continuing Resolution Amendment based on fiscal 2010 funding levels, 
it is not clear if Army transformational goals are being met at this point. As he stated 
before, war may serve as a catalyst for change, but the U.S. Army may not have changed 
to the degree to which some prefer. 
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Army Transformation: An Analysis 
 The three Army chiefs of staff that have served from 1999 until April 2011 may have at 
least one thing in common, none of them may know the results of Army transformation. They all 
agree that transformation is a process that will allow the Army to adapt to  new and emerging 
threats . However, according to Andrew Krepinevich, General Shinseki viewed the Future 
Combat System program as the key to transforming the Army and that the transformation would 
need to be accomplished by 2010 or the Army would lose its relevancy (Krepinevich 2008, 39). 
General Schoomaker states, in the 2004 Army Transformation Roadmap, ‖the Army is changing 
and the changes ahead for the Army are significant – the most comprehensive transformation of 
the U.S. Army since World War II. A continuous cycle of innovation, experimentation, 
experience and change will lead to a campaign-quality Army with joint and expeditionary 
capabilities‖ (Schoomaker 2004, 19).  
 This section will compare what each of the three chiefs of staff has stated in relationship 
to five transformation imperatives. These five imperatives are listed in Table 5.1 below and are 
similar to comments that field grade officers were asked to respond to in the survey provided in 
the Appendix. These imperatives are important in determining if the chiefs of staff view them as 
being important and if they view them consistently. The language the chiefs of staff use here in 
describing their individual take on these imperatives will be further used in Chapter 6 when the 
survey results are analyzed. 
 The first and second imperatives suggest that transformation may be either revolutionary 
or evolutionary in nature, and may be either a process or an end-state. While General Shinseki 
suggests that the Army‘s transformation strategy is evolutionary, he may also suggest that 
transformation is also revolutionary. He states that ―we will begin immediately to turn the entire 
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Army into a full spectrum force that is strategically responsive and dominant at every point on 
the spectrum of operations (Shinseki 1999). This language used by General Shinseki appears to 
be more revolutionary in that he intends to ―immediately‖ change the Army, which infers 
achieving some end-state, as opposed to a more evolutionary change of the Army over time. On 
the other hand, General Schoomaker takes a more evolutionary approach in describing Army 
transformation when he states that the Army‘s plan ―is continuously improving our ability to 
operate as part of the Joint Team, while ensuring our ability to dominate in any environment 
against current, emerging and unforeseen threats (Harvey and Schoomaker 2006). His Vice Chief 
of Staff and successor, General Casey, would continue in describing transformation in more 
evolutionary terms. General Casey says that ―transformation is a holistic effort…transformation 
is a journey…not a destination…transformation is also a multi-faceted process‖ (Casey 2007b). 
The three chiefs of staff have addressed the two first transformation imperatives. Although 
General Shinseki states that the Army is evolving his narrative indicates a more revolutionary 
approach that must meet some end-state. Conversely, General Schoomaker and General Casey 
consider transformation to be evolutionary and a process that will result some day in an ideal 
army.     
 The next imperative in Table 5.1 has to do with what the force will look like in a 
transformed army. The three chiefs of staff all agreed that the Army had to transform from 
division as the basis of combat deployments to a smaller force that is lighter, lethal, sustainable 
and more mobile. General Shinseki believed that there would be a need for interim brigades to 
meet these criteria in the short-term, but other than referring to a ―combat capable brigade‖ he 
may not have known for sure what his vision of the Objective Force would look like since his 
vision relied on technology that was still evolving. General Shinseki stated that ―candidly, we 
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don‘t have all the answers today; but we are asking the right technological questions, and we will 
go where the answers are‖ (Shinseki 2000). Conversely, General Schoomaker and General Cases 
almost exclusively refer to the Brigade Combat Team (BCT), or modularity in the context of a 
brigade deployment package, when discussing a transformed army. In 2002, General Shinseki 
stated that ―the Army will begin fielding an Objective Force – this decade (Shinseki 2002). 
While he also expressed that ―true transformation takes advantage of new approaches to 
operational concepts and capabilities and blends of old and new technologies and innovative 
organizations that efficiently anticipate new and emerging opportunities‖ (Shinseki 2000) he 
confines any reference to a Brigade Combat Team (BCT) to the Interim Force and is less clear 
on what the Objective Force would look like.  
 General Schoomaker states ―We are transforming to create a future force with a broad set 
of capabilities to enable our soldiers to address strategic problems the nation will face (Harvey 
and Schoomaker 2006). General Schoomaker moves away from more idealistic narrative to the 
more specific when he adds that ―we are building a modular force centered on BCTs…our 
modular conversion across the active and reserve components is designed to meet the demands 
of the current war, sustain other global commitments, establish the organizational structure 
needed to accelerate modernization, and support a new global basing posture that will rely more 
heavily on rotational presence [ i.e. an expeditionary force]‖ (Harvey and Schoomaker 2006). 
Again, while General Schoomaker refers to achieving an ideal army, he was more specific in that 
he described an army that was brigade-centric once transformed.  
 In the spirit of being more process-oriented and evolutionary in thought, General Casey 
states that ―we will continue to rapidly field the best new equipment to our fighting forces, 
upgrade and modernize existing systems, and incorporate new technologies derived from the 
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Future Combat Systems research and development…and soon begin fielding FCS themselves‖ 
(Casey 2007). Since 2007 General Casey had to amend his comments by stating that ―we‘ve 
moved away from the FCS program to what we believe is an achievable, affordable 
modernization program for our BCTs (Casey 2010). Assuming that field grade officers even 
knew the details of FCS, this significant change away from FCS being the ―centerpiece for 
transformation‖ may cause some confusion about what is now meant by transformation.    
 The next transformation imperative discussed in Table 5.1 centers on Army culture and 
whether it needs to change before transformation can be successfully achieved or pursued. 
General Shinseki stated in 1999 that the commitment to change will require a comprehensive 
transformation of the Army (Shinseki 1999).  General Shinseki may have been talking to both 
external and internal groups when he indicated that transformation includes the entire Army. He 
further states that ―this is the most significant effort to change the Army in 100 years…our aim is 
not a single platform swap-out, but a systematic change and full integration of multidimensional 
capabilities—space, air, sea, land‖ (Shinseki 2000).  
 This clearly indicates, for an army that has not experienced such significant change in 
―100 years‖, that Shinseki believes the culture of the Army will need to change before 
transformation can be achieved. General Schoomaker makes reference to the Army of the Cold 
War, a period that is included in Shinseki‘s claim that ―the Army has not significantly changed in 
100 years‖. 
 By stating that ―at the end of the Cold War, the United States had no peer 
competitor…our Army was much larger and was built around heavy, mechanized and armored 
formations…today the future is uncertain and presents many challenges…the emerging 
challenges manifest themselves as new adaptive threats, employing a mix of new and old 
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technologies that necessitate changes to the ways in which the elements of our national power 
are applied‖ (Schoomaker 2004). The implication made by Schoomaker may be as simple as 
thinking light as opposed to thinking heavy when it comes to weapon systems, and the fact that 
the battlefield today (or battle-space) is far different than that of the Cold War threat, and the 
culture will need to change first in order to acknowledge this new reality.  
 General Casey moves away from Cold War language and addresses threats in the context 
of what the U.S. faces now.  He states that ―we live in a world where global terrorism and 
extremist ideologies are real threats…national security experts are virtually unanimous in 
predicting that the next several decades will be ones of persistent conflict – protracted 
confrontation among state, non-state, and individual actors that use violence to achieve their 
political and ideological ends (Casey 2007). This statement suggests that Casey believes that the 
Army needs to do away with Cold War rhetoric and focus on the new realities of persistent 
threats that come from a variety of sources, a re-focus that may first require a cultural change 
within the Army.  
 The last imperative discussed in Table 5-1 addresses the significance of FCS in the 
context of achieving transformation. All three chiefs of staff have indicated that FCS was either 
the critical path to or the center piece of transformation. General Shinseki gave life to FCS when 
he stated that ―the Army will create a new family of ground systems called the Future Combat 
Systems…a key to fielding the Objective Force…see the FCS first unit equipped and operational 
by 2010…the Army will begin fielding an Objective Force – this decade‖ (Shinseki 2002). This 
language indicates that Shinseki placed considerable significance on FCS in achieving the 
Objective Force and the transformed army.  
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 As stated previously, General Schoomaker upon becoming chief of staff in 2003 would 
no longer refer to Shinseki‘s Objective Force but would instead adopt the term Future Force, a 
force that the U.S. Army would continuously be in pursuit of achieving. However, Schoomaker 
would still remain in pursuit of FCS began during Shinseki‘s tenure. General Schoomaker states 
that ―our largest and most promising science and technology investment remains the pursuit of 
Future Combat Systems technologies by ―spinning out‖ FCS capabilities into the Current Army 
Modular Force…when completed, FCS will add crucial capabilities to the Future Army Modular 
Force…FCS-equipped units…will be more deployable and survivable than our current units and 
will enhance joint capabilities‖ (Schoomaker 2005). General Schoomaker may have adopted the 
new Future Force term because he may not have been as optimistic in achieving the Shinseki‘s 
Objective Force by 2010. He may have also adopted a more process and evolutionary oriented 
language, as opposed to Shinseki‘s more revolutionary and end-state language, because it may 
have been difficult to forecast FCS fielding dates.   
 General Casey‘s comments regarding FCS were provided earlier, in the discussion 
pertaining to the force composition imperative. However, as late as 2007 General Casey was 
talking less about fielding FCS combat vehicles and more about integrating the technology 
derived from the FCS program into existing weapon systems. General Casey stated that ―the 
Army will accelerate delivery of advanced technologies to infantry BCTs fighting in combat 
today through ―spin outs‖ from our FCS program‖ without any mention of the FCS combat 
vehicles at all (Geren and Casey 2009). It appears that FCS technology survives for purposes of 
upgrading or modernizing current weapon systems. If this represents what transformation now 
means, it may be counter to what General Shinseki intended when he argued that this change was 
not simply an upgrade or modernization effort.    
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TABLE 5.1 
The Chiefs of Staff views on Transformation Imperatives 
Transformation 
Imperatives 
General  
Shinseki 
General 
Schoomaker 
General  
Casey 
 
Revolutionary or 
Evolutionary 
 
―A transformation 
campaign plan will 
enable the Army to 
complete its 
evolution…‖ 
 
―Our Future Force 
is the operational 
force the Army 
continuously seeks 
to become…‖ 
 
―we are in a period 
of continuous and 
fundamental change, 
and that we must 
continually adapt 
with evolving 
threats.‖ 
 
Process or an 
 end-state 
 
―…will result in an 
Objective Force.‖ 
 
―When completed, 
FCS will add 
crucial capabilities 
to the Future Army 
Modular Force to 
achieve DoD 
transformation 
goals.‖ 
 
―…it is a 
journey…we must 
continuously 
modernize our forces 
to put our Cold War 
formations and 
systems behind us.‖ 
 
 
Force Composition 
 
 
―Organized into 
Interim Brigade 
Combat Teams…to 
serve as a link to the 
Objective Force.‖ 
 
 
―Our goal is to 
provide a 
continuous supply 
of 20-21 BCTs to 
meet global 
commitments.‖ 
 
 
―We must continue 
to convert our 
combat and enabling 
formations to 
modular 
units…more 
deployable, 
tailorable and 
versatile.‖ 
 
 
Army Culture must 
change 
 
 
―Transformation 
will result in a 
different Army, not 
just a modernized 
version of the 
current Army.‖ 
 
 
―Our Army is 
taking action 
across a broad front 
to make jointness 
an integral part of 
our culture…‖ 
 
 
―Our transformation 
cannot be cemented 
until institutional 
systems are adapted 
to meet the realities 
of current and future 
environments.‖ 
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FCS is key ―…the FCS…a key 
to fielding the 
Objective Force.‖ 
―The FCS provides 
a system of 
systems 
capabilities that 
was not previously 
available to 
soldiers and 
commanders in 
joint operations.‖ 
―We‘ve transitioned 
from the FCS 
program to what we 
believe is an 
achievable, 
affordable 
modernization 
program for our 
BCT‘s.‖ 
Sources: Brownlee and Schoomaker (2004); Casey (2010, 2007a, 2007b); Geren and Casey 
(2009); Schoomaker (2007, 2005, 2004, 2003b); Shinseki (2002, 2001, 2000b, 1999a, 1999b).  
 
 The three chiefs of staff are consistent in their views of what FCS means to achieving 
transformation. FCS and its technology are keys to achieving Brigade Combat Teams that meet 
the operational requirements of the Combatant Commanders.  It is clear that where General 
Shinseki has more of a revolutionary, end-state view of transformation, General Schoomaker and 
General Casey both appear to have more of an evolutionary and process view of transformation. 
General Shinseki indicated that transformation would be more than just modernizing existing 
weapon systems; his two successors appear to focus on modernizing current weapon systems 
with FCS technology spin-offs.  
 General Shinseki‘s vision for a revolutionary end-state for significant change may have 
been viewed as transformative. However, in comparison, his successors may have moved away 
from what may have been considered to be transformative, although the term that describes the 
Army‘s pursuit of change did not go away, to an evolutionary and process oriented approach that 
will result in modernization to existing equipment but may not be considered to be 
transformation at all by some. 
Conclusion 
In April 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates effectively eliminated the procurement 
of the FCS manned vehicles and increased the rate at which the components of FCS could be 
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integrated into existing types of modular units (CBO 2009, 11). According to the Congressional 
Research Service (2009) Secretary Gates was concerned that there were significant unanswered 
questions in the FCS vehicle design strategy and, despite some adjustments they still did not 
adequately reflect the lessons learned of counterinsurgency and close quarters combat in Iraq and 
Afghanistan (CRS 2009, 3).  
The Congressional Budget Office (2009) has estimated that the Army has received at 
least $57 billion in appropriated funds for 2005 through 2008 for equipment that could be used to 
equip modular units; that amount is more than twice the $24 billion than the Army estimated for 
that equipment for the same period (CBO 2009, 34).   
Since the FCS family of vehicles no longer exists, the Army is left with the heavy 
weapon systems that were developed in the 1960s and 1970s for its Modularity Initiative (CBO 
2009, ix). The Congressional Budget Office (2009) argues that the Army‘s transformational 
programs have achieved some of their initial goals, but generally at a higher cost or over a longer 
period that was originally projected. Many of those goals have been altered or abandoned 
altogether (CBO 2009, 36). Before effectively being cancelled by the Secretary of Defense, the 
FCS program had fallen short of its original goals and would have only been able to equip fewer 
than 20 percent of the Army‘s combat units with the original cost estimates being exceeded by at 
least fifty-percent (CBO 2009, 36 - 37).  
 The three Army Chiefs of Staff that have been presented here have expressed a strong 
desire to change the Army from its Cold War configuration.  It is not clear if existing weapon 
systems will be a part of any future force, but according to some, we should not be too quick to 
discard a known capability in the expectation that something else is better. As Boot (2006) 
argues, transformation does not necessarily mean that old weapon systems and old ways have to 
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be swept aside. It is more important to think about how to make a transition and not about how to 
eliminate current weapon systems (Boot 2006, 467). The Army‘s bureaucracy appears to have a 
preference for a technological solution in achieving transformation.  However, the Army appears 
now to be looking past FCS and focusing on how the technology that was developed over the last 
several years might be incorporated into existing systems.   
 According to the Government Accountability Office (2010), the Army is taking more of 
an incremental approach in fielding an information network capability, which is expected to 
incorporate some of the technology that was developed for FCS (GAO 2010, 7). Although the 
vehicle portion of FCS has been cancelled, there has been a great deal of technology developed 
within the FCS program that will benefit current weapon systems, mostly in the area of 
information technology. This benefit may have come at an extremely high price. The weapon 
systems that were to be developed in the future were to be lighter in order to be able to move 
them quicker; the current systems, many argue, are too heavy to meet this important 
transformation criterion.  
  James Carafano corroborates General Casey‘s position by providing that unless we build 
institutions, doctrine, organizations, traditions and practices throughout the federal government, 
we will re-learn the lesson again next time (Carafano 2007, 4).  The author goes on to mention 
that every time we have participated in a war, going as far back as the Revolutionary War, we 
have done so in an ―ad-hoc‖ fashion. This is the United States rhythm of habits; we re-learn 
every time (Carafano 2007, 1).  Based on Carafano‘s viewpoint of U.S. military history, why 
should the Army transformation efforts of the last two decades be any different?  One of the 
most significant criticisms of transformation efforts is that the Army may be moving too rapidly 
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and many are concerned that there is a risk of failure on a large scale. The cancellation of the 
FCS program in 2009 may be a good example of such concern.    
 Thomas K. Adams (2008, 250) argues that the success of transformation depends on 
cooperative enemies that play to the strengths of high-tech forces. If Afghanistan, Iraq and the 
war on terrorism are examples, the author adds, old fashioned conventional units may not be 
disposable at all. Adams  argues that the digitization of current armored and mechanized systems 
will remain in business for some time to come; and newer systems may not be able to answer the 
call any time soon. Army transformation may include both current systems and future weapon 
systems and organizational structure, it may be difficult to really know at this point. In the 
meantime, Kagan (2006) argues Army Transformation may simply mean what the Army Chief 
of Staff says it means. To what extent field grade officers understand what they mean is the topic 
of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
This chapter presents the results of the survey that was conducted in February 2010 at the 
Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Additionally, a 
summary of the open-ended interviews that were conducted in January 2010 at the Command 
and General Staff College will be presented in this chapter. The primary purpose of the open-
ended interviews is to corroborate the survey findings. The processes used in conducting both the 
survey and the open-ended interviews were described in Chapter 4. These two processes were 
employed in order to gain the perspectives of field grade officers‘ views on Army 
Transformation. The views of the Army chiefs of staff were obtained via the case study 
conducted in Chapter 5 of this dissertation. The survey, the views of the chiefs of staff relative to 
specific areas of the survey and the open-ended interviews are used to triangulate information 
that is necessary to test the five hypotheses discussed in Chapter 4 and answer the research 
question. The research question is: 
Do U.S. Army lieutenant colonels and majors understand Army transformation in the 
same way as the three Army chiefs of staff who have served since 1999?  
  The views field grade officers hold regarding Army transformation is important to 
understand, especially since many of those officers will be the senior Army leaders of the future. 
Field grade officers throughout the military are competitively selected to attend Military 
Education Level 4 (MEL 4) training; the Command and General Staff College at Fort 
Leavenworth is but one institution within the military that fulfills that requirement. Although 
there is no guarantee that an officer who attends MEL 4 training will attain the rank of general 
officer, those who do not attend will in all probability not achieve that rank during their career. 
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Therefore, those who do become general officers in the future will most likely be in charge of 
implementing programs and decisions that are being made by current senior leaders. Gaining the 
perspectives of current field grade officers, some of whom may be flag officers in a few short 
years, may be helpful in describing any gap that may exist in how transformation is currently 
defined.  Both the survey and the open-ended interviews allow for some basic demographic 
information to be collected on the officers who participated in one of these two data collection 
processes.  
 
A Description of the Survey Participants 
 There were 1,051 students who attended CGSC during the survey period. Of that number, 
837 were active Army, Army Reserve or Army National Guard. The survey was issued to the 
837 officers that were directly affiliated with the Army in one of these three ways. Although the 
survey was issued to these specific students, there were 15 participants who identified 
themselves as other than active duty Army, Army Reserves or Army National Guard, as shown 
in Table 6.1
20. Additionally there were four officers who identified themselves as ―other,‖ 
without specifying other military affiliations.  
 The total number of individuals who responded to the survey was 216, which provides a 
response rate of 25.8%. If the 19 officers who identified themselves as ―other than Army‖ were 
removed from the total the response rate would then fall to 24%. As discussed in Chapter 4, 
                                                   
20
 In addition to the Active Army, Army Reserve and Army National Guard, the other U.S. 
military services as well as DoD civilians and U.S. allies from around the world also attend the 
U.S. Army CGSC. 
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Methodology, while this response rate may appear to be low it does represent an average rate for 
survey participation at CGSC
21
.  
 The number of participants that responded to the demographical information was 
inconsistent in that as few as 169 responded to the prior enlisted service question and as many as 
197 responded to education level, the Army component affiliated with, and the source of 
commission.  The 197 respondents to these three demographic areas represent the total number 
of eligible respondents. Most officers who responded were at least 35 years of age, all officers 
had at least 10 years of military service with over half having more than 13 years in the military.  
 Army officers must have received a college degree before being commissioned or in 
some exceptional cases within a very short period of time after being commissioned. A little less 
than half of the participants had at least obtained a bachelor‘s degree, with over half having 
received a master‘s degree or higher. Five participants had received a doctorate and two had 
received a law degree. A third category included a participant that reported as a master degree 
candidate.
22
. The active Army component represented most of the participants, followed by the 
Army Reserves and the Army National Guard. Most officers, over 96%, were majors followed 
by 2% who identified themselves as lieutenant colonels or other. The ―other‖ category may have 
included the two Army warrant officers and an Army captain. A majority of participants 
indicated that they had received their commissions through the Reserve Officers Training Corps 
(ROTC), while the remaining officers were commissioned either through the U.S. Military 
Academy, presumably at West Point and not at one of the sister service academies, through 
                                                   
21
 Dr. David Bitters, statistician at CGSC, indicated that a survey response rate of between 20-
25% is about average for the time of year in which this survey was conducted.  
22
 Female officers may be underrepresented in the survey. Only 7.6% of respondents identified 
themselves as much. A response has not been received from the Quality Assurance Office at 
CGSC to an e-mail request for demographic information pertaining to this population. It is 
conceivable that female officers may represent a significantly lower percentage of the population 
at CGSC. 
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Officer Candidate School (OCS), by a direct commission, or through a state sponsored military 
OCS program. 
 The demographic information that was collected from these participants indicated that the 
average field grade officer is a major (0-4), over the age of 35, is well educated with many 
having a master‘s degree, a doctorate or a law degree, that has been in the military for well over 
10 years and appears to be on track for a career in the Army. Most officers identified themselves 
as being active duty (as opposed to being reservist or national guardsmen), being commissioned 
through ROTC, and had indicated that they had at least some prior enlisted experience.  
 Since most officers who attend CGSC are majors, it was expected that lieutenant colonels 
would be represented at a lower percentage. In most cases, graduating from a MEL 4 military 
institution such as CGSC is a prerequisite to attaining the rank of lieutenant colonel. However, 
some officers may attain that rank while a student at this year-long course. To have gained a 
higher representation of lieutenant colonels, it would have been necessary to have conducted a 
survey at the U.S. Army War College.   There is no evidence that would suggest that by 
conducting an additional survey at the Army War College simply to capture a greater population 
of lieutenant colonels, that the survey results would have been any different. However, officers 
who attend the U.S. Army War College are more likely to attain the rank of general officer. Not 
all officers who attend CGSC will attend the War College. 
 The Quality Assurance Office (QAO) at CGSC advised against asking for demographic 
data relating to ethnicity.  It is the opinion of some that requesting such information may be 
offensive. Additionally, requesting officers to provide their branch affiliation (infantry, armor, 
artillery, etc.) may not have served a very useful purpose. Unlike the linear battlefields of the 
Twentieth Century where officers and soldiers were stationed based on their branch (infantry and 
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armor up front and all others in support), the battlefields in Iraq and Afghanistan have not been 
linear and everyone is on the battlefield in almost the same way. The fact that ethnicity and 
branch affiliation were not requested should not affect the outcome of the survey results. 
 
Table 6.1 
Demographic Information on Army Transformation Survey Participants 
  Percent Total 
Age (N=196)   
30-34 
35-39 
40-44 
45+ 
            19.9 
45.4 
28.6 
6.1 
39 
89 
56 
12 
   
Total Years Active Duty 
(N=184) 
  
10-12 35.3 65 
13-15 32.1 59 
16-18 21.2 39 
19+ 11.4 21 
   
Highest Education Level 
(N=197) 
  
Bachelor‘s Degree 
Master‘s Degree 
Doctorate Degree 
Other 
45.7 
50.3 
2.5 
1.5 
90 
99 
5 
3 
   
Gender (N=196)   
Male 92.4   181 
Female 7.6 15 
   
Army Component (N=197)   
Active Army 87.3 172 
Army Reserves 8.1 16 
Army National Guard 4.6 9 
   
Current Rank (N=191)   
0-4 96.3 184 
0-5 2.1 4 
190 
 
Other 1.6 3 
   
Source of Commission 
(N=197) 
  
Military Academy 12.7 25 
OCS 
ROTC 
14.7 
65.5 
29 
129 
Direct 4.6 9 
Other 2.5 5 
   
Prior Enlisted Service? 
(N=169) 
Yes 
No 
 
 
58.6 
41.4 
 
 
99 
70 
 
 The above demographic information provides an overview of the population of student 
officers that responded to the survey.  The opinions that these officers hold regarding 
transformation is the most important aspect to the findings of this research.   
 The information collected from the survey instrument (see Appendix A) will be presented 
in five individual tables that represent specific themes associated with transformation in the 
Army. The data that were collected for each of the items represented in the tables will provide 
the primary basis for testing the five corresponding hypotheses.  
 It is important to determine the participants‘ views on transformation and to see if those 
views vary among field grade officers.  Additionally, the view of the participants regarding 
senior Army leadership is relevant in determining if field grade officers view transformation 
differently than the chiefs of staff. While the first two items focus on an understanding of what 
transformation might mean, the third area of interest has to do with determining the basis of how 
transformation occurs. If field grade officers do not understand the basis for transformative 
change, then they may prefer the status quo until a more definitive and understandable 
description of transformation becomes available. The fourth area of interest gives the participants 
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an opportunity to provide their perceptions of transformation.   The literature review in Chapter 
3, as well as the Case Study in Chapter 5, may indicate that field grade officers may perceive 
transformation as being driven primarily by technological innovation and less by other areas that 
make up the Army as an institution. The last area asks for the respondents to put themselves in 
the place of fellow field grade officers throughout the Army and to opine as to how they might 
view Army transformation.  
 By asking the participants to represent the views of all field grade officers, and that 
population collectively represents a large segment of Army culture, it is possible, especially if 
there is a gap in how transformation is defined between field grade officers and between field 
grade officers and senior Army leadership, that the culture within the Army may need to change 
first before transformation is possible. Testing each of the five hypothesis statements will allow 
for the potential confirmation that a gap does exist in how field grade officers define 
transformation as compared to the views of senior Army leadership.  
Participants’ Views of Army Transformation 
The research question centers on the idea that there is a difference in how senior Army 
leaders define transformation as opposed to how field grade officers interpret it. Both the 
literature review and the case study indicate that the three chiefs of staff view the transformative 
change the Army is experiencing as significant. In pursuit of answering the research question it is 
necessary to determine if field grade officers also view Army transformation as being significant.  
This leads to the first hypothesis statement which is: 
 
H1: U.S. Army field grade officers will view the Army‘s transformation as being 
significant. 
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There are two items in Table 6.2 that the participants responded to regarding their views on the 
significance of Army transformation. The first item asks for the participants to acknowledge 
whether transformation has occurred at all since 1999, or when General Shinseki first announced 
that the Army would begin the process of transformation. Over 94% of the officers either agreed 
or strongly agreed that significant organizational change had occurred since 1999. However, over 
58% of officers either agree or strongly agree that the term ―significant change‖ and 
―transformation‖ are the same in relationship to current Army goals, while more than 41% either 
have a neutral view, disagree or have no opinion at all.  
Table 6.2 
Views of Army Transformation 
N=197 
 
Strongly 
agree 
% 
Agree 
% 
Neutral 
% 
Disagree 
% 
Strongly 
Disagree 
% 
Don’t 
know 
% 
The U.S. Army has experienced 
significant organizational change 
since 1999. 54.3 40.6 4.1 1.0 0.0 0.0 
       
Significant change and 
transformation are synonymous 
relative to current U.S. Army 
goals.  10.2 48.5 22.5 15.3 2.6 1.0 
 
There appears to be a rather significant gap when comparing the first variable with the 
second in Table 6.2.  Field grade officers may acknowledge that change has occurred and that 
change has been significant, but the Army goals in achieving significant change may not 
necessarily be firmly linked in the minds these officers. In responding to the first hypothesis 
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statement, the distribution of responses indicate that officers do believe that Army transformation 
has been significant over the last decade, although a significant majority also believe it is 
difficult to associate this significant change with current Army goals. The respondents also 
provided comments to this section of the survey that may provide greater insight to the tabular 
results presented above.  
These comments include: 
 
―It [transformation] is good, but we keep taking three steps back for every step forward. 
It also seems that we get new direction with every CSA [chief of staff] and programs are 
constantly cancelled or redefined. Nothing is constant except change itself.‖ 
 
―Transformation is different than significant change. Significant change is [a] possible 
outcome of a specific organization‘s transformational process. For instance, lifting code 
restrictions in gays entering the military is a significant change, yet part of the 
transformation process.‖ 
 
―Transformation is good. However clearly defining those goals and articulating then to 
the lowest level must be improved. Senior leaders understand that the Army must change 
and may stay out front.‖ 
 
―We have made some very good changes in response to the current operational 
environment, but most of them are incremental/evolutionary not revolutionary as 
advertised. For example, BG [Brigadier General] Was de Czege described ‗modular 
BCTs‘ in 1986, and 7 of 10 division had de facto BCTs since the mid-90‘s. Execution of 
some of these changes has been poor-modular BCT‘s again, would have been better 
served to have created 2 large BCTs per division, instead of 4 small BCTs that not really 
sustainable. ARFORGEN [Army Force Generation] necessary to sustain the current war 
without substantially growing the force has raped our readiness, and is recognized as a 
farce by most of the field grade officers that have to participate in re-setting a BCT to go 
down range [to ready a brigade combat team to train or to return to combat operations].‖  
  
  The survey data confirms that over 94% of the respondents believe that significant 
transformative change has occurred since 1999; therefore the first hypothesis statement appears 
to be true. Although survey results indicate that respondents acknowledge the Army has 
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experienced significant change, there is less agreement as to whether transformation is consistent 
with achieving stated Army goals. If there is a lack of clarity regarding what is intended by 
transformation or significant change, then it may be inferred there will be differences in how 
field grade officers define one or both of those terms. Additionally, if the technological based 
FCS program was viewed by many as the centerpiece of Army transformation, and promoted as 
such by the three chiefs of staff associated with this research, and the program is in effect 
terminated, then it may be difficult to find a consensus among field grade officers of what now 
constitutes Army transformation.  It is therefore important to review what senior Army 
leadership has provided regarding Army transformation.  
 Although Table 6.2 provides insight on how the respondents view transformation, it may 
also be useful to see what the three chiefs of staff have said that may have played a role in 
shaping the respondents‘ views of transformation.  A majority of the respondents agree that there 
has been significant organizational change in the Army since 1999. However, significantly fewer 
officers are not convinced that such significant change is synonymous with current Army goals. 
An understanding of what the three chiefs of staff have said, or information and messages that 
they have sent, regarding transformation is useful. Significant change may have taken place, 
however many officers may not associate such change with the Army goals outlined by the three 
chiefs of staff.  
 Of the three Army chiefs of staff that have served since 1999, General Eric Shinseki is 
the one that specifically coined the term ―transformation.‖ In testimony before the U.S. Senate  
Armed Services Committee, General Shinseki stated that ―on 12 October 1999, the Army 
articulated its vision that defined how the Army would meet the Nation‘s requirements now and 
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into the 21
st
 Century…the vision is comprised of People, Readiness and Transformation‖ 
(Shinseki 2002, 6). Shinseki further states that  
―…transformation is first and foremost about changing the way we fight in order to win 
our Nation‘s wars decisively…the 21st Century strategic environment and the 
implications of emerging technologies necessitate Army transformation…the Army is 
taking a holistic approach to transformation, implementing change across its doctrine, 
training, leader development, organization, materiel, and soldier systems, as well as 
across all of its components…transformation will result in a different Army, not just a 
modernized version of the current Army‖ (Shinseki 2002, 14-15). 
 
 General Shinseki describes transformation as maintaining the Legacy Force, establishing an 
Interim Force, and finally achieving the Objective Force as the means in achieving Army 
transformation. He stated in 2001 that ―transformation of the Army‘s operational force proceeds 
on three vectors – the Objective Force, the Interim Force and the Legacy Force…all are equally 
necessary to our Nation‘s continued world leadership‖ (Shinseki 2001, 10).  In the 2002, General 
Shinseki stated that ―we intend to achieve the Objective Force this decade‖ (Shinseki 2002, 17).  
 General Shinseki appeared to highlight up front the importance of emerging technology 
in achieving transformation. General Shinseki further stated that ―the Army will create a new 
family of ground systems called the Future Combat Systems (FCS)…this networked system-of-
systems is a key to fielding the Objective Force-will allow leaders and soldiers to harness the 
power of digitized information systems‖ (Shinseki 2002, 17). He also stated that ―the results of 
transformation will result in a different Army than the one we have now‖ (15). He specifically 
stated that ―the end result of transformation is a new, more effective, and more efficient Army 
with a new fighting structure, the Objective Force‖ (Shinseki 2002, 16).  
 Again, most survey respondents agree that significant change has occurred, starting in the 
Shinseki era, but fewer respondents are not quite as sure when it comes to understanding those 
goals expressed by senior leadership, or the use of the terms significant change or 
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transformation. Later in this chapter we will see that many respondents (as well as some 
interview participants) either did not address the significance of FCS relative to transformation, 
or did not know what FCS included.  General Peter Schoomaker would continue the task of 
defining transformation in order for field grade officers, and others to form a view of what that 
means to the Army. 
 General Schoomaker began his tenure as chief of staff by immediately moving away 
from General Shinseki‘s use of the term Objective Force that described an end-state of what 
would be a transformed army, by coining the new term of the Future Force. In testimony before 
Congress, General Schoomaker stated that ―we are prioritizing wartime requirements, 
incorporating next-generation capabilities into current systems where appropriate, and preserving 
essential investments in the Future Force (Schoomaker 2004, 5). Where General Shinseki had 
insisted that in order to transform the Army needed to proceed along three different paths 
simultaneously (the Legacy, Interim and Objective Force), General Schoomaker simply referred 
to transformation in the context of the Army‘s Current or Future Force.  
 In 2003 General Schoomaker described these two terms by stating that ―the Army frames 
the constant change of transformation through the interaction of the continuously evolving 
capabilities of the Current to Future Force. The Current Force is today‘s operational Army. The 
Future Force is the operational force the Army continuously seeks to become. Informed by 
national security requirements and DoD guidance, the Future Force in the strategically 
responsive, joint interdependent, precision maneuver force, dominant across the full range of 
military operations envisioned in the future global security environment‖ (Schoomaker 2003, 1-
5). When General Schoomaker made this statement he may not have known himself what the 
transformed Army would look like when he used terms such as ―operational force the Army 
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continuously seeks to become‖.  That language does not appear to speak of a definitive end-state 
of what transformation will be, rather it may best refer to transformation as a journey to some 
ideal state. If this is the case then the respondents to the survey, and the field grade officers in 
general, may have a difficult time developing consistent views of what transformation might 
mean. General Schoomaker‘s successor as chief of staff, General George Casey, Jr., would 
continue with the General Schoomaker‘s objectives in maintaining the Current Force while 
endeavoring to achieve the Future Force. 
 General George Casey, in a statement before Congress in 2007, stated that 
―…we must continue to transform our Army to meet the demands of the 21st Century. 
Transformation is a holistic effort to adapt how we fight, train, modernize, develop 
leaders, station, and support our soldiers. Families and civilians…transformation is a 
journey…not a destination. Transformation is a multi-faceted process…we must 
continuously modernize our forces to put our Cold War formations and systems behind 
us…we will continue to rapidly field the best new equipment to our fighting forces, 
upgrade and modernize existing systems, incorporate new technologies derived from the 
Future Combat Systems and begin to field the Future Combat Systems themselves…we 
are ultimately working toward an agile, globally responsive Army that is enhanced by 
modern networks, surveillance sensors, precision weapons, and platforms that are lighter, 
less logistical dependent, and less man-power intensive‖ (Casey 2007, 5).  
 
As in the case of his predecessor, General Schoomaker, General Casey appears to be creating the 
view that transformation is a journey that will be continuous.  
 Since transformation is a journey, as defined by Generals Schoomaker and Casey, then it 
is likely that field grade officers may have different views about what is really meant by 
transformation.  Senior Army leadership, since 1999, has defined transformation differently in 
that General Shinseki described the Objective Force as the end-state for achieving a transformed 
army, while his two immediate successors have defined transformation as a continuous journey. 
If transformation is a journey then it may be difficult to arrive at a consensus as to what 
transformation means to a group of field grade officers, much less arriving at a consensus among 
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field grade officers in general. To better understand how the survey participants may view senior 
Army leadership transformation initiatives it is important to ask them about how senior Army 
leaders may view transformation. 
 
Participants’ Perceptions of the Basis of Transformation 
 
 Transformation may not only have a different meaning among field grade officers, but 
the meaning may also be different between senior level leaders and field grade officers. In Table 
6.3, the survey participants were able to provide their thoughts of what Army transformation 
means to them. The responses that the participants provide indicate that not only do their 
thoughts differ among themselves relative to transformation, but the participants also think of 
transformation differently than do the chiefs of staff. This provides the basis for the second and 
third hypotheses statements:  
H2: Field grade officers will define transformation differently from one another. 
 
H3: Field grade officers will define transformation differently than the chiefs of staff.  
 
The first item in Table 6.3 refers to the perception of whether respondents consider the 
integration of technology as the basis of transformation. Over 40% of the respondents indicate 
that Army transformation is based largely on technology, while over 59% either have no opinion 
or a negative opinion regarding technology‘s role in transformation. The first item addresses 
specifically whether field grade officers believe technology drives transformation. If technology 
is a major transformation driver in the minds of the chiefs of staff, and the Army is in a position 
of having to wait for technology to evolve, then field grade officers may be inclined to believe 
that another variable, such as force structure, is more important.  
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The second survey item in Table 6.3 asks the respondents to address whether 
transformation is based on force structure. Almost 80% of the respondents either agree or 
strongly agree that force structure is very much a basis of transformation. The remaining 20% 
either have no opinion or have a somewhat negative view of this variable as a transformation 
driver. Almost 80% of the respondents believe that transformation has more to do with changes 
in force structure (how many soldiers are available and how the organizations within the Army 
are designed) while approximately 20% of the respondents had no opinion, either disagree or 
strongly disagree, or do not know.  
The third survey item in Table 6.3 addresses whether transformation is a process or an 
end-state. Over 80% of the respondents indicated that transformation is a process while the 
remaining 20% either disagree or have no opinion at all. The respondents were asked if 
transformation includes all that the Army does before, during and after combat operations; in 
other words, does transformation include the complete ―battlespace‖? Over 48% of the 
respondents believe that transformation does include the complete battlespace, while over 50% 
of the respondents either have a different opinion or no opinion at all. Finally, the fifth survey 
item asked the respondents if transformation refers to the complete Army mission. Over 41% of 
the respondents believe that it does, while a majority either has another opinion or no opinion at 
all.  
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Table 6.3 
Basis of Army Transformation 
N=197 
                                         
 
Strongly 
agree 
% 
Agree 
% 
Neutral 
% 
Disagree 
% 
Strongly 
Disagree 
% 
Don’t 
know 
% 
U.S. Army transformation is 
based largely on the integration of 
technology into weapon systems. 7.6 32.5 27.9 29.4 1.5 1.0 
U.S. Army transformation is 
based largely on changes in force 
structure. 17.8 61.9 12.2 7.1 .5 .5 
U.S. Army transformation is a 
process and not an end-state.  19.4 61.7 11.2 5.6 .5 1.5 
U.S. Army transformation 
addresses the complete ―battle-
space‖ (all aspects of the 
battlefield before, during and after 
combat operations).   6.1 42.4 26.0 17.4 5.6 2.6 
U.S. Army transformation 
addresses all aspects of the U.S. 
Army mission 6.1 35.2 31.1 19.4 6.1 2.0 
 
 The data in Table 6.3 clearly indicates that the respondents view transformation 
differently from one another.  Additionally, where a majority of respondents tend to agree that 
force structure is most important relative to transformation the following will suggest that the 
chiefs of staff focus a great deal on technology as a means in transforming the Army. The 
respondents, in large part, have a different view of transformation as compared to the chiefs of 
staff. General Shinseki was more specific about achieving some end-state; his two successors 
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were not so specific in that they viewed transformation as a journey. It also appears that the 
modularity initiatives under Generals Schoomaker and Casey were intended more toward the 
Current Force and the BCTs, but what is intended for the Future Force. Field grade officers may 
view the insertion of modular technology into the current BCTs as being transformative, when in 
actuality the Future Force is where transformation may actually occur; but it may be that senior 
Army leadership does not know what the Future Force will look like. The respondents also 
provided the following narrative comments to this segment of the survey: 
―Transformation must encompass full spectrum warfare [deployment, combat operations, 
peace-keeping, etc.] the Army must be able to be competent in all phases.‖ 
 
―[Transformation] Covers the spectrum-from well defined path to not sure where we are 
at or where we are going and need to go.‖ 
 
―I think that most field grade officers believe transformation was about reorganizing into 
BCT‘s and integrating the FCS system and Net-centric warfare. This is, unfortunately, a 
wrong mind set.‖ 
 
―I do not believe the Army should focus so heavily on technology. This is still a people 
business and one that must close with and destroy the enemy…We are the good idea cut 
off point…It would be nice for the Army to spell out what it is that we are trying to 
achieve with transformation.‖ 
 
―Transformation is of course more than organization. It includes the culture of the 
personnel, equipment, doctrine, plus the mentality of the force. Embracing the reality that 
the U.S. will conduct stability and support operations and security force assistance is 
appropriate. Army leaders must value initiative and adaptability and week to develop 
these traits. A broad based, liberal education for the office corps and as many personnel 
as possible would also be encouraged.‖ 
 
―I think the Army leadership looks at transformation as a means of supporting the 
combatant commanders [CINCs] requirements.  I think that new equipment and 
technology are considered important parts, and perhaps they are too important. 
Transformation should be more about the process that about equipment.‖ 
 
 
 According to the survey results, an argument can be made that there appears to be a lack 
of consensus among field grade officers regarding the basis of Army transformation. The 
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responses and comments that the respondents provided also indicate that not only do field grade 
officers view the basis of transformation differently, but collectively they may view the basis of 
transformation differently than the chiefs of staff.  Overall, the five items indicate a rather broad 
distribution of responses between the ―strongly agree‖ to ―disagree‖. This collective distribution 
of ―neutral‖ and ―disagree‖ responses, except for perhaps the second and third items where those 
responses are relatively low, would indicate that a relatively high percentage of the respondents 
may not agree with the basis of transformation as provided in Table 6.3. If there is disagreement 
here, or a relatively high degree of uncertainty, then there is a gap in how respondents view the 
basis of transformation as compared to that of the chiefs of staff.  
In addressing the second hypothesis statement it is helpful to refer to the three chiefs of 
staff, and what they have said, that in order to determine how they may have contributed to the 
fact that field grade officers may not agree on what transformation includes, In describing the 
Objective Force, General Shinseki clearly intended that any transformation would include the 
entire Army. Additionally, any initiative that he took as chief of staff would need to be continued 
under future leadership. The question is would future chiefs of staff proceed with the 
transformation initiatives initiated by General Shinseki, or would they deviate from his vision 
thereby causing field grade officers to view transformation differently than originally intended 
under Shinseki? General Shinseki (2000) stated: 
―...that transformation to the ‗Objective Force‘ would encompass the entire Army. The 
Legacy Force will transform directly to the Objective Force, and the Interim Force will 
follow. Over the course of 10 to 15 years the Army will transform itself into the 
Objective Force. The budget request provides sufficient funds to support continuation of 
the Army‘s transformation in fiscal year (FY) 2001. We have restructured the FY 2001 
budget to fund the transformation. Fielding the Objective Force while sustaining decisive 
capabilities will require significant resources throughout this transformation‖ (Shinseki 
2000, 9).  
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In order to achieve General Shinseki‘s vision, transformational goals would have to be adjusted 
by future chiefs of staff. Shinseki had a vision that transformation will result in a different Army, 
not just a modernized version of the current Army (Shinseki 2002, 2). He further states that ―the 
Objective Force is our main transformational effort. It seeks to leverage advances in technology 
and in organizational innovation to transform land-power capabilities. Better than 90 percent of 
our science and technology investment are focused on this future Objective Force (Shinseki 
2002, 3). 
 General Shinseki publicly announced his intention to transform the Army on October 12, 
1999. In his speech he stated that ―our commitment to meeting these challenges (increased 
responsiveness, rapid deployment, more agility, more versatility, greater lethality, increased 
survivability, and becoming more sustainable) compels comprehensive transformation of the 
Army…we will begin immediately to transition the entire Army into a force that is strategically 
responsive and dominant at every point in the spectrum of operations (Shinseki 1999).  General 
Shinseki made it clear that the Army was entering a period of significant change.  
 Shinseki also expresses that change is difficult and that an environment of innovation 
needs to exist. General Shinseki spoke of the Objective Force as a concept and not as something 
that was describable in tangible terms. If the Objective Force is what General Shinseki had 
intended by transformation, and it was only a concept, then transformation in the context of 
achieving some Objective Force may not have been well understood by field grade officers.  
 General Schoomaker continued with his take on what the basis of transformation should 
be. In testimony before Congress, he stated that ―there are no front lines in today‘s battle 
space…we must remain committed to investing in technologies and equipment that enable our 
most important asset, the Soldier to remain ahead of our adversaries who quickly adapting their 
204 
 
methods, tactics, and tools of warfare. Investing sufficiently in our future readiness is a strategic 
necessity-which must be viewed as a matter of priority not just affordability‖ (Schoomaker 2007, 
3).  
 General Schoomaker was speaking on the need to provide more resources for soldiers 
who were currently at war, but his point was that the U.S. needed to make sure that battle space 
was different than before, that technology needed to be exploited. To that end, he continued by 
stating that ―the Future Force is the operational force the Army continuously seeks to 
become…the Future Force is the strategically responsive, joint interdependent, precision 
maneuver force, dominant across the full range of military operations envisioned in the future 
global security environment‖ (Schoomaker 2004, 1-5).  
 General Schoomaker appeared to have a dual role with regard to his interpretation of the 
basis of transformation. He needed to make changes to support soldiers on the battlefield now, 
and then he envisioned that the Future Force would be that ideal force that would be continually 
sought after. General Schoomaker does address the basis of transformation, including that 
transformation is a process (continually trying to achieve) and not an end-state. 
 General Casey described the four aspects of transformation as growth, modernization, 
adapting our Reserve Components and agile and adaptive leaders. The second point, 
modernization, is important to discuss with regard to the transition between General Schoomaker 
and General Casey as chiefs of staff. General Casey (2007) states:  
 
―that we must continually modernize our equipment to put our Cold War systems behind 
us and to provide our soldiers a decisive advantage over any enemy they face in the 
future. We‘ll continue to rapidly field the best possible equipment to our soldiers. 
They‘re fighting every day. We‘ll upgrade and modernize the existing combat and 
support systems. We‘ll incorporate new technologies that are spun out of the future 
combat systems research and development. And we‘ll finally begin to field the future 
combat system [FCS], brigade combat teams [BCTs] themselves…the future combat 
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system is the full spectrum combat force that we need for the 21
st
 century‖ (Casey 2007, 
5). 
 
 Upgrading legacy systems, or the heavy systems that may have been developed during 
the Cold War era, was something that General Casey thought was necessary in order to support 
soldiers currently involved in current war-fighting efforts. At the same time General Casey 
remained optimistic about the final development and future fielding of the FCS-BCT. The 
fielding of FCS-BCTs may have been his vision of achieving a transformed Army. FCS was not 
the idea of General Schoomaker or General Casey as chief of staff; according to Eric Hollister 
(2010) FCS was the Army‘s modernization plan beginning in 2000. It was originally intended 
that all 65 brigade combats teams were to be FCS-equipped by 2032, but the program would be 
revised multiple times until only 15 BCTs, less than a fourth of the total, would become FCS 
BCTs (Hollister 2010, 5-6). In the fall of 2008, the Army Deputy Chief of Staff
23
 stated that FCS 
is ―non-negotiable and that it is not the Chief of Staff‘s (General Casey) program, it is the 
Army‘s program‖ (Hollister 2020, 6). The Deputy Chief of Staff may have been representing the 
views of the Chief of Staff when he made such a statement to a group of field grade officers at 
Fort Leavenworth in the fall of 2008. 
 Despite Casey‘s support for the program, the acquisition portion of the program was 
terminated by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates the following spring, effectively ending the 
combat vehicle portion of the program. The views of the three chiefs of staff appear to indicate 
that the Army has been involved in transformative or significant change, but it is not all that clear 
if field grade officers understood what was intended by transformative change in the same way.  
                                                   
23
 Eric A. Hollister does not refer to the Army Deputy Chief of Staff/G-8 by name in this 2010 
document; however, MG David D. Halverson was the G-8 Deputy Chief of Staff at the time this 
statement was made. 
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  If a gap does exist within the field grade officer ranks regarding what is meant by 
transformation then that may indicate that a conflict exists between those who perceive 
transformation as an end-state or as a process.  Although a majority of participants indicated that 
transformation is a process, General Shinseki tended to talk in terms of transformation as being 
some end-state that must be achieved, i.e. the Objective Force. Many field grade officers entered 
the Army just prior to or in the very early stages of the current transformation era, and they may 
by now have had their fill of constantly transforming, and may be more inclined to prefer 
equipment and force structure that they currently know and understand. Many field grades 
officers (>80%) believe that transformation is a process as opposed to an end-state, and believe 
that since it is a process that transformative change occurs incrementally, which in effect may not 
be transformative at all. If transformation, therefore, is revolutionary or is other than a process, 
then there appears to be the likelihood of more resistance to such change and the status quo may 
be preferred. In short, the reason that a majority of officers consider transformation to be a 
process as opposed to an end-state is that change is all they have ever known. So when change is 
indeed transformative, most may still regard that transformative change as a process as opposed 
to changing the Army from what it was before. The following discussion, which will address the 
third hypothesis statement, will center on how the survey participants view transformation 
differently than the Army chiefs of staff.  
 All three of the chiefs of staff adopted the term transformation in describing what the 
Army must do in order to confront new threats. Some of the respondents believe that the term 
transformation may be an antiquated term, although the term appears to be still in use by senior 
Army leadership. Some respondents believe that while senior Army leadership may know what 
is intended by transformation, that same viewpoint appears not to be making it down through the 
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ranks to field grade officers. The following represents some of the comments that were provided 
in this section of the survey: 
―Transformation is necessary in order to maintain a relevant, capable fighting force.‖ 
 ―I think that Army leadership sees it as a thing of the past. We often hear about the time 
when transformation was taking place, or when we were trying to fight a war in the 
middle of the transformation.‖ 
  
 ―It appears that Army leadership is just looking to the Army instead of the entire joint 
force. [The] Goldwater-Nichols [Act] was signed over twenty years ago, and we are still 
struggling to become joint.‖ 
 
 ―Conceptually, certain leaders may know what transformation means and understands the 
vision, but the information is not readily available to some of the junior field grade 
officers.‖ 
 
 ―General Shinseki was the last Army leader to take on this project [transformation]. I 
wish the previous Chiefs of Staff put as much effort behind it as he did.‖ 
 
 ―Aside from the Chief of Staff, I have seen many senior officers resist the changes, 
especially at the colonel and lieutenant colonel level.‖  
―The Army leadership understands transformation. However, members of its force do 
not.‖ 
 
 
 The above respondents provide some insightful comments on transformation. Again, 
some view the term as being antiquated, while others view transformation attempts as being 
―cosmetic‖, a process that has not been achieved since the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 and 
has not been seriously pursued since General Shinseki was chief of staff. There are those that 
believe that senior ranking officers within the Army, other than the chief of staff, may resistant to 
such significant or transformative change. And finally, the operations tempo that the Army is 
faced with in being involved in both Afghanistan and Iraq may allow for the chief of staff to 
provide only ready units, in support of the CINCs, that are still using legacy systems from the 
Cold War era.  If field grade officers do not understand what senior leaders mean by 
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transformation, it is useful to review some of the statements that have been made by the chiefs of 
staff that may have contributed to some level of confusion between these two groups.  
 General Eric Shinseki had described the Objective Force as arguably the end-state in 
achieving Army transformation.  In describing the Objective Force, General Shinseki stated that 
―the greatest potential for revolutionary (as opposed to evolutionary) advances in capability 
derives from technology, the Army recognizes that only through the synergy of parallel advances 
in doctrine, training, leader development, organizations, material and soldiers (DTLOMS) will 
the Objective Force achieve its full potential (Shinseki 2001, 15).  
 Shinseki continues by adding that ―the Objective Force will be more responsive, more 
deployable, more agile, more versatile, more lethal, more survivable and more sustainable than 
today‘s forces, ready to provide precise and dominant capabilities for land campaigning‖ 
(Shinseki 2001, 21).  Some of the respondents gave General Shinseki credit for being specific on 
what he intended for transformation. Since he spoke in terms of an Objective Force and in 
achieving some end-state, that language may have been easier to understand for field grade 
officers. Shinseki‘s successors preferred not to use such ―end-state‖ language. 
 General Schoomaker continued with the transformation initiated by his predecessor, but 
instead of endeavoring to achieve the Objective Force, his plans would have centered on 
pursuing (a continuous effort) the Future Force.  General Schoomaker did away with the term 
―Objective Force‖ upon becoming Chief of Staff in August 2003. In the 2003 Army 
Transformation Roadmap, General Schoomaker stated that ―the Future Force is the operational 
force the Army continuously seeks to become‖ (Schoomaker 2003, 1-5).  Even with the change 
of terms General Schoomaker continued to pursue the FCS program that was initiated under 
General Shinseki. General Schoomaker stated that: 
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―…the Future Combat Systems-equipped force represents a capability crucial the Army‘s 
Future Force and the accomplishment of Department of Defense transformation 
goals…FCS remains at the heart of the Army‘s strategy to adjudicate risk using the 
Current to Future construct. Under this construct, the Future Force informs development 
of the Current Force…the Army has used the FCS-equipped unit of action operational 
and organizational plan as the starting point to create a modular, brigade-based 
Army…through its modularity efforts, the Army is rapidly moving its Current Force 
toward characteristics envisioned for the FCS-equipped Units of Action…and this will 
enable the Army to transition into FCS-equipped units and FCS-enabled methods of 
operations‖ (Schoomaker 2004, 13).  
 
General Schoomaker placed a great deal of emphasis on modularity and the technological 
advantages of FCS. It appears that technology may be a very big driver in achieving 
transformation.  While General Schoomaker addresses modularity as enabling the Army to be 
more responsive to Combatant Commanders, he does not acknowledge modularity being the 
attainment of the Future Force. He states that ―modular units are interchangeable, scalable, and 
tailorable formations (customized for operational purposes), which provide the Joint Force 
Commander with a strategically responsive force that greatly increases his ability to defeat any 
adversary. Modularity enables us to tailor our capabilities to the requirements of the 
situation…modularity permits the Combatant Commander to optimize his war-fighting tool set‖ 
(Brownlee and Schoomaker 2004,15). If field grade officers are experiencing modularity in 
brigades, then that may be their view of how the Army is transforming. However, General 
Schoomaker appears to only indicate that such modularity pertains to the Current Force. It is not 
clear what he means by transformation in terms of the Future Force. The pursuit of modularity 
would continue with the next chief of staff.  
 General Casey, who would continue many of his predecessor‘s modularity initiatives, 
believes that ―transformation is a journey, and we will continue to evolve as we continue to look 
and see how the future security environment will cause us to continue to adapt‖ (Casey 2008). 
He continued by stating that ―versatile, expeditionary, agile, lethal, sustainable and interoperable 
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forces will be essential to providing the prompt, sustained, and dominant responses across the 
spectrum of conflict that will be necessary for our security in this environment…while we 
already possess many of the qualities that we need for the future, we must continue to transform 
to realize the full potential of our experiences, and to stay ahead of our enemies‖ (Casey 2008). 
General Casey, as General Schoomaker did before him, addressed each of the bases for 
transformation that were listed in the survey. General Casey went one step further by saying that 
transformation will never stop because the U.S. needs to stay ahead of its enemies. By referring 
to transformation in this way it may over time, if it has not already, make the term rather 
meaningless in the minds of field grade officers.  
 This leads to the discussion of the third hypothesis statement. The three chiefs of staff 
view technology as a transformation driver. In the first survey item in Table 6.3, a majority of 
participants have no opinion, disagree or do not know if transformation is based on the 
integration of technology. This collective view clearly indicates that this group of officers do not 
share the same views as those of the chiefs of staff, Additionally, a majority of the participants 
either have no opinion, disagree or do not know if transformation includes all aspects of the 
battlespace (the operational environment before, during and after combat operations). Finally, a 
majority of participants have no opinion, disagree or have no opinion of whether transformation 
includes all aspects of the Army mission (i.e. everything the Army does including battlespace 
operations). The first, fourth and fifth variables in Table 6.3 clearly demonstrate that the 
participants view transformation differently than do the chiefs of staff. 
 The survey participants, along with their comments and those of the chiefs of staff, 
clearly indicate that field grade officers do not look at transformation in the same way. This 
difference provides evidence in support of the second hypothesis. Additionally, there is a 
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significant difference, according to the participants and what the chiefs of staff have stated in 
how field grade officers view transformation vis-à-vis the Army chiefs of staff. This gap between 
how field grade officers and the chiefs define transformation may have consequences. Any gap 
may lead field grade officers to form a negative view of transformation until they are able to 
understand and accept transformational goals that are established by senior Army leadership.  
The delivery of technology that increases the capabilities of current weapon systems or the 
delivery of new systems (such as what was intended with FCS) may provide material proof, to 
field grade officers, of what is meant by transformation from the view points of the chiefs of 
staff. The role of technology in transformation and the officers‘ views toward transformation will 
be the topics of the next two sections.    
Participants’ Perceptions of Technology in Army Transformation 
 
 This section addresses how field grade officers perceive technology, from a variety of 
viewpoints, and its role in achieving transformation.  Arguably, many of the transformation goals 
center on the Army being able to deploy on a brigade level basis or as BCTs. Improved 
technology may be a major aspect in the Army‘s ability to effectively deploy brigades for a 
variety of mission requirements. The fourth hypothesis statement seeks to determine if field 
grade officers view technological innovation as a key factor in achieving transformation. The 
hypothesis is states as follows:  
  
H4: Field grade officers believe that Army transformation is determined primarily by 
technological innovation. 
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 Table 6.4 displays the results of survey items which asked the participants to respond to 
four items in order to determine the perceptions of technology‘s role in achieving such 
significant change. The first survey item in this area has to do with the development and 
availability of new weapon systems. It takes a great deal of time, perhaps years, to develop and 
field a new weapon system. The respondents are asked to provide their views of how new 
systems may impact the achievement of transformation. The second item addresses specifically 
whether field grade officers believe technology drives transformation. If technology is a major 
transformation driver, then senior Army leaders may be in a position of waiting on the 
integration of technology before they are able to provide clearly stated goals vis-à-vis a less 
tangible vision of the future. Regarding the third survey item, field grade officers are asked to 
address the role of Network Centric Warfare (NCW)
24
 technology in achieving transformation. 
Finally, the fourth survey item asks the respondents to provide their views of how Future Combat 
Systems (FCS) factors into how the Army achieves transformation. The responses to these four 
areas will confirm that field grade officers consider technology to be imperative in achieving 
transformation. 
 Again, the first survey statement in this area addresses new weapons system development 
and the time-line that is needed for achieving some new capability. Current weapon systems may 
be viewed as being sufficient in achieving mission success, and the fielding of new weapon 
systems may not be all that important if Army transformation goals are not achieved. 
Approximately 43% of the respondents addressing the second category, time-line for new 
                                                   
24
 Network Centric Warfare (NCW) is an information superiority-enabled concept of operations 
that generates increased combat power by networking sensors, decision-makers (strategic, 
operational and tactical), and shooters (war-fighters) to achieve shared awareness, increased 
speed of command, higher tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased survivability, and a 
degree of self-synchronization. NCW translates information superiority into combat power by 
effectively linking knowledgeable entities into the battle-space (Cammons et al. 2003, 13)  
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weapon systems, believe that weapon system development is a key aspect in achieving 
transformation, while the majority of officers had no opinion, disagreed or strongly disagreed, or 
did not know if new weapon systems time-lines were key to transformation. A majority of 
respondents did not believe that the development of new weapon systems served as a key factor 
in achieving Army transformation. 
  As stated previously, the second survey item is very direct in asking for the respondents 
to address technology as a driver for transformation. A majority of the respondents 
(approximately 53%) believe that technology drives transformation in the Army, while the 
remaining respondents either have no view, either disagree or strongly disagree, or do not know. 
While a majority of the respondents believe that technology is a transformation driver, a majority 
of the respondents also believe that the Army will remain relevant even if transformation goals 
are not achieved. Somewhat paradoxically, a majority of the respondents believe that the weapon 
system development time-line is not all that important in determining successful transformation 
while at the same time a majority of respondents believe that new technology is imperative to 
transformation.  
The third item in Table 6.4 has to do with information technology on the battlefield. 
Network Centric Warfare (NCW), as both a term and a concept, was described earlier.  A 
majority of the respondents to this survey item either had no opinion (29%), either disagreed or 
strongly disagreed (17%), or did not know (7%). Over 46% of the respondents agreed that NCW 
is a significant component of Army transformation. There are perhaps a couple of reasons for 
why the majority of field grade officers would either have no view or a negative view of NCW as 
a transformation driver. It is possible that the respondents are not familiar with the concept of 
NCW, which might explain the 36% that responded either ―neutral‖ or ―do not know‖. A second 
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reason might be that field grade officers may be concerned about decision makers, at all levels 
(strategic, operational and tactical), having complete battle-space situational awareness and 
therefore be able to override the decision-making authority (i.e. reducing the amount of 
discretion) of officers in the field.    
The final survey item in Table 645 addresses the Future Combat System (FCS). FCS 
includes much of what is available under NCW.  But in addition to information technology, the 
FCS includes a new family of combat vehicles and other capabilities that are based largely on 
new technology. This fourth item in Table 6.4 resulted in even fewer respondents than NCW, 
above, indicating that FCS may have been a significant factor for successfully achieving 
transformation. Approximately 33% of the respondents believe FCS is important, while a 
majority (77%) of the respondents were neutral; either disagreed or strongly disagreed, or did not 
know. There were over 27% that disagree that FCS was significant to the achievement of Army 
transformation.  
Again, there are perhaps a couple of reasons for this rather large negative to neutral 
response. The first reason may be as a result of the Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, canceling 
the procurement portion of FCS in 2009, which in effect ended the combat vehicle portion of the 
program. The inference is that since the program was in effect canceled, then it must not be 
significant relative to Army transformation. Secondly, some field grade officers may have not 
been familiar with FCS since it was late in being fielded. Many field grade officers may have 
only been familiar with FCS from a conceptual perspective and had little understanding of what 
capabilities FCS would provide. Again, senior Army leadership appears to be proponents of 
FCS, but field grade officers on the other hand may have had a slightly more negative view of 
what FCS means to transformation. 
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Table 6.4 
Perceptions of Technology’s Role in Army Transformation 
N=197 
 
 
Strongly 
agree 
% 
Agree 
% 
Neutral 
% 
Disagree 
% 
Strongly 
Disagree 
% 
Don’t 
know 
% 
The weapon systems 
development time-line is a key 
aspect of determining successful 
transformation. 11.2 32.5 28.4 20.3 6.1 1.5 
The U.S. Army will rely on 
technology to drive 
transformation goals.   7.6 45.7 24.9 18.3 2.5 1.0 
Field grade officers believe that 
Network Centric Warfare is a 
significant component of 
transformation.   8.1 38.6 28.9 13.2 4.1 7.1 
Field grade officers believe that 
Future Combat Systems is a 
significant transformation factor. 5.6 27.7 32.8 19.0 8.2 6.8 
 
 Again, this section of the survey gave the participants an opportunity to provide input on 
their perceptions of transformation from two perspectives dealing with transformation. Some of 
the comments provided by respondents are included here: 
 ―Stop relying on technology for transformational needs. Just because technology is 
available does not mean we have to incorporate it. Sometimes the new technology is 
irrelevant and does not apply to our needs and only serves to overcomplicate the 
situation.‖ 
―Transformation should not solely rely on technology. Technology is definitely part of it, 
but most importantly are training and doctrine.‖ 
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―I think that the Army leadership should clearly focus on changing the Army culture 
rather on technological developments.  Army culture need to change to emphasize a 
clearly stated professional military ethic, reduce the rampant anti-intellectualism, and 
support and educate divergent thinkers. Our professional military schools do not 
emphasize enough the importance of critical thinking and intellectualism. We need smart, 
educated officers who can respond to an uncertain environment…this more than anything 
else, especially superficial changes like berets and uniforms, will drive Army 
transformation – it‘s a mindset not a piece of equipment.‖ 
 
These perceptive comments made by the survey participants, above, may indicate that 
technology is only one aspect of transformation. It may be in fact more important to first change 
other areas of the institutional Army before endeavoring to achieve transformation. The 
following will present an overview of how the chiefs of staff have provided some insight into 
this area of the survey. 
 General Eric Shinseki highlighted the significance of a cultural change within the Army 
as well as the need for the development of new technology. He must have perceived that any 
significant change would have to be preceded by a change in Army culture. Shinseki (2001) 
states that ―change in any large organization is not easy. Leaders at all levels have a critical role 
in the Army‘s attainment of the Objective Force and must work to overcome the inertia that 
impedes progress. Leaders must embrace the Army vision and become agents and disciples of 
change themselves. Leaders must establish an environment of innovation and encourage 
initiative that will harness the creative energy required in the development of the Objective Force 
concept‖ (Shinseki 2001, 20). In effect General Shinseki may have been indicating that the 
Army‘s culture would need to change in order to successfully transform to the Objective Force.   
 Some leaders may use some sort of a symbol as a reminder that the organization needs to 
change.  In the case of pursuing Army transformation, General Shinseki used the black beret as a 
symbol for Army change. Shinseki (2000) insisted that 
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 ― the Army must change to maintain its relevance for the evolving strategic 
environment…that as technology allows, we will begin to erase the distinctions between 
heavy and light forces…we are transforming today‘s most powerful Army in the world 
from a Cold War Legacy Force to an Objective Force with early entry capabilities that 
can operate jointly, without access to fixed forward bases, and still have the power to slug 
it out and win campaigns decisively…this transformation will correct the condition in 
today‘s Legacy Force where our heavy forces are too heavy, and our light forces lack 
staying power…to symbolize the Army‘s commitment to transforming itself into the 
Objective Force, the Army will adopt the black beret for wear Army-wide‖ (Shinseki 
2000).   
 
General Shinseki appeared to have observed that the Army‘s culture needed to transform, and in 
order to make sure that happened he required that everyone in the Army wear the black beret. 
Additionally, General Shinseki also made the comment ―that as technology allows‖ that the 
Army would change from the heavy systems to systems, based ostensibly on technology yet to 
be developed, that would allow the Army to become the Objective Force. This was his vision, 
and to remain focused on that vision the black beret would be worn by everyone in the Army. 
 It is not clear if General Shinseki‘s successor embraced the black beret as an emblem of 
transformation, but he did indicate that there is a human element to transformative change. 
General Schoomaker states that: 
―…regardless of concepts, capabilities, and technologies, it is important to remember that 
at the center of every joint system are the men and women who selflessly serve the 
Nation. Although the tools of warfare change, the dynamics of the human dimensions, 
instilled through innovative leadership, remain the driving force in all military 
operations…the human dimension of Army transformation is the crucial link to the 
realization of Future Force capabilities and the enhanced effectiveness of the Current 
Force…to realize the full power of transformation, the Army seeks to embed a culture of 
innovation within its people and organizations to ensure innovative practices, processes 
and activities emerge to produce required joint capabilities…changing the Army‘s culture 
now, however, is not about introducing innovation…it is about changing how and when 
innovation occurs in the transformation cycle…instead of processes constraining 
solutions, solutions must drive processes‖ (Schoomaker 2003, 1-4 – 1-5). 
 
  Innovation may mean different things (tactics, leader development, etc.) but it appears that 
General Schoomaker may mean that innovation is the integration of technology which will 
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continue as the Army seeks to continuously transform itself; the culture within the Army may 
need to adapt to that reality if it has not done so already. 
 Changing the culture within the Army may be more difficult than any other aspect of 
achieving transformation. General Casey stated in 2007 that: 
―…most of our systems were designed to support the pre-9/11 Army. Our transformation 
cannot be cemented until the institutional systems, personnel, education, training, 
healthcare, procurement, and support among them, are adapted to meet the realities of our 
current and future environments. We will continue Army Business Transformation 
through management, contracting and acquisition reform; comprehensive redesign of 
organizations and business processes that support our expeditionary Army at war; and 
consolidation of bases and activities. While this is largely an internal process, it may well 
be the most difficult aspect of transformation…and the one that is most essential to 
giving us the Army we need for the rest of this century‖ (Casey 2007, 6).  
 
 General Casey may indicate here that the expeditionary army, the one that is currently at 
war, may be have already adapted to the realities of transformation, whereas the institutional 
army, or everyone else, may still need to change in order for the Army to achieve it 
transformational goals and objectives. Procurement and acquisition, a part of the institutional 
army as described be General Casey here, is the segment of the Army that develops and procures 
both new weapon systems and new technology. If these areas are lagging, as General Casey 
seems to indicate, then the culture within that part of the institutional Army may need to 
transform in order to allow the Army to achieve the technological advantages needed for the 
Future Force. Culture may in fact drive the Army‘s ability to achieve innovation in not only 
technology, but also within its educational institutions, training efforts, healthcare practices and 
general business practices. 
 The majority of the survey respondents believe that technological innovation primarily 
drives transformational change in the Army. Along with that belief a majority of respondents 
either agree or are neutral in viewing weapons system development time-time as being important 
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in achieving transformation. Regardless of these views on the importance of technological 
innovation, a majority of officers believe that the Army will remain relevant even transformation 
goals are not achieved. This viewpoint may reinforce the idea that the respondents may have a 
negative view of transformation if such change is other than incremental in nature.  Responses 
regarding the importance of technology in achieving transformation, and the emphasis that the 
chiefs of staff appear to make on technology, lend support for the fourth hypothesis; field grade 
officers believe that Army transformation is determined primarily by technological innovation.  
While in this section the respondents, as field grade officers, provide their views on the 
importance of technology and other factors for the attainment of transformation, it is also 
important for respondents to offer their estimates on how they believe other field grade officers 
may influence transformation. 
 
Participants have a Critical Perception of Army Transformation 
 This section seeks to determine if field grade officers possess a critical view of Army 
transformation.  As expressed in Chapter 4, Methodology, the responses provided by the 
participants here may be based largely on the collective experiences and associations with other 
field grade officers over the course of a career, particularly over the last decade. It is possible 
that some bias will occur as these participants seek to represent the attitudes of all field grade 
officers serving in the Army. Table 6.5 affords the participants an opportunity to provide 
responses to eight different variables which will help in determining if field grade officers hold a 
critical view of Army transformation.  If field grade officers view Army transformation efforts 
critically, then those viewpoints may explain the differences in how senior Army leaders 
interpret transformation as compared to field grade officers. The fifth hypothesis statement seeks 
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to determine if field grade officers do indeed possess a critical perception of transformation. The 
fifth hypothesis is stated as follows:  
  
H5: Army officers will view Army transformation efforts critically. 
 
The first variable in Table 6.5 indicates that a majority of close to 60% of the participants believe 
that the term transformation is well understood by field grade officers in terms of current 
objectives. There is a rather high percentage of participants, approximately 40%, who either 
disagree or have no opinion. Regarding the second item, a little more than 58% of the officers 
believe that transformation changes from one chief of staff to the next, while the remaining 
approximately 42% of participants either have no opinion or disagree. Approximately 44.5% of 
the participants in terms of the third variable believe that the Combatant Commanders (CINCs) 
have greater influence in defining Army transformation while the remaining 55% either disagree 
or have no opinion. The fourth question indicates that a majority of participants, approximately 
53%, do not believe that senior Army leaders have been clear in defining transformation goals. 
This view supports the response where 75% of the participants, in the fifth variable, indicate that 
goals should be more clearly stated by senior Army leaders. Regarding the formation of  
transformation in the sixth variable  a minority of participants, approximately 28%, believe that 
field grade officers have the opportunity to provide input regarding transformation. Additionally, 
in variable seven, a minority of officers, approximately 23%, believe that field grade officers 
have discretion in implementing transformation goals.   Finally, variable eight indicates that 67% 
of the respondents believe that significant change in Army organizational goals are clearly 
understood by field grade officers. 
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  Table 6.5 
Views of Leadership on Army Transformation 
N=197 
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
% 
Agree 
% 
Neutral 
% 
Disagree 
% 
Strongly 
Disagree 
% 
Don’t 
know 
% 
The term transformation is well 
understood by field grade officers 
in terms of U.S. Army change 
objectives.   6.6 53.3 21.8 15.2 1.5 1.5 
The meaning of Army 
transformation changes from one 
chief of staff to the next. 19.8 39.1 27.9 9.1 1.5 2.5 
The Combatant Commanders 
(CINCs) have greater influence in 
defining transformation than does 
the Army chief of staff. 18.6 25.9 32.9 21.8 4.1 6.6 
I believe senior Army leadership 
has been clear in defining 
transformation goals.  5.1 41.8 30.6 16.3 5.6 .5 
The U.S. Army transformation 
goals should be more clearly 
stated by senior Army leadership. 30.1 44.9 20.4 4.6 0.0 0.0 
Field grade officers have an 
opportunity to provide input in 
determining what Army 
transformation means. 3.6 24.4 27.9 31.0 12.7 .5 
Field grade officers have 
flexibility in implementing Army 
transformation goals. 2.1 21.0 30.3 31.8 12.8 2.1 
Significant change in U.S. Army 
organizational goals are clearly 
understood by field grade 
officers. 6.6 60.4 20.3 11.7 .5 .5 
222 
 
 Again, this section of the survey gave the participants an opportunity to be critical of 
transformation. Some of the comments provided by respondents are included here: 
―Most field grade officers have ideas on how transformation should work but their ideas 
are rarely integrated if they are even received at the echelon making decisions.‖ 
            ―I feel field grade officers have an excellent opportunity to affect transformation yet feel 
senior level leaders tend to discount their opinions.‖ 
 ―I think that most of my peers feel that transformation is a joke. A series of useless 
cosmetic changes have been sold as transformation, but the basics of military readiness 
are not addressed by senior leadership, and, in fact, many initiatives are a distraction from 
training for war. I don‘t need resiliency, new uniforms and pie in the sky weapons 
systems. I need time to train soldiers, and I need to get those soldiers early enough in the 
ARFORGEN [Army Force Generation] cycle that I can exercise collective training to 
standard.‖ 
 
The perceptive comments made by the survey participants, above, indicate that field 
grade officers hold critical views of transformation. Their comments confirm that, in their view, 
transformation could be more clearly defined by senior level leaders. While a majority of officers 
(59.9%) believe that transformation is well understood in terms of Army objectives, a similar 
majority of the participants (58.9%) believe that the meaning of transformation changes from one 
chief of staff to the next. Additionally, a majority of officers (53%) either have no opinion or 
hold a negative view regarding senior leadership clearly defining transformation goals. Indeed, a 
significant majority (75%) of field grade officers believe that the chiefs of staff should more 
clearly state transformation goals. To the degree that transformation is understood, any changes 
that a new chief of staff makes may cause field grade officers to form a more critical view of 
significant change.      
 Some field grade officers may view the chief of staff as having less influence in 
determining transformation as compared to other senior level officers. A rather significant 
percentage of participants, approximately 44.5%, who believe that Combatant Commanders 
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(CINCs) have more influence in shaping transformation than does the chief of staff may indicate 
that there is some confusion regarding who provides clearly defined goals. Because a significant 
percentage of field grade officers believe that the CINCs (i.e. the war-fighting four-star generals) 
have significant influence in determining what transformation should entail, their view of 
transformation may be critical if the Army chief of staff‘s view is different than that of the 
CINCs.   
 The participants were also clear in their views that field grade officers have little 
opportunity to provide input in defining transformation and have little discretion in determining 
how transformation is implemented. Field grade officers serve in assignments at the battalion 
level and higher, as well as in senior Army and joint staff assignments. Because of their relative 
high status within the Army, field grade officers will most likely develop a critical view of 
transformation if they believe that they have little opportunity for determining such policy or if 
they have little discretion regarding its implementation. The inability for field grade officers to 
provide input regarding transformation, and to also exercise some discretion, may have 
something to do with a budget process that is largely determined from the top down.  While 
somewhat outside the scope of this research, a constrained budget (especially constrained when 
in time of war) may also make it difficult for senior leadership to send a strong and clear 
message of change because of limited resources. If senior leaders are espousing transformative 
change on one hand and a constrained budget makes it difficult to achieve transformation on the 
other, then field grade officers will most likely form a very critical view of transformation. 
Again, this question may be better left to further research that determines if the budgeting 
process within the federal government contributes to critical views of significant change. 
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 If field grade officers are not able to express their views of what transformation means, 
and they believe they lack the discretion necessary to implement transformation goals, then field 
grade officers will have a critical view of transformation, if for no other reason that they do not 
view themselves as partners in the process. According to the survey results in Table 6.5, and the 
comments provided by the survey participants, there is a rather large percentage of officers that 
are neutral or do not agree with many of the items in Table 6.5.  While there are many who do 
agree that the chiefs of staff make transformation understandable as a term, that senior Army 
leadership has been clear in defining transformation goals, and significant change in terms of 
Army organizational goals are well understood, there is nevertheless a rather large percentage in 
the ―neutral‖ and ―do not agree‖ categories that may indicate a large percentage of officers who 
hold very critical views of transformation.   By opening up the lines of communication between 
senior Army leadership and field grade officers, especially in the area of transformational goals, 
and then allowing field grade officers to exercise more discretionary authority may go a long 
way toward eliminating the critical view of transformation that a relatively large number of 
officers currently possess.  
 There is an obvious inconsistency in Table 6.5 regarding the views of field grade officers. 
The first variable indicates that almost 60% of the officers believe that Army transformation is 
well understood, while in item five 75% of the officers believe that senior Army leadership 
should do a better job of stating transformation goals. Approximately 40% of field grade officers 
believe that the term transformation could be better understood by field grade officers. 
Additionally, in the last variable 66% of officers believe that transformation goals are clearly 
understood by field grade officers, while over 30% believe that significant changes in Army 
organizational goals are clearly understood.  The relatively high percentage of officers 
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represented in the neutral or disagree categories in the first and last variable indicate that many 
officers hold a critical view of transformation. Those percentages along with the fifth variable, 
where a high percentage of officers believe that transformation goals should be more clearly 
stated, confirms that field grade officers view transformation critically.   
Based on the results of the survey, the five hypotheses statements presented in this 
research have been proven warranted. By proving the accuracy of each of these hypotheses 
statements, it also indicates that there is indeed a gap that exist between how senior Army leaders 
define transformation as compared to how field grade officers define that term. If there is a 
difference in how the chiefs of staff have defined transformation (an end-state or an Objective 
Force preferred by General Shinseki as compared to the continuous pursuit of some Future Force 
that was the preferred approach of both General Schoomaker and General Casey) then there is 
strong possibility that field grade officers may also view transformation differently.  
Similarly, field grade officers may view transformation as being defined differently from 
one chief of staff to the next. If transformation takes on a somewhat different meaning, or 
perhaps a significantly new meaning, from one chief of staff to the next then field grade officers 
may perceive senior Army leaders as being clear and consistent on transformation goals and 
objectives. If field grade officers do not understand what senior leaders mean by transformation, 
then they may be more inclined with the status quo (weapon systems, tactics, institutions, etc.) of 
which they are more familiar. If transformational goals are not clear, then the unknown may not 
be preferred by most field grade officers; in fact field grade officers may have a negative view of 
transformation. 
Each of the three chiefs of staff has highlighted technology, most notably FCS, as the 
centerpiece for transforming the Army.  While the respondents do not necessarily address FCS in 
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many of their comments, they do acknowledge that technology has benefited the Brigade 
Combat Teams (BCT) that serve as the Army‘s primary units of deployment. Finally, field grade 
officers believe that the culture of the Army needs to change in order for the Army to transform. 
Many of the respondents believe that field grade officers have limited access to senior Army 
leadership for purposes of making recommendations and comments concerning transformation. 
While many field grade officers have known nothing but change since they began their careers in 
the late 1990s, senior ranking officers who began their careers decades before may have a 
different perspective of what needs to be accomplished. The difference in how transformation is 
perceived by the chiefs of staff and field grade officers may have a great deal to do with a clash 
of sub-cultures within the Army, The cultural change may occur at senior levels within the Army 
as field grade officers get promoted to general officer.  To further support the survey results 
presented here, open-ended interviews were conducted at CGSC for purposes of receiving first-
hand input into how some field grade officers think about transformation from a variety of 
perspectives.  
 
Interview Results 
 As discussed in Chapter 4, Methodology, a series of open-interviews were conducted at 
CGSC in January 2010 with the participants consisting of four students (Army Majors) and three 
faculty and staff members (an Army Major and two Lieutenant Colonels). These interviews were 
open-ended in that the prepared questions (see Appendix B) may have caused each interview to 
take a somewhat different direction based on the willingness of the participants to each provide 
somewhat different points of view. Indeed, due to time constraints, in some cases all of the 
questions were not addressed. Some questions caused some informants to go down different 
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paths in providing their responses, which did take considerable time in some cases. Some of 
those responses provided a great deal of information that was not specifically relevant to the 
research. For instance, there was some discussion of what is taking place within the BCT that 
had little to do with the overall research question or hypotheses. The interviews were useful in 
triangulating the information that was received during the survey process, as well as the 
information that was gathered as a part of the literature review.   
 The informants each signed an informed consent form (Appendix B), were all very 
cooperative, provided excellent insight into the challenges of transformation, and completed the 
entire interview process. While the transcription of the interviews resulted in a large amount of 
information, only a portion of the total interviews are represented here.  
 The selection of officers who participated in this interview was out of my control. The 
Deputy Chief of the U.S. Student Division at CGSC selected four student-officers and four 
faculty and staff members to participate. There were no minority or female officers selected to 
participate. Of the officers selected, the four student-officers were Active Army majors and the 
faculty and staff consisted of three Active Army lieutenant colonels and one Active Army major. 
As stated in Chapter 4, Methodology, a cassette tape containing the interview with a lieutenant 
colonel, while available, did not allow for information to be accessed. This is the reason for why 
there are only seven open-ended interviews as opposed to the eight that I had intended to 
transcribe.   
 It was important to have the officers acknowledge whether any transformation had 
occurred, and if it did it was useful to receive their viewpoints as to the nature of that 
transformative change. The following represents some of the responses relating to the question of 
whether there has been any organizational change within the Army since 1999:  
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 ―Oh, absolutely.‖ 
―Probably a large degree of organizational change not only in terms of structural but on 
how the Army is trying to change how we think about complex problems…instead of 
more methodology like you do it like this…thinking more in terms of what are all the 
factors involved in this problem and how we get to where we need to be after solving the 
problem based on the factors.‖ 
 
―Yes, I think more so due to the conflicts in wars than transformation itself…when it 
comes to transformation, we realigned some of our units…and decentralized some of 
how we fight to a lower level…but I don‘t it goes as far as reorganizational change…you 
still wake up in the morning, you put on your uniform, you still follow orders, and a lot of 
our processes are very much the same…I don‘t think the using of BCT structure is the 
centerpiece of the transformation or so significant that I would say it was an 
organizational change…I wouldn‘t go so far as to say that our transformation was as 
great as some of the military transformations or revolutions of the past.‖ 
 
  The next question that is represented here asked the participants to provide input on how 
they view the development of weapon systems as a driver for achieving transformation in the 
Army. 
―They could probably speed up the process [weapons system development]. I know 
there‘s the bureaucracy that you, you know, you have to maneuver through, but they 
should shorten the lifecycles for programs from conception to production…the 
transformation piece, I mean it has basically two parallel paths; one is, you know, just a 
natural evolution of technology and the other is always wanting to have, you know, top 
shelf stuff.‖ 
 
―…I think it has experienced some organizational change…I mean maybe not as drastic 
as from what I‘ve seen, but there has been some.‖ 
 
 The term transformation or significant may not mean the same thing to different people. 
Additionally, some individuals may view even transformative change as being incremental and 
not necessarily change that occurs all at one. The following represents responses to the question 
that addresses whether transformation is either significant change or incremental change. 
―I think we are wrapped up in the demands of the current operating environment and I‘m 
not sure that at the highest level we start to say here‘s where we are going to with an 
Army 10 or 15 years from now [do you think the status quo is sufficient?]…yeah, I think 
we‘ve proven that as an organization we will continue to move and progress and 
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evolve…you have to ask yourself are we really getting to where the chief wants us to go 
if he‘s not thinking?‖ 
 
―It‘s both, certainly significant but it‘s been incremental and it‘s been a revo lution 
making adaptation to requirements of the strategic operations environment, I think you 
could see that in the organization for combat…in the institutions available on the various 
posts around the world and the support we offer the units.‖ 
 
 ―I would say both. I would say the incremental changes that we have experienced since 
2004 have significant at a logistical standpoint, we‘ve seen a majority of the logistical 
structures changed to the way we fight now and the maneuver units are supporting them, 
so I would say both.‖  
 
―…in terms of organizational structure, I would say that it was a significant 
transformation in the context of both, you know, brigade centric versus the whole 
structure of divisions that occurred…I‘d say the impact …were almost 
instantaneously…but when you‘re talking about a large organization and you‘re trying to 
guide in a different direction I would say it‘s been incremental, the gains have been 
realized incrementally because in a large organization you can‘t just flip a light switch 
and say we‘re now doing this…it takes some time.‖   
―It would be significant change…so, the transformation is…a big broad stroke of you 
know a major muscle group type of change…transformation is a big broad stroke 
whereas with that broad stroke you have all these little different changes that are done 
with a fine brush that support the big broad stroke.‖   
―I would say that it has been much more incremental for the simple fact that as they 
transformed units to BCTs they had to do so incrementally.‖ 
―…a little bit of both, incrementally in the fact that we have seen the change in uniforms, 
we‘ve seen changes in equipment, we‘ve seen change in just about everything that could 
be changed…we‘re changing.‖ 
―…yes I think it does when I think the biggest change that we had all at once was a minor 
change…that was putting the black berets on all at the same time back in 2000.‖ 
 Some officers may not view the Army Chief of Staff as the individual that is responsible 
for creating the vision for transformation. Others may view other actors such as the Secretary of 
Defense, the Secretary of the Army or other public officials external to the Defense Department 
as being more influential in determining what organizational change needs to occur in the Army. 
The following responses provide the participants‘ opinion of who determines change in the 
Army. 
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―I think the senior leaders of the Army to be that voice. I see the chief of staff of the 
Army probably to be the primary guy that says here‘s where we are go, certainly every 
four-star has a role in that, hopefully there‘s some consensus at that level…I hope that 
they are informed by the recommendations of organizational leaders from throughout the 
formation and that information is gathered in a variety of ways, to do a lot of face-to-face 
for we know what we want to look like 5-10-15 years from now…certainly the chief is 
that mouthpiece, that guy represents our interests and after that lawmakers and all the 
budgetary discussions and things that drives change at you.‖ 
 
―Ultimately, I think the Chief of Staff of the Army…is the person who has to set the 
tempo and then push it down and get people to follow suit…you know, if it‘s not coming 
from the chief of staff it‘s not going to happen.‖ 
 
―…the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Army and we work through the 
civilians when we have to get that guidance…I mean we have a lot of smart senior 
officers…who can see the trends and the way things are going, but I think that we have 
input, but the national command authority has to say this is the direction you have to go.‖   
 
―…the Army is not so much higher autocratic, or whatever you want to call it, it has been 
modified over the last 10 years, where we have thicker skin than we use to…we kind of 
screwed that up and we got to fix it is the mindset now.‖ 
 
―I think all leaders are responsible for the structural change…I would say the Army 
leadership with guidance from the civilian leadership to ensure we are forming and 
changing to meet the needs that the civilian leadership directs us to go as far as their 
strategy, as far as their guidance to us on how we need to be best.‖ 
 
 While the participants may agree that change has occurred within the Army, there is 
some disagreement on who actually determines the change objectives for the Army. If that is 
true, then there may be some ambiguity about what the vision may be for transformation in this 
military service. The following comments are in response to whether or not a vision has been 
expressed for purposes of transformation. 
―I think it has been expressed…it‘s also been changed over time for a variety of reasons 
since 1999.‖ 
 
―There‘s been a vision and they‘ve put out a lot of what I call propaganda…that may 
seem like the wrong term to explain the vision in the higher ups of the chain…I think a 
lot of that gets lost when you get down to the ground levels…I saw a lot of power point 
charts with a lot of arrows that pointed to a lot of this is what‘s changing, but when you 
said to someone what is that…they couldn‘t articulate it…I think there is ambiguity built 
into it because we‘re learning as we go, we‘re trying to change fast, we don‘t want to go 
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too far in the wrong direction so they think if they filter some flexibility into the change, 
cause they‘ll know it when they see it.‖ 
 
―… we all have a piece of it, so I can‘t say one particular person would be responsible for 
saying ‗hey this what it is and this is what we‘re looking at‘…in 2000 is when I started 
hearing about transformation, they said by 2010, which oh by the way by now 
transformation should be complete.‖ 
 
―I would say no and I would be interested in seeing something like that and hoping that I 
get that here (at CGSC) but I have not seen anything like that in what I have been doing 
lately.‖ 
 
―I think as definitive and expressive as they can be…we just changed out doctrine and we 
include stability support operations and counter-insurgency as a much greater piece of the 
overall operations.‖ 
 
―…there‘s a gap and it‘s mostly I say between the three and four star level and the 
commanders. You know you have a bunch of three and four stars and two stars who 
come up through the old Army with NTC [National Training Center] rotations; they‘re 
fine and very intelligent men, but now we‘ve got this kind of different way of looking at 
business…and we have ones that from 2003 – 2004, those battalion commanders who are 
now brigade commanders…so it‘s coming up you‘ve got people who were getting 
experience in this type of war and that goes all the way down to the lieutenants who don‘t 
know anything but patrolling in an urban environment.‖  
 
―I guess we‘re lacking vision right now but it has been provided in the past from the 
civilian leadership then transferred into military leadership out to the units…I think it is 
important for the members of the organization to understand what leadership, whether it 
be military or civilian, what their vision is for the unit; where they want things to head for 
the organization and what direction they want them to travel in.‖ 
 
The next section asks the participants to address the significance of having an expressed 
vision that is driven from the top down within the Army‘s organizational structure. The open-
ended interview approach allowed for additional insight to be gained regarding the ability 
subordinates to provide information from the bottom up. 
[Does bottom-up feeding of information make its way to senior level leadership and 
become incorporated in change?] 
 ―Yes, because if you don‘t, especially in the organization…with the culture of the 
military, you know people are slow to change.‖ 
 
―…more so now than it use to and I think a lot of it is exacerbated by technology…when 
I started my own career back in 1992 we were lucky to have a computer in a company 
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now we‘re all connected to the internet, to all this vast amount of data, that didn‘t exist 
before, so the information sharing and the existing information is so much greater I think 
to some of our senior leaders.  
 
The chiefs of staff all emphasized the need for innovation and the need to insert 
technology into both existing and developing weapon systems (mostly FCS). The participants 
were asked to provide their views of how technology may drive transformation in the Army. 
―…we try and use technology too much on transforming to meet technology and the 
situation doesn‘t allow us to be, that technology is the driver…we‘re in two different 
wars right now with two drastically different scenarios but what we try to do is when 
something works with one scenario or in one area we try to use it over in the other and 
sometimes maybe…we realize it‘s not really appropriate and we try and force it to work.‖ 
  
―…two categories…those things that enhance your efficiency and those technological 
advances that are so sweeping at different levels of command that they want now and 
they want more…cannot live without.‖ 
 
―…it plays a significant role.‖ 
 
―…technology affects force structure much more…I don‘t know how much you know 
about future combat system (FCS)…it wasn‘t working.‖ 
 
―I think another reality of this current environment is that technology in not going to 
carry the day in future accomplishments…when I hear FCS I don‘t think of light and 
deployable…I think this environment is showing us that might be a pipe dream and 
regardless of how high tech we get it‘s very difficult to truly understand all the aspects 
and human dimensions of war and to really have information dominance…in end there 
are other factors that are more important in that equation.‖ 
 
As stated previously, the Army budget affects everyone in the organization. The 
participants were asked to provide their viewpoints on how the Defense Budget may impact the 
U.S. Army‘s ability to achieve organizational change 
―I‘d say probably the budget issues are the main reason transformation has become so 
bureaucratic, it so political…what you need to look like gets clouded by the budget 
restraints and that‘s where we become bureaucratic and you get tied into problems…all 
these political leaders from all camps that helping to cloud the issues.‖ 
 
―…the budget is very important because…until you get this stuff that symbolizes the 
change…you get the equipment and you‘re able to restructure your force.‖ 
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―I think it depends on the level of transformation the unit that is transforming, what the 
unit was before they transformed versus what they are going to be once they complete 
transformation…if a unit is infantry and they‘re transforming they‘re staying infantry and 
they‘re just transforming the unit‘s structure as far as the personnel there, they may be 
gaining a few more soldiers, or fire teams, the budget will need to increase a little to pay 
for the training.‖ 
The survey results indicated that the Army chiefs of staff have a different view of what 
transformation means as compared to that of field grade officers. The interview participants were 
asked express their views on how transformation may be different between these two levels.  
―I would say no. I would say that the more senior you become the broader the scope 
across the Army becomes, so you tend to see things differently than what a major down 
in a battalion or maybe at the brigade level would see; the scope is different. 
 
―I would have to say yes more than in the past when Shinseki pretty much started the 
whole thing, he kind of changed the model for the concept of thinking and that‘s just kind 
of how the snow ball affect with the chiefs that succeeded him, because before you can 
change, like everything else it is painful, nobody likes change because it is different…it 
forces you to learn something new or do something different than what you‘re use 
to…but the Army has gotten used to this idea of change.‖  
 
―I don‘t think so, I there‘s a gap between their strategic plan and the way they want to go 
and how it‘s being executed on the ground…I think the gap is wide because it often 
seems that the input from the grade officers and the guys on the ground doesn‘t get to 
higher, or higher already made up their mind before they ask for input…‖ 
 
―I think a four-star would think about change as more long-term because of the size and 
scope of the organization that they command whereas field grade officers would view the 
principles…a four star can change his shirt from red to blue and that means 
organizational change. 
 
―I think they (senior leaders) are more focused on strategic level…they have a longer 
view of requirements and I think different perspectives toward change.‖ 
―I think that the chief‘s answer would be a composite of sound-bites probably driving 
toward big objectives…I think my answer would be focused more on well transformation 
equals force structure changes down at the division and brigade, both levels with new 
technologies in the formations, more soldiers, a change in how we educate the force and 
train the force.‖ 
 
 The open-ended interview provided for a very good forum for discussing what Army 
transformation means to a field grade officer on a personal level. The following provides some 
viewpoints on what transformation means to the interview participants. 
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―…when it was coined General Shinseki was trying to change the Army into a more 
expeditionary force into a force that was more capable of deploying rapidly, realigning 
our formation and to be able to plug into to small wars to go fight as brigade units…send 
in small packages somewhere very quickly…which was going to have to change a lot of 
mindsets and a lot of our logistics tail…[General Shinseki made the comment that if we 
don‘t have FCS by the year 2010 the Army is going to be irrelevant]…but no one can still 
tell you what FCS is.‖ 
―…nothing. It doesn‘t affect me. I mean my day-to-day activity in the Army kind of 
continues whether it was Army transformation or not…‖ 
―…I don‘t think they do. I think that …senior leaders have feelings of stewardship they 
need to change some things we need, emerging threats, but at the same time it‘s easy to 
come out and say this is what we need to do and then it is the majors and lieutenant 
colonels that have to staff and execute all these, and again just the amount of stuff that 
we‘ve got going on in our day to day mission, not even talking about deployment training 
and all that, if you‘re going to transform a unit you got to just transform a unit.‖ 
―…a lot of officers have never known anything but change…they‘re comfortable with 
change.‖ 
―…it probably means there is a defined end-state.‖ 
―…it is basically a timeframe in the Army‘s history where we went through a major 
restructuring and reorganization of the way our units are structured and supported and the 
way we actually look at those units…I see transformation as really 2000 – 2001 
timeframe until now where we are, I would say probably coming towards the end as we 
finish migrating everybody from what we call legacy units, the older structured units to 
the modular structured units‖ 
 
―Transformation is nebulous and a term which should be retired. It adds little clarity and 
serves and has become something of a joke because contractors and program managers 
now dub everything ―transformation‖ to gain funding. Same thing is now being done with 
COIN (Counterinsurgency)/IW (Information Warfare.‖ 
 
 The interviews provided a unique opportunity to interface with majors and lieutenant 
colonels and to gain an understanding of how they perceive transformation. This experience 
would not have been possible through the survey process, but the interviews did serve to support 
the findings in the survey. There is clearly not a consistent understanding of what transformation 
means among field grade officers. Even when these officers address transformation as being 
either an end-state or a continuous process, there is still some disparity in how they perceive the 
magnitude in what is actually happening in the way of significant change. Many of these officers 
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have known nothing but change since they entered the Army over a decade ago.  The fact that 
General Casey, for instance, refers to transformation as a ―continuous journey‖ that is ever 
evolving may be less of an impact on these officers than the generation of officers who preceded 
them. Additionally, the participants in these interviews have also experienced war for over seven 
years. The idea of receiving new technology that makes their life easier, if not safer, may be a 
welcome change. Receiving any new technology for purposes of fighting the current war may 
not be associated with transformation by these officers, the insertion of technology may only be 
perceived as upgrading existing equipment which may be viewed as only an evolutionary or 
incremental change to existing systems.      
 
Conclusion 
 The term Army transformation means different things to different people. Within the 
Army, there are different meanings of transformation among field grade officers and field grade 
officers have a different perception of what transformation means as compared to senior Army 
leadership, and field grade officers generally view that the meaning of transformation changes 
from one chief of staff to the next.  In this chapter there has been empirical evidence provided 
that proves that each of the five hypothesis statements is true. Transformation may necessitate 
that a cultural change needs to take place within the organizational or institutional army; it may 
mean the need to constantly pursue technological innovation for both current weapon systems 
and for any weapon systems that are being developed for the future; it may include the need to 
change the current force structure of the army into something that is more appropriate for present 
and future needs; it may mean addressing all aspects of what the Army is engaged with before, 
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during and after combat operations; and, finally, it may include all of the above as well as other 
considerations that may be outside of the scope of this research.   
In short, Army transformation may simply mean what any given chief of staff says it 
means. To the degree that the term changes from one chief of staff to the next, there is going to 
be some difference in how the term is perceived or defined by field grade officers. Those field 
grade officers will view the term critically primarily because of their education, experience and 
their view of the world around them. If the term Army transformation is not made more 
definitive, if it means a continuous journey to some ideal state, then the way in which that term is 
viewed and defined by the many members of an organization will be numerous.  
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United States Army Command and General Staff College 
Army Transformation Survey 
Researcher(s): Administrator(s): 
David H. Jerome, Graduate Student, Public Policy Ph.D. Program  
 
Researchers:                Compliance Contact Person: 
 
David H. Jerome, Graduate Student                 Ro Windwalker, Compliance Coordinator 
William D. Schreckhise, Ph.D., Faculty Advisor   Research & Sponsored Programs 
University of Arkansas     Research Compliance 
College of Arts and Sciences    University of Arkansas 
Public Policy Ph.D. Program    120 Ozark Hall 
428 Old Main      Fayetteville, AR 72701-1201 
Fayetteville, AR 72701     479-575-2208 
479-575-3356      irb@uark.edu 
djerome@uark.edu 
 
Description: The present study will investigate the meaning of ―Army Transformation‖ as 
defined by senior U.S. Army leaders and U.S. Army lieutenant colonels and majors. You are 
asked to voluntarily participate in this survey. 
 
Risks and Benefits: The benefits include contributing to the knowledge base pertaining to the 
meaning of the term ―Army Transformation‖. By engaging in the survey you should continue to 
consider the meaning of ―Army Transformation‖, perhaps throughout your career, and its 
importance to senior level planners and decision-makers. There are no anticipated risks to 
participating in the survey. 
 
Voluntary Participation: Your participation in the research is completely voluntary.  
 
Confidentiality:  All information will be kept confidential to the extent allowed by law and 
University policy. Results from the research will be reported as aggregate data. 
 
Right to Withdraw: You are free to refuse to participate in the research and to withdraw from this 
study at any time. Your decision to withdraw will bring no negative consequences — no penalty 
to you. 
 
Purpose of the survey: The following survey is a part of a doctoral research project concerning 
United States Army transformation efforts that have occurred since 1999. The survey will take 
roughly 15 minutes to complete. The questions below will be used to understand differences in 
perception among different groups. There will be no attempts to identify individual responses. 
The aggregated summary information will be used by the researcher but will otherwise remain 
confidential. If you do not feel comfortable answering a question, leave it blank. Your 
participation in this survey is very much appreciated.  
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Demographic Information 
1.  Current rank 
      A. O4 
      B. O5 
      C. 06 
      D. Other, specify: _____ 
2.  Army Component 
     A. Active Army 
     B. Army Reserves 
     C. Army National Guard 
     D. Other, specify: ____________________ 
3.  Current Duty Position 
     A.  CGSC Student Officer 
     B.  CGSC Staff 
     C.  CGSC Faculty 
     D. Other, specify: _________________ 
4.  Total number of years of active duty service: __________ 
5. Gender 
    A. Male 
    B. Female 
6. Age: ____ 
7. Race: ______ 
8. Highest level of education achieved: 
    A. Bachelor‘s Degree 
    B. Master‘s Degree 
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    C. Doctorate  
    D. Other: _______________ 
9. Source of U.S. Army Commission: 
    A. Military Academy 
    B. OCS 
    C. ROTC 
    D. Direct 
    E. Other: _______________________________ 
10. Branch (i.e. Infantry, Artillery, Acquisition Corps):_____________________ 
 
Please respond to all of the remaining survey comments by using the following scale: 
 
     Strongly                                                            Strongly        Don‘t  
     Agree       Agree       Neutral     Disagree     Disagree        Know     
         5               4                3                 2                    1 
   
Terminology 
The purpose of this section is to gain an understanding of what the term “transformation” 
means to you 
1.  The U.S. Army has experienced significant organizational change since 1999. 
    5                4                3                 2                1            Don‘t Know 
 
2.  Significant change in U.S. Army organizational goals by field grade officers. 
     5                4                3                 2                1            Don‘t Know 
 
 
3.  ―Significant change‖ and ―transformation‖ are synonymous relative to current U.S. Army 
goals.    
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     5                4                3                 2                1            Don‘t Know 
4.  The term ―transformation‖ is well understood by field grade officers in terms of U.S. Army 
change objectives. 
      5                4                3                 2                1            Don‘t Know 
5.  I believe senior Army leadership has been clear in defining ―transformation‖ goals 
   5                4                3                 2                1            Don‘t Know 
6. The meaning of Army transformation changes from one Army Chief of Staff to the next. 
     5                4                3                 2                 1              Don‘t Know 
7. Combatant Commanders (CINCs) have greater influence in defining Army Transformation 
than does the Army Chief of Staff. 
    5                4                 3                 2                 1         Don‘t Know 
Comments 
 
What “transformation” means to the Army 
The purpose of this section is to gain an understanding of what transformation means to 
the Army. 
8. U.S. Army transformation is based largely on the integration of technology into weapon 
systems. 
   5                4                3                 2                 1        Don‘t Know 
9. U.S. Army transformation is based largely on changes in force structure. 
     5                 4                3                 2                1        Don‘t Know 
10. U.S. Army transformation is based largely on information technology. 
             5                4                3                 2                1         Don‘t Know 
11. U.S. Army transformation is a process and not an end-state. 
      5                4                3                 2                1         Don‘t Know 
12. U.S. Army transformation addresses the complete ―battle-space‖ (all aspects of the 
battlefield, before, during and after combat operations). 
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     5                4                3                 2                1          Don‘t Know 
13. Transformation addresses all aspects of the U.S. Army mission. 
    5                4                 3                 2                1          Don‘t Know 
14. The U.S. Army will remain relevant even if transformation goals are not achieved. 
   5                4                3                 2                1          Don‘t Know        
15. The weapon systems development time-line is a key aspect in determining successful 
transformation. 
    5                4                3                 2                1          Don‘t Know 
16. Military training and educational institutions clearly express a senior level description of 
what ―Army Transformation‖ means. 
 5                4                3                 2                 1         Don‘t Know 
Comments 
 
Field Grade Officer views about transformation 
The purpose of this section is to get your perceptions of what other field grade officers 
think about “transformation” 
17. Field grade officers have an opportunity to provide input in determining what ―Army 
Transformation‖ means. 
      5                4                3                 2                   1          Don‘t Know 
18. Field grade officers have flexibility in implementing ―Army Transformation‖ goals. 
   5                4                3                 2                   1          Don‘t Know 
19. Field grade officers believe transformation is necessary based on 21
st
 century threats v. 20
th
 
century threats 
   5                4                3                 2                   1           Don‘t Know 
20.  Field grade officers believe that Network Centric Warfare is a significant component of 
transformation 
   5                4                3                 2                   1            Don‘t Know 
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21.  Field grade officers believe that the Future Combat System is a significant transformation 
factor 
5                4                3                 2                   1            Don‘t Know 
22. Field grade officers believe that the U.S. Army transformation is a ―process‖ as opposed to 
an ―end-state‖ 
5                4                3                 2                   1            Don‘t Know  
 
Comments 
 
What the U.S. Army should consider for Transformation in the future 
23.  The U.S. Army will rely on technology to drive transformation goals and objectives 
   5                4                3                 2                   1           Don‘t Know 
24.   U.S. Army Transformation goals and objectives should be more clearly stated by senior 
Army leadership. 
5                4                3                 2                   1           Don‘t Know 
25.  U.S. Army leadership must change the culture within the Army in order to achieve 
transformation. 
   5                4                3                 2                   1           Don‘t Know 
 
Comments 
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OPEN-ENDED INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
 
Informed Consent 
 
Title: Army Transformation: What does it mean? 
Researcher(s): Administrator(s): 
David H. Jerome, Graduate Student, Public Policy Ph.D. Program  
Researchers:                Compliance Contact Person: 
David H. Jerome, Graduate Student                 Ro Windwalker, Compliance Coordinator 
William D. Schreckhise, Ph.D., Faculty Advisor   Research & Sponsored Programs 
University of Arkansas     Research Compliance 
College of Arts and Sciences    University of Arkansas 
Public Policy Ph.D. Program    120 Ozark Hall 
428 Old Main      Fayetteville, AR 72701-1201 
Fayetteville, AR 72701     479-575-2208 
479-575-3356      irb@uark.edu 
djerome@uark.edu 
 
Description: The present study will investigate the meaning of ―Army Transformation‖ as 
defined by senior U.S. Army leaders and U.S. Army lieutenant colonels and majors. You will be 
asked to participate in an open-interview. 
 
Risks and Benefits: The benefits include contributing to the knowledge base pertaining to the 
meaning of the term ―Army Transformation‖. By engaging in the interview you should continue 
to consider the meaning of ―Army Transformation‖, perhaps throughout your career, and its 
importance to senior level planners and decision-makers. There are no anticipated risks to 
participating in the study. 
 
Voluntary Participation: Your participation in the research is completely voluntary.  
 
Confidentiality: You will be assigned a code number that will be used to match the responses to 
the interview questions. Only the researcher will know your name, but will not divulge it or 
identify your answers to anyone. All information will be kept confidential to the extent allowed 
by law and University policy. Results from the research will be reported as aggregate data. 
 
Right to Withdraw: You are free to refuse to participate in the research and to withdraw from this 
study at any time. Your decision to withdraw will bring no negative consequences — no penalty 
to you. 
 
Informed Consent: I, _____________________________________________, have read the             
                                                                                 (print your name) 
description including the purpose of the study, the procedures to be used, the potential risks and 
side effects, the confidentiality, as well as the option to withdraw from the study at any time. 
Each of these items has been explained to me by the investigator. The investigator has answered 
all of my questions regarding the study, and I believe I understand what is involved. My 
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signature below indicates that I freely agree to participate in this experimental study and that I 
have received a copy of this agreement from the investigator. 
 
 
________________________________________________  
Signature/Date 
 
Open-Ended Interview Questions 
U.S. Army Command & General Staff College 
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 
Demographic Information 
1.  What is your rank? 
2.  How many years have you served in the Army? 
3.  Are you a student of staff member at CGSC? 
4.  Male/Female  
Core Questions 
5.  Has the Army experienced any organizational change since 1999? 
 
6. If yes, has that change been significant or incremental since 1999? 
 
7. If no, has there been a need for the Army to make any changes since 1999? 
 
8.  In your opinion, who is responsible for expressing what organizational change is needed for 
the U.S. Army? 
 
9. Has a vision for change in the U.S. Army been expressed? 
 
10.  If yes, would you consider that expressed vision for change as incremental or significant? 
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11. If no, is it important to have an expressed vision for change? 
 
12.  What role does technology play in U.S. Army organizational change, if any? 
 
13. What role does force structure play in U.S. Army organizational change, if any? 
 
14. What role does the Defense Budget play in U.S. Army organizational change, if any? 
 
15. Do field grade officers and senior leaders view change in the same way? 
 
16. What does ―Army Transformation‖ mean to you? 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUSION 
 The chiefs of staff of the Army and field grade officers define transformation differently.  
This difference may be as a result of many factors that can exist within a large bureaucracy such 
as in the case of the U.S. Army. The findings in this research indicate that not only do field grade 
officers view transformation differently than the Army chiefs of staff, they also view 
transformation differently among themselves as a group. If there is not a clear and consistent 
understanding of what transformation means either to or among field grade officers, then they 
will have a critical if not negative view of transformation until they can develop a better 
understanding of its effects. Because the chiefs of staff appear to emphasize technological 
innovation, field grade officers are more inclined to view any such innovation as the driver for 
transformation. The Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) and the Future Combat System (FCS) 
program were both referred to by the chiefs of staff as the centerpiece of transformation. The 
findings in this research may be of use to senior Army leadership as they compare their vision 
for the future of the Army with the understanding that field grade officers currently have of that 
vision.  Before an attempt is made to apply the findings of this research to areas with broader 
public policy implications, it is important to first summarize the five hypotheses statements that 
were validated in the previous chapter. 
 
A Summary of the Five Hypotheses Statements 
 In Chapter 6 empirical proof was provided that affirmed each of the five hypotheses 
statements. There is a gap that does exist in how senior Army leaders define transformation and 
how field grade officers define that same term. To degree that the gap exists there will be some 
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level of goal failure in achieving whatever transformation initiatives the Army chiefs of staff 
have in mind.  The five hypotheses statements are: H1: Field grade officers will view the Army‘s 
transformation as being significant; H2: Field grade officers will define transformation 
differently from one another; H3: Field grade officers will define transformation differently than 
the chiefs of staff; H4: Field grade officers believe that Army transformation is determined 
primarily by technological innovation; and, H5: Field grade officers will view Army 
transformation efforts critically. Each of these five statements will be summarized here. 
 The Army is a large bureaucratic organization and its members have different opinions 
about what transformation means to them. While the survey respondents in Chapter 6 largely 
acknowledged that significant change has occurred within the Army, it is significant largely 
because the effects are unclear to them, and that any transformation may depart from established 
standard operating procedures for which they have grown accustomed. The first hypothesis 
statement addresses this point: 
 
H1: Field grade officers will view the Army‘s transformation as being significant. 
 
 Many field grade officers have been deployed in combat operations over the last decade, while 
others have served in other capacities where they may have formed a somewhat different view 
on how the Army is transforming itself. Independent of programs like FCS, officers still have 
different views of what is intended by transformation based on their individual experiences and 
views of the world. Changes in force structure, doctrine, training, the institutional army, and 
operations were all factors that field grade officers considered, in varying degrees, in 
determining what transformation means to them.  If there is no consensus on what transformation 
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means among field grade officers, then it is even less likely that field grade officers will define 
the term in the same way as the Army chief of staff. 
 Army chiefs of staff come and go, with each four-star general appointed to that position 
serving approximately four years. During any one chief of staff‘s term there is a very limited 
amount of time to both address the day-to-day operational needs of the Army and to pursue any 
vision that they may have for the future. At the four-star level there may be a different 
perspective of what significant change means as opposed to how field grade officers may view 
that same term. This leads to the second and third hypotheses which state: 
 
H2: Field grade officers will define transformation differently from one another. 
 
H3: Field grade officers will define transformation differently than the chiefs of   staff.  
 
 Field grade officers may view transformation as being any change that provides a 
capability that was not available. Such change may only represent a fragment of what the chiefs 
of staff are trying to achieve in transforming the Army on a much larger scale. Additionally, 
Army chiefs of staff may have a different take on what transformation means at their level. Some 
chiefs of staff may view transformation as being revolutionary with a defined end-state, while 
others may view transformation as being more of a process that continues. If there is not a clear 
definition of what any one chief of staff means by transformation, or transformation is re-defined 
by different chiefs of staff, it is very likely that field grade officers will have a different 
definition of that term. If there is a different definition between these two levels, then field grade 
officers will most likely view transformative initiatives critically, if not negatively.. 
 Field grade officers may prefer a more incremental or evolutionary approach to 
transformation where fewer and less dramatic changes are pursued over time and in a more 
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understandable manner. Revolutionary or sudden significant change will create a more critical or 
negative view in that field grade officers will not understand the purpose of such change in the 
context of current operations. Field grade officers may also not understand the implications of 
transformative change in terms of what it may mean to them personally. If transforming the 
operational Army to BCT‘s reduces promotional opportunities for field grade officers, then there 
most likely will be a critical view of what transformation is trying to accomplish. If the only 
perceived evidence of transformation is technological innovation, then field grade officers will 
most likely view technology as the primary driver in achieving transformation. 
 In Chapter 6, the survey respondents stated they believe that technology is a 
transformation driver. The Brigade Combat Team‘s (BCTs), arguably the operational unit that 
the Army hopes to transform into, is heavily dependent of technological innovation in order for 
the Army to become lighter, more mobile, more deployable, more lethal and more sustainable. 
This perception of the importance of technology is the basis of the fourth hypothesis: 
 
H4: Field grade officers believe that Army transformation is determined primarily by 
technological innovation 
 
 
While field grade officers tend to agree that technology is a transformation driver, they also 
believe that transformation should be driven by other factors besides technology. It must be hard 
for field grade officers to ignore the emphasis the chiefs of staffs have made in areas such as the 
FCS program, modularity initiatives, and information systems. Field grade officers also believe 
that training, logistics, doctrine, and the institutional Army need to change as well; not just 
technology. If technology is preferred by senior level leaders, then the viewpoints that field grade 
officers may have concerning transformation may not be taken into consideration. 
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 It is not uncommon for field grade officers to spend their careers developing skills based 
on certain weapon systems, based on training that they receive and based on their understanding 
of doctrine in an operational or combat environment. When significant changes in these areas are 
made and field grade officers are not able to visualize how these changes are situated into what 
they know to be true, then field grade officers will hold a critical perception of transformation. 
According to the survey respondents, field grade officers believe that they have limited 
opportunity to shape transformation goals and objectives.  This viewpoint is provided for in the 
fifth and final hypothesis statement: 
 
H5: Field grade officers will view Army transformation efforts critically. 
 
Not only do field grade officers believe they have little opportunity to provide input into 
determining transformation, but they also believe that they have little discretionary authority in 
implementing transformation programs. If field grade officers lack the opportunity to provide 
input, and little authority to determine how to implement the output, then they may consider 
themselves as only actors in the transformation process itself whereby they play only minor 
roles. If there is little communication occurring up and down the chain of command, then there 
will most likely be different views of what transformation means to all field grade officers. There 
is a gap in what transformation means to senior Army leadership and field grade officers. In 
order to respond to an ever-changing world that is different from that of the Cold War era, an era 
that is most familiar to senior level leaders, then the gap of what transformation means to these 
two groups needs to be narrower in order for the Army to more efficiently meet future national 
security requirements. 
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The Broader Implications of Army Transformation 
 The Army may have to modify its vision for transformation if other agencies and 
departments within the federal government assume a greater role in national security planning 
and execution. For instance, should the State Department increase its diplomatic role then 
perhaps the Defense Department, including the Army, may need to adjust its current 
transformation plans. The United States Army is but one element of the U.S. National Security 
apparatus. If there is a disagreement within the Army on what transformation means, then there 
may be some concern moving forward regarding the difficulty this branch of military service 
may face in not only meeting its joint obligations in support of combatant commanders, but in 
participating in national security efforts that include more actors from throughout the U.S. 
federal government. Additionally, if changes are not well understood or accepted within the 
bureaucracy, as the Army seeks to support strategic national security interests and priorities, 
there may be some limitation in its ability to engage effectively in interagency collaboration and 
coordination. Army leadership clearly understands the need to support the joint environment in 
theaters of operation such as Iraq and Afghanistan. However, supporting future joint operations 
that are not currently known may be difficult if the Army lacks consensus of what is needed for 
an environment which may be fundamentally different from that which the Army currently seeks 
to understand. 
 Relative to U.S. military involvement in both Iraq and Afghanistan, Max Boot (2006) 
argues that many have asked: ―why did the Department of Defense not invest in more linguists, 
more military police, more civil affairs specialists, and more soldiers in general, rather than in 
more high-tech weapons‖ (466)? The answer, Boot continues, is that senior military leaders 
believe that the future of warfare lays in high tech information systems, not in lowly 
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infantrymen. If technology appears to be the driver of transformation, this may come at the 
expense of the basic areas that Boot describes.  
 Boot makes a case in point by referring to the U.S. Army of the 1950s, where there was 
an emphasis to rearrange around the demands of the nuclear battlefield which found the Army 
unprepared for the threat that would be faced in the Vietnam War in the 1960s (466). Boot 
(2006) argues that trade-offs need to be continually made between basic requirements and 
technology insertion; should the U.S pay for more traditional infantrymen, or push resources into 
―transformational‖ programs like surveillance satellites, wireless broadband networks, and 
directed energy weapons (467)?  
 History indicates, according to Boot, that the wisest course of action is to feel one‘s way 
along with careful study, radical experimentation and free-wheeling war-games; paradoxically, 
revolutionary transformation can often be achieved in evolutionary increments (467).  The first 
decade of the new millennia may have caught the U.S. Army focusing more on revolutionary 
change-centered on technology, and less focused on trying to strike the balance suggested by 
Max Root, above. This unbalanced focus may have been out of the control of the Army chiefs of 
staff. 
The following is intended to demonstrate that there is disagreement within the defense 
community on how transformation should occur. It may only serve to cause greater confusion as 
to what transformation means if there is disagreement at the very top levels in the Defense 
Department. By the time Donald Rumsfeld‘s tenure as Secretary of Defense had ended, 
according to Bacevich (2010), the term transformation had become a symbol of overweening 
arrogance that had characterized his entire tenure in office (166). Senior officers, including those 
within the Army, at least those wishing to remain in the defense secretary‘s good graces, 
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parroted the language of transformation (175). The very person that coined the term 
transformation for the Army in 1999, General Eric Shinseki, was one of those senior officers 
who fell out of favor with Secretary Rumsfeld, as a result of statements that he made about the 
need for significant troop levels in post-invasion Iraq (Bacevich 2010, 175).  It appears that 
General Shinseki understood the need for more ground troops given the circumstances of Iraq 
and Afghanistan, which went counter to Secretary Rumsfeld‘s preference for fewer troops and 
increases in technology.  
According to David Margolick (2007) all
25
 applauded when Rumsfeld was named to his 
post; some even initially favored his plans to streamline – or ―transform,‖ as he termed it, the 
military. But Margolick argues that most had soured on him before the public did, after they 
believe he had humiliated and marginalized four-star general Eric Shinseki, the well-respected 
army chief of staff, who had disputed Rumsfeld‘s lowball estimates of the troops required for 
any Iraq war (Margolick 2007). Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld preferred a technological 
approach in confronting Iraq with less emphasis on additional troops as had been proposed by 
some. To emphasize this point U.S. Army Lieutenant General Robert Wagner, Deputy 
Commander of the Joint Forces Command, stated that: 
―…we envision the future from an information age perspective where operations are 
conducted in a battle-space, not a battlefield. We are now able to create decision 
superiority that is enabled by networked systems, new sensors and command and control 
capabilities that are producing near real-time situational awareness. Our operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated the operational attributes that an adaptive joint 
force must possess in the modern battle-space‖ (Wagner 2004). 
 
 According to Bacevich (2010) this statement was made by Lieutenant General Wagner within a 
year after U.S. forces entered Iraq (176). Such a statement, by a U.S. Army lieutenant general, 
that advocated for technology over troops would have run counter to what the U.S. Army Chief 
                                                   
25
 The author is not clear on what ―all‖ represents. 
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of Staff was advocating for a year earlier. Not only was there disagreement between the Army 
chief of staff and Secretary of State, but there was disagreement at very senior levels within the 
Army regarding its priorities.    
General Shinseki left his post as chief of staff before a replacement was available. 
According to Robert Haddick (2011) Secretary Rumsfeld lured General Peter Schoomaker out of 
retirement to be the new chief of staff. General Schoomaker was charged with implementing 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld‘s vision of converting the Army from large divisions to 
smaller and more deployable brigades. Haddick points out that Rumsfeld preferred that the 
Pentagon‘s funding remain focused on research and equipment modernization rather than 
personnel accounts, where more soldiers could be made available for combat operations 
(Haddick 2011).  Some in the Defense Department may believe that pursuing high technology in 
deference to supporting basic capabilities is the priority in this particular era of transformation. 
Again, this may suggest that Max Boot‘s point regarding the need to maintain basic 
requirements, such as soldiers, may have been overlooked and may have been more appropriate. 
 Conversely, while there may have been mistakes made in trying to achieve 
transformation by focusing almost exclusively on technology over the last decade, Max Boot 
(2006) argues that focusing on technology in the future may not be a mistake if the U.S. finds 
itself in a clash with China or North Korea (466).  Bradley A. Thayer (2005) argues that due to 
the growth of Chinese power in the 21
st
 century there is no greater foreign policy issue for the 
American public. Thayer argues that there is a distinct possibility of a new Cold War with China, 
and so it is essential now for the United States to evaluate how it will respond to the growth of 
Chinese power (Thayer 2005). If the burden of addressing any foreign policy concerns relating to 
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China is left to the U.S. military, then the maximum benefit of the U.S. national security 
apparatus will not have been engaged. 
  Other agencies within the U.S. federal government have an important role to play in the 
area of national security. If China becomes a more realistic threat to U.S. national security, then 
the U.S. Army may have only just begun its efforts to transform its force by integrating 
technology into current and future weapon systems. The U.S. Army facing, in part, a scenario 
involving hostile sub-state actors for which it may not have fully anticipated, entered Iraq and 
Afghanistan in 2003 with a capability better suited for the likely heavy force-on-force scenario of 
the 20
th
 Century. The weaponry, technology and tactics of the Cold War may not have been 
appropriate for the demands of Iraq and Afghanistan, but if the United States is ever threatened 
by China those Cold War capabilities, along with new technology, may be essential in such a 
scenario where there is a nation-state level engagement. Boot (2006) argues that there is no rule 
of thumb to suggest how much or how little a military should change in response to 
technological developments (467). However, as Boot stated earlier, it may be wise to ―feel one‘s 
way‖ by engaging in radical experimentation and free-wheeling war-games‖ and then perhaps 
incrementally over time a radical transformation will have occurred (Boot 2006). Perhaps 
transformation is more than just the Army‘s problem, or for that matter the Department of 
Defense‘s problem to deal with; maybe it is a problem because the national security apparatus of 
the United States needs to be fixed. 
 There may be too much demand being placed on the Army, along with the other military 
services within the Defense Department, when it comes to addressing foreign policy issues. New 
demands that have been placed on the Army by civilian leadership, since the end of the Cold 
War, for which the Army may be ill-suited in preparing for may contribute to the problem of 
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defining transformation. Admiral Mike Mullen (2010), former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (2007-2011), argues that 
 ―…military power should not - and maybe cannot - be the last resort of the state. The 
tangible effects of military engagement may give policymakers a level of comfort not 
necessarily or wholly justified; as we have seen, the international environment is more 
fluid and more complex than ever before. We cannot count on military might alone, we 
have to invest in our homeland security, we have to improve and better coordinate our 
intelligence and we will have to use diplomacy. U.S. foreign policy is still too dominated 
by the military, too dependent on generals and admirals who lead our major overseas 
commands. It is one thing to be able and willing to serve as emergency responders; quite 
another to always have to be the fire chief‖ (Mullen 2010). 
 
Perhaps diplomacy, international relations and national security planning should include more 
from the U.S. government than just what is available from the Defense Department.  
 Admiral Mullen continues by pointing out that he agrees with Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in that there needs to be more funding and more 
emphasis on soft power.
26
 Mullen argues that ―should we choose to exert American influence 
solely through our troops, we should expect to see that influence diminish in time; in fact, I 
would argue that in the future struggles of the asymmetric counterinsurgent variety, we ought to 
make it a precondition of committing our troops, that we will do so only if and when the other 
instruments of national power are ready to engage as well‖ (Mullen 2010).  By increasing the 
presence of civilian agencies in national security activities (i.e., removing functions that the 
Defense Department currently performs then transferring it to a more appropriate department or 
agency) there is a risk that effective coordination and collaboration will take some time to 
achieve, especially in the heat of any given moment when engaged in pre-conflict, conflict or 
post-conflict operations.  
                                                   
26
 According to Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (2004) ―soft power‖ rests on the ability to shape the 
preferences of others, or getting others to want the outcomes that you want, it co-ops people 
rather than coerces them. Soft power uses a different type of currency (i.e., without force or 
money) to engender cooperation-an attraction to shared values and the justness and duty of 
contributing to the achievement of those values. 
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 Richard K. Betts (2000) argues that civilian strategists may take a nonpartisan approach 
to integrating service priorities for a combined strategy, but very few know enough about 
operations and logistics to be as informed about the underpinnings of strategy as military 
professionals. Betts continues by arguing that when civilians override service objections they 
risk promoting strategies that proved tactically insupportable. Betts argues that national strategy 
remains hobbled by organizational parochialism, inflexibility, and incremental change; leaders 
can disturb organization behavior but can rarely control it (Betts 2000). If others are to join the 
Defense Department in sharing the burden of national security planning an execution, then it 
may be wise to start training and planning together now.  
 Both Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Admiral Mike Mullen have argued, 
according to Lubold (2010), that there needs to be a more balanced resourcing of foreign policy 
and that this argument has caused some policymakers and lawmakers to begin rethinking the 
status quo. But it could take years before Congress really gets the message. If generals and 
admirals are the defacto leaders of U.S. foreign policy, then their solutions for addressing foreign 
policy matters will most likely be centered on a military solution; that is what they know. 
Transformation may be continuous within the services, namely the Army, in that senior military 
leaders are continually learning that their role in U.S. foreign policy is both growing and 
changing. The communicating to Congress of the Army‘s perceived role will be the focus of the 
next section.   
 
 National Security Documents Need to be Specific 
 The U.S. Army is first and foremost a military force that has been used to fight wars and 
to protect U.S. national interests. Generals have advanced through the ranks, to fight and win 
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wars as a part of achieving overall U.S. foreign policy objectives. These senior Army or military 
leaders did not rise up through the ranks to be the foreign policy principals on behalf of the 
United States. If the military has been placed in the leading role in matters of foreign policy, then 
that designation may be ill-placed. Senior Army leaders are not professional diplomats or 
international economists; they are leaders of soldiers. If generals are required to focus in areas 
that are best left to the leadership of more appropriate civilian agencies and departments, then 
solutions to foreign policy concerns may not be desirable.  
 For instance, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. argues that ―for the all the fashionable predictions of 
China, India and Brazil surpassing the United States in the next decades, the greater threat may 
come from modern barbarians and non-state actors‖ (Nye 2010). The military is but one 
component of U.S. foreign policy. Perhaps the military needs to focus on what it does best, 
providing a military force that supports the overall foreign policy objectives. 
  J. Brian Atwood, M. Peter McPherson and Andrew Natsios (2008) argue that the 
Defense Department‘s massive staff has assumed roles that should be performed by the State 
Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Pentagon‘s 
$600 billion budget has eclipsed those of civilian agencies. Hillary Rodham Clinton (2010) 
argues that diplomacy and developments (arguably foreign affairs areas of expertise that are 
better accomplished with civilian departments and agencies in the lead) can only be 
accomplished if the U.S. moves beyond agency ―stove-piping‖ and uses all talent and expertise 
within the federal government (Clinton 2010). Clinton continues by arguing that the U.S. cannot 
succeed if agencies are not working together; the internal branches of the U.S. Government need 
to focus on integration, cohesion and problem solving (Clinton 2010). If transformation is 
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difficult to achieve within the Army, then it may be even more difficult to change the manner in 
which the U.S. engages in national security planning across the federal government. 
 James Carafano (2007) argues that the military‘s job is to fight and win the nation‘s wars. 
He continues by arguing that the U.S. has relearned a lesson in Iraq that we have re-learned a 
thousand times; winning the peace is a part of fighting and winning the war, but unless the U.S. 
builds institutions, doctrine, organizations, traditions and practices throughout the federal 
government, it  will re-learn the lesson again the next time (Carafano 2007). By increasing the 
role of other agencies in areas of foreign policy, and taking the load off of the Defense 
Department, then perhaps senior Army leaders will be able to focus more on transformation or 
organizational change within their department. Problems in achieving Army transformation 
should not rest on the shoulders of one or two actors, such as a Secretary of the Army or an 
Army chief of staff. Transformation of a large bureaucracy involves many more actors 
throughout government. Recent national strategy documents suggest that there may still be a 
focus on the military to drive national security initiatives. 
 In the 2006 National Security Strategy, President George W. Bush indicated that the 
major institutions of American national security were designed in a different era to meet different 
challenges; now they must be transformed.  While the president makes reference to 
transformative initiatives at the Department of Homeland Security and the Intelligence 
Community, there is clearly a focus that the Defense Department is pursuing a Future Force and 
that the department is transforming itself to better balance its capabilities across four categories. 
Those four categories are 1. Traditional: challenges posed by states employing conventional 
armies, navies, and air forces in well-established forms of military competition. 2. Irregular: 
Challenges from state and non-state actors employing methods such as terrorism and insurgency 
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to counter our traditional military advantages. 3. Catastrophic. Challenges involving the 
acquisition, possession, and use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) by state and non-state 
actors; and deadly pandemics and other natural disasters that produce WMD-like effects. 4. 
Disruptive: Challenges from state and non-state actors who employ technologies and capabilities 
in new ways to counter military advantages the U.S. currently employs. President Bush stated 
that there needs to be improved capability to plan for and respond to post-conflict and failed-
state situations. He mentions that there is an Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization that will 
integrate all relevant U.S. government resources and assets in conducting reconstruction and 
stabilization operations. Finally, President Bush expressed the need to improve the capacity of 
agencies to plan, prepare, coordinate, integrate, and execute responses covering a full range of 
crisis contingencies and long-term challenges. Specifically, the president mentioned that the U.S. 
needs to strengthen the capacity of departments and agencies to do comprehensive, results-
oriented planning, and that agencies that have traditionally played only a domestic role 
increasingly have a role to play in our foreign and security policies.  
 He concludes that this requires us to better integrate interagency activity both at home 
and abroad (Bush 2006). The National Security Strategy of 2006 made no provisions for how 
these initiatives would be achieved, or at what point the Defense Department would cede certain 
functions that are better suited for another agency or department. A national security planning 
document could be instrumental by increasing the level of specificity that is needed to better 
integrate agencies and departments for purposes of national security planning and 
implementation.   
 A national security planning document may be useful for purposes of realigning the roles 
and responsibilities of agencies and departments in meeting national security and foreign policy 
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objectives. In the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Department of Defense 
recommended that a National Security Planning Guidance be made statutory in order to better 
direct the development of both military and non-military plans and institutional capabilities. The 
Defense Department argues that this planning document would set priorities and clarify national 
security roles and responsibilities that would reduce capability gaps and eliminate redundancies 
between departments and agencies. The planning document will help federal departments and 
agencies align their strategy, as well as develop budget and planning functions with national 
objectives (QDR 2006).  Such a planning document would assist in better supporting the 
president‘s national security strategy and the nation‘s policy goals (QDR 2006).  Self-admittedly, 
the Defense Department states that it is still profoundly influenced by the Cold War in the way it 
is organized and executes its missions (QDR 2006). Evolving threats of the 21
st
 Century may not 
be suited for a Cold War approach. 
In November 2008, the Project on National Security Reform, headed by James R. Locher 
III, issued its report to the President of the United States entitled Forging a New Shield. The 
project‘s focus was on improving the national security planning process. As recommended by the 
QDR in 2006, this project also recommended that a National Security Planning Guidance be 
issued annually by the president to all national security departments and agencies (Locher et al. 
2008). Specifically, the Project on National Security Reform recommended the following: 
1. We recommend instituting a National Security Review to be performed at the 
beginning of each presidential term, as directed by the new President‗s Security Council. 
The review should prioritize objectives, establish risk management criteria, specify roles 
and responsibilities for priority missions, assess required capabilities, and identify 
capability gaps.  
 
2. We recommend the preparation of the National Security Planning Guidance, to be 
issued annually by the president to all national security departments and agencies, in 
order to provide guidance to departments and agencies based on the results of the 
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National Security Review. The president should further direct that departmental and 
agency planning conforms to this guidance. 
 
3. We recommend that an executive secretary of the President‗s Security Council be 
empowered by statute, as detailed in the report, to support overall system management. 
The executive secretary would report to the director for national security. 
  
4. We recommend the creation of an official, reporting to the director for national 
security, to analyze interagency operations, including real-time assessments of overall 
system performance and system component performance. 
  
The recommendation for the president to issue an annual National Security Planning Guidance 
was not implemented during President George W. Bush‘s administration and has not been 
considered thus far in President Barrack Obama‘s administration.  Based on the statements made 
by both Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Admiral Mike Mullen, provided earlier, who 
both argue for a balanced resourcing of foreign policy planning, there appears to be little 
indication that such a planning guidance will be available any time soon.  
The Future and National Security 
 
 The Cold War has been technically over for more than two decades.  Since then, the 
United States has been involved in a variety of conflicts, peacekeeping operations, and post-
conflict activities since the end of the Cold War in November 1989. The U.S. is still very much 
engaged in conflict in both Afghanistan and Iraq. According to Aaron L. Friedberg (2005), the 
future character of the U.S. China relationship is also profoundly uncertain. Friedberg argues that 
most experts have opinions about this question, but few would claim to be sure about what lies 
ahead. He points out that the answers to this question are not only unknown, but they are 
unknowable. Friedberg argues that twenty years ago few people foresaw that the confrontation 
between the United States and the Soviet Union was about to undergo a radical transformation, 
and few still imagined that the latter would soon cease to exist. Friedberg argues that today‘s 
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observers are no better equipped than their counterparts were over 20 years ago (Friedberg 
2005). If the Defense Department has the lead in driving national security planning, then what 
evidence is there that suggests that Army generals, or other Defense Department flag officers 
(generals and admirals) as far as that goes, are the go-to experts for determining what seemingly 
no one else knows anything about? 
 The United States may have an opportunity to prepare for the future now by 
understanding that the Defense Department cannot bear the burden of national security planning 
and implementation.  Graham T. Allison (1969) argues that at any given time a government 
consists of existing organizations, each with a fixed set of standard operating procedures and 
programs. The behavior of these organizations and consequently of the government, Allison 
argues, relevant to any particular instance is, therefore, determined primarily by routines 
established in these organizations prior to that instance. Allison (1969) argues that organizations 
do change; that learning occurs gradually over time; and that dramatic organizational change 
occurs in response to major crises. Allison concludes that both learning and change are 
influenced by existing organizational capabilities (Allison 1969). Since budgets change 
incrementally, according to Allison, then the U.S. may want to consider changes sooner rather 
than later as it moves funding from defense to another department where a function is perhaps 
more appropriate. Now may be the time for the United States to clearly change the way in which 
national security planning takes place and is implemented. Although the Defense Department 
may have the largest budget as compared to other departments and agencies involved in national 
security, it clearly is not capable of performing duties that are more appropriate for other 
organizations.  
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 Army Transformation Continues, But What Is It? 
 This evidence provided in this dissertation suggests that Army transformation means one 
thing to senior Army leadership and something else to field grade officers. Each of the three 
Army chiefs of staff discussed in this research have provided a vision for what transformation 
means to them, but that vision of what transformation will ultimately look like is not clear to 
field grade officers. Indeed, there is a lack of consensus among field grade officers as to what 
transformation means, which may indicate that the meaning was not well expressed in the first 
place by senior Army leaders. How the term ―transformation‖ is interpreted may have a great 
deal to do with one‘s perspective based on social status within the Army. Senior leaders may 
understand what the term means to them, but lower ranking officers, because of their view of the 
world, may have a different take on what the term means to them.  But like the integration of 
new technology or attempts to change force structure for purposes of transforming the Army, 
leadership within the Army changes as well. Transformation appears to take on somewhat new 
meaning from one chief of staff to the next. If that is true, then there may be an opportunity for 
new definitions from senior Army leadership over the very short term.   
 General Martin E. Dempsey succeeded General George Casey, Jr. as Army Chief of Staff 
on April 11, 2011. In his initial address General Dempsey stated that ―today our Army is in 
transition. This is certainly not a new phenomenon for us. We are always in transition…we‘ll 
change. Change is inevitable, but we change, we‘ll change to contribute to the versatility and 
relevance of the nation‘s military instrument of power. We‘ll maintain a reputation as good 
stewards of America‘s resources. We‘ll remain connected to America. And we‘ll succeed in all 
that because we‘ll connect, engage, empower and hold our leaders accountable‖ (Dempsey 
2011). In his speech General Dempsey does not use the word ―transformation‖ but instead uses 
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the words ―change‖ and ―transition‖. It is not clear that General Dempsey is acknowledging any 
transformation that the Army may have achieved over the last decade when he states that ―we‘ll 
change to contribute to the versatility and relevance of the nation‘s instrument of power‖. On 
Monday, May 30, 2011, President Obama nominated General Dempsey to replace Admiral Mike 
Mullen, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who retired on October 1, 2011(Sandza 2011). 
General Dempsey‘s nomination was confirmed by the U.S. Senate and is now serving as the 18th 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Department of Defense 2011). Additionally, the President 
nominated General Ray Odierno to replace General Dempsey as the Army Chief of Staff (Sandza 
2011). General Odierno was also confirmed and he became the 38
th
 Chief of Staff of the Army 
on September 7, 2011 (U.S. Army 2011). By October 1, 2011 the Army had three chiefs of staff 
(General Casey, General Dempsey and General Odierno) in a period of just six months.  Change 
appears to be continuous in the Army, and that is certainly the case when it comes to the office of 
the Chief of Staff of the Army. 
 
Summary 
  
 The U.S. Army is at war. The U.S. Army is being asked by the national command 
authority to do more than just fight and win battles; it is being asked to be more involved before 
and after conflicts in ways that it never planned for during the Cold War. The Army has also 
come to the realization that counterinsurgency operations and information warfare are facts of 
life in the 21
st
 Century and that it needs to adapt to that reality.  It is possible that field grade 
officers knew of that reality before senior Army leadership was ready to admit. The reality of the 
future is that the U.S. does not know the future all that well. Perhaps the best course would be to 
not call anything transformation, but to change incrementally based on experiences, testing, 
training, and the involvement of other government agencies and departments being funded to 
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perform the duties and functions that they can perform best. Perhaps the best definition of 
transformation could include every government organization performing their national security 
responsibility without any one department or agency dominating because of the size of their 
budget, but instead are performing duties for which they are better suited. 
 In the meantime organizations within the Department of Defense, and senior Army 
leadership in particular, will define transformation in terms that they can best understand. The 
U.S. Army can and does win wars, but can it be expected to win the peace as well? The Army 
may be better suited to stay in its lane for purposes of national security planning. Other functions 
may be best left up to another agency. If the nontraditional tasks that the Army is being asked to 
perform are placed in their rightful agency or department, then senior Army leadership may be 
able to concentrate on what the Army needs to do in support of the overall national strategy, and 
thereby be in a better position to describe in clearer terms what transformation means. 
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